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ABSTRACT
DETECTION RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN ADVERSARIAL PROBLEMS
Halil Bayrak, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
We consider the problem of optimally allocating static and dynamic detection resources in
order to detect or prevent evaders from reaching their destinations. The evaders may be
terrorists or smugglers attempting to enter a facility or illegally cross a border. Examples of
static detection resources include sensors that detect people and weapons, cameras and check
points. In addition, examples of dynamic detection resources include guards at the borders
and unmanned aerial vehicles. It is crucial to use these resources efficiently to increase the
detection probabilities of evaders.
This study describes two different models built to allocate the available resources. In the
first model, we seek an optimal allocation scheme in which only static detection resources are
considered. Information asymmetry between the evader and the system designer is utilized
and several risk criteria are analyzed. In the second model, both static and dynamic detec-
tion resources are considered. We determine an allocation scheme for the static detection
resources and an inspection policy for the dynamic detection resources.
The models are built, solved and analyzed using integer programming, stochastic pro-
gramming and game theory techniques. Structural properties of the models are explored
and heuristic algorithms are developed to solve larger problem instances.
Keywords: Network interdiction, asymmetric information, perimeter inspection, inspection
game, homeland security.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Terrorist attacks are a concern that must be addressed for both public and private insti-
tutions. In assessing terrorist attacks, the goal is to discover the terrorist before an attack
occurs or install adequate security measures to deter an attack. One of the main approaches
in detecting the attacks is to place sensors that are capable of detecting weapons. There are
several types of sensors used to detect different weapons. Among these are sensors used to
identify metallic weapons, ceramic weapons, plastic explosives, organic materials, chemical
and biological agents. Some of these sensor types are discussed in [13, 15, 16, 32, 40, 43].
Sensors are also used widely in industry to secure buildings and plants, to detect people,
vehicles, voice and/or motion. Some of the industrial applications of sensors are discussed in
[23, 44]. Preventing smugglers’ entry into the country is another security issue that must be
addressed by public institutions. Similar sensors to the ones described above as well as other
detection resources such as check points, guards and unmanned aerial vehicles are employed
at the borders for this purpose.
The U.S. has allocated significant financial resources for the prevention and detection
of terrorism and for border security. The budget of the Department of Homeland Security
for fiscal year 2008 is $37.7 billion which includes approximately $10.2 billion for customs
and border protection, $5 billion for immigration and customs enforcement, $6.4 billion for
Transportation Security Administration, and $8.8 billion for the U.S. Coast Guard [1, 2].
The budget also proposes spending $178 million on improved radiological and screening
equipment at the borders, and $865 million on new technology to strengthen explosives
screening. Annual government expenses on sensors are estimated to be around $421 million
[13]. The market size for devices to screen people is estimated to have grown from $590
million in 2001 to $800 million in 2003, and is expected to grow to $1.85 billion in 2010 [8].
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To secure the borders, U.S. Customs and Border Protection plans to hire 3000 new border
patrol agents bringing the total number to 17819 and 151 new pilots, air crew and specialists
to control the border using air fleet; to invest $1 billion to build fences; and to invest $100
million to build new facilities such as checkpoints and remote forward operating bases [1].
Considering the quantity of financial resources invested in detection resources, it becomes
imperative to use them effectively. One way to achieve this goal is to improve the design
of allocation schemes for these resources. In designing an allocation scheme, the decision to
be made is which resources to use and where to place them in order to minimize the risk of
attack, or maximize the detection probability of the terrorist or the smuggler.
In order to analyze these allocation schemes we define two entities with conflicting objec-
tives. The first entity is the evader (referred to as he), which may be an terrorist attempting
to reach a destination or a smuggler attempting to smuggle materials through a border. The
second entity is a protector (referred to as she) who attempts to detect the terrorist before
they reach their destination or to prevent a smuggler from smuggling materials.
An evader must pass through regions to reach his destination. The path he follows
may be probabilistic or deterministic. The protector allocates her available resources to the
regions on the evader’s path. Each detection device has a chance of detecting the evader
if he passes through the corresponding region. The protector’s decision is to determine the
optimal allocation scheme based on her risk criteria, and the evader’s decision is to select a
path that minimize’s his detection probability.
The allocation of detection resources to the regions have mainly been studied in two cate-
gories: network interdiction models and inspection game models. In the network interdiction
models, first the protector allocates her available detection resources to the regions, then the
evader selects his path considering these detection resources. Note that, the detection re-
sources stay where they are located after the initial allocation, i.e., the detection resources
in the network interdiction models are static. In the inspection game models, the protector
devises an inspection policy which is comprised of deciding which regions and/or when to
inspect, while the evader selects a policy deciding where and/or when and/or how much
material to smuggle. Both parties make their decisions simultaneously without knowing the
other’s policy. Since the protector inspects different regions at different time periods, the
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detection resources are dynamic in the inspection game models. Namely, the network in-
terdiction models deal with the allocation of static detection resources, while the inspection
game models deal with the allocation of dynamic inspection resources.
We consider two different models to allocate the detection resources optimally. The first
model is a shortest path network interdiction model that determines the optimal allocation
of the static detection resources. In this model, we utilize information asymmetry between
the evader and the protector in terms of the detection capabilities of the detection resources.
In the model, protector’s objective is to maximize the detection probability of the evader,
while the evader’s objective is to minimize his detection probability. We also consider an
extension of this model in which the worst case detection probability should be greater than
a threshold value. The second model is a combination of a network interdiction model and
an inspection game model. In this model, first the protector allocates her available static
detection resources to the regions, then the protector and the evader play an inspection
game. In the inspection game part of the model, the protector determines which region to
inspect at each period using his dynamic detection resources, and the evader determines
how much material he should smuggle through each region. To objective of the protector is
to minimize the amount of the materials smuggled using her static and dynamic detection
resources, while the objective of the evader is to smuggle as much material as possible.
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1.1 Network Interdiction Models
Network interdiction models consist of two entities with conflicting objectives. The evader
operates in a network in order to optimize his objective function (maximize flow, minimize
the length of the shortest path, etc.), and the protector attempts to negatively impact
the evader’s objective function by interdicting some of the arcs using limited interdiction
resources. Two main categories of network interdiction models are shortest path network
interdiction models and maximum flow network interdiction models.
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Network interdiction has attracted some interest in literature. One of the earliest works
in maximum flow network interdiction is by Wollmer [52] in which he studied the effects of
removing arcs from a network. The objective of the problem is to find k arcs which cause
greatest decrease in the maximum flow from the source to the sink if they are removed
from the network. The author proposed a finitely terminating algorithm that solves the
problem optimally. However, the algorithm is only valid for planar networks. McMasters
and Mustin [39] extended this study to allow partial decreases in the capacities of the arcs.
The capacities of the arcs are decreased linearly with the amount of resource used, and there
is a limited amount of resource to be used for interdicting the arcs. The network has to be
planar in this case, too. They solved the problem using a finitely terminating algorithm based
on the minimum cut problem. Wood [53] studied the maximum flow network interdiction
problem for general networks. In this problem, interdiction of an arc removes the arc from
the network. He formulated the problem as an integer program and solved using standard
integer programming techniques. He showed that this problem is NP-complete. He also
extended the problem to allow partial arc interdictions, multiple source and sink nodes,
undirected arcs, multiple interdiction resources, and multiple commodities. In addition, he
proposed valid inequalities that give stronger formulations for the problem.
Cormican et al. [21] studied stochastic extensions of maximum flow network interdiction
problem. In the problem, the interdiction successes are binary, i.e., if an interdiction is
successful, then the capacity of the related arc is decreased by a fixed amount. In this case,
the problem is a two stage stochastic integer program. They solved the problem by using
sequential approximation algorithms, and stochastic programming techniques. The authors
made some extensions to the problem to allow binary arc capacities, uncertain arc capacities
that can take on a finite number of nonnegative values, and multiple uncertain interdictions
on an arc.
One of the earliest works about the shortest path network interdiction is by Fulkerson
and Harding [27]. In the problem they studied, the lengths of the arcs are increased linearly
with the amount of resource used. The objective is to maximize the shortest path between
two nodes by interdicting the arcs using a limited amount of resources. The authors showed
that this problem is equivalent to a minimum cost flow problem. Israeli and Wood [34]
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studied the same problem with binary interdiction effort. They formulated this problem as an
integer program and solved using branch-and-bound techniques. They also employed Benders
decomposition algorithm, developed super-valid inequalities which improve the efficiency of
Benders decomposition, and presented a covering decomposition particularly useful for the
problems in which interdictions destroy arcs. Bayrak and Bailey [12] extended this problem
to investigate the case where there is information asymmetry between the protector and the
evader in terms of the arc length perceptions. They formulated this problem as a non-linear
mixed integer program, provided a mixed integer program reformulation, and solved using
standard branch-and-bound techniques. They also provided an algorithm to accelerate the
solution speed. Held et al. [31] considered the shortest path network interdiction problem
with binary interdiction effort for the case where arc lengths are stochastic and with the
objective of maximizing the probability of sufficient disruption. They solved the problem
using a decomposition algorithm. This model is appropriate especially for the networks
for which a failure may be catastrophic. Pan et al. [42] considered a network interdiction
problem in which the evader attempts to avoid detection while the protector attempts to
maximize the detection probability. This problem is equivalent to that of Israeli and Wood
[34], but they extended it by allowing unknown origin/destination pairs.
Network interdiction problems also have been analyzed in the context of game theory.
Washburn and Wood [50] studied a long term interdiction problem using game theory. A
single evader attempts to traverse a path between two nodes, and a single protector attempts
to detect the evader by setting up an inspection point on one of the arcs. There is a fixed
probability of being detected on each arc known to both the evader and the protector.
The evader’s objective is to find a probabilistic path selection strategy that minimizes the
probability of being detected, and protector’s objective is to find a probabilistic arc inspection
strategy that maximizes the detection probability. The authors showed that such strategies
can be found in polynomial time by solving a min-cut problem. They also solved the problem
with unknown origins and destinations, multiple protectors or evaders, undirected arcs, and
node interdictions. Bailey et al. [7] presented a more general form of stochastic network
interdiction in which the protector interdicts the state-action rewards in an adversary’s
stochastic dynamic programming network.
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1.1.2 Inspection Game Models
Inspection games typically involve a violator (or a set of violators) attempting to gain benefit
by violating laws (e.g., environmental disposal restrictions), and an inspector (or set of
inspectors) attempting to prevent or minimize violations by conducting inspections. The
inspector decides when and/or which regions to inspect, while the violator decides on the
amount, type, location, and time of the violations. Thomas and Nisgav [47], Baston and
Bostock [11], and Garnaev [29] investigated the problem of a patrol attempting to stop a
smuggler who is attempting to ship a cargo of contraband across a border. Thomas and
Nisgav [47] studied the case where the inspector has a speedboat with which he can patrol
during k of n nights. The inspector determines which dates to patrol, and the smuggler
decides which date to ship. Baston and Bostock [11] studied the case where the inspector
has two boats which can patrol k1 and k2 of n nights respectively. Garnaev [29] extended
these studies to allow the inspector to have three boats, and determined optimal policies.
Garnaev et al. [28] considered an inspection game in which an evader attempts to go from
an origin node to a destination node on a graph of n arcs within a time limit without being
caught, whereas an inspector attempts to catch the evader making a restricted number of
inspections. They described optimal strategies and provided the value of this discrete zero-
sum inspection game. Ferguson and Melolidakis [24] considered an inspection game where
the smuggler can act more than once. In their model, a smuggler attempts to smuggle l units
in n days, whereas the inspector can inspect k of these days. They found optimal policies
explicitly for this problem using the results of previous studies.
Canty et al. [18] studied the inspection problem for a single location which stores large
numbers of identical items. They modeled this problem as a two-person, sequential game.
They parameterized the timely detection of illegal activity in terms of a critical time to
detection, and derived equilibria, which provide inspection policies. They also discussed the
necessary conditions for deterrence of illegal behavior. Filar [26] considered the problem of
dynamic inspection of a number of facilities in different locations. The inspector travels from
location to location and inspects the facilities he visits aiming to minimize the losses due
to undetected violations and traveling cost. Filar formulated this problem as a noncooper-
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ative, single-controller, stochastic game. He showed that violators can be aggregated into
a single violator under mild conditions, and Nash equilibrium exists for this problem. He
also discussed the issue of the inspector’s power to enforce such an equilibrium. Avenhaus
and Kilgour [6] considered an inspection game with two inspectees and imperfect inspections
in the sense that violations can be missed. They characterized the resource level adequate
for deterrence. They showed that when the detection probabilities are increasing in in-
spection resources, it is possible to describe optimal allocation policies for both special and
general cases. They also showed that when detection probabilities are convex inspection
efforts should be concentrated on one inspectee, whereas when they are concave it should be
spread deterministically over the inspectees. They proposed that a priori constraints on the
distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies.
Canty et al. [19] considered a critically time-dependent inspection problem which is
modeled as two-person non-cooperative game. In the problem, over a reference time interval
the inspector performs precisely k inspections and the inspectee behaves illegally at most
once. The inspections are assumed to incur both types of errors and first type error is known
both by the inspector and the inspectee. They also considered the variants of the problem in
which the inspectee may or may not be in a position to take advantage of information gained
during the reference time interval. They investigated equilibria and determined conditions
for the existence of deterring inspection strategies. Avenhaus and Canty [5] considered
a sequential two-person inspection game in which inspections are carried out for timely
detection of illegal activity on a finite, closed time interval and subject to first and second
kind errors. In the model, the utilities of the inspector and inspectee are assumed to be
linear in the detection time with time-independent false alarm costs. They obtained sets of
Nash equilibria in which the inspectee behaves illegally or legally with probabilities one.
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1.2 CONTRIBUTION
1.2.1 Network Interdiction with Asymmetric Information
In all of the previous network interdiction models, it was assumed that both the protector
and the evader have the same knowledge about the network. Both decision makers know
the arc lengths (or the probability distributions if the arc lengths are stochastic) before and
after the interdiction. This amounts to an interdiction scheme based on worst-case analysis.
In practice, the evader may not know the true arc lengths, and instead has estimates of
them. He will select his optimal path based on these estimates which can lead to a path
other than the true optimal path. We exploit this asymmetry in information to better utilize
available resources. In the context of detection resource allocation problem, the arc lengths
correspond to the detection probabilities. Therefore, information asymmetry in terms of arc
lengths corresponds to information asymmetry in terms of detection probabilities. Namely,
the protector knows the detection capabilities of the resources used since she is the one
who installs them. However, the evader may not know the true detection capabilities of the
resources, instead he will use his estimates to evaluate his objective function. By utilizing this
incomplete information of the evader, the protector can increase the detection probability of
the evader. Also, by making sensitivity analysis of the results, the protector can decide how
much she should spend on intelligence about the estimates of the evader. Overall, this study
allows us to analyze the risks and benefits of modeling information asymmetry between the
protector and the evader.
This study is the first one to incorporate information asymmetry in the network interdic-
tion models. Network interdiction problems are often complex and difficult to model since
they include both the design and the execution phases. Including information asymmetry
makes the problem even more complicated. We were able to model the problem as a non-
linear mixed integer program, and converted it to a mixed integer program using linearization
techniques and exploiting some structural properties of the problem. We also developed an
algorithm that decreases the computation time to solve the problem.
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1.2.2 The Perimeter Inspection Game with Interdiction
Perimeter security problems have been analyzed using network interdiction models and in-
spection game models. Network interdiction models assist the protector in optimally allocat-
ing her static detection resources to the regions, whereas the inspection game models assist
the protector in optimally allocating her dynamic detection resources to the regions and to
develop inspection policies. For perimeter security problems, the protector will often have
both static and dynamic detection resources. Not taking some of the detection resources
into account while making allocation decisions would lead to suboptimal results. However,
until now no study has taken both dynamic and static detection resources into account at
the same time. This dissertation fills this gap between the network interdiction models and
inspection game models, and provide a more complete model for perimeter security problems
by taking both kinds of detection resources into account. This comprehensive model com-
prises the network design capability of the network interdiction models and dynamic nature
of the inspection game models.
We modeled the perimeter security problem with the allocation of static and dynamic
detection resources as non-linear mixed integer program by using the linear programming
formulation of competitive Markov decision processes, and converted this complex formu-
lation into a mixed integer program using linearization techniques. We investigated some
structural properties of the problem to simplify the formulation even further. We also pro-
vided explicit solutions for some simple cases and developed a heuristic algorithm to solve
the larger problem instances.
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the shortest path network interdiction problem with information
asymmetry. It analyzes the case where the evader does not know the true arc lengths, and
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uses his estimates of these arcs lengths, but the protector knows both the true arcs lengths
and the evader’s estimates of these arc lengths. The problem is defined, formulated and
solution techniques are developed. Finally, the benefits and risks of this model is illustrated
with computational examples.
Chapter 3 presents the perimeter inspection game with interdiction. This model is devel-
oped to help the protector to allocate her dynamic and static detection resources to minimize
the amount of the materials smuggled by the evader. The problem is formulated, its struc-
tural properties are investigated and a heuristic algorithm is developed to solve the problem
more efficiently, and finally computational examples are presented.
Chapter 4 extends the model developed in Chapter 2 by including a risk criterion in
the model. The criterion is that the risk arising due to modeling asymmetric information
should not be greater than a prespecified threshold value. This model is formulated and
computational examples are given to analyze the risk and benefits of this model. Finally, a
stochastic model is introduced in which there is a complete information asymmetry between
the protector and the evader.
Chapter 5 analyzes the results obtained from the models in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4, and derives conclusions based on these results. The chapter concludes with a
brief explanation of future research directions that are suggested by this dissertation.
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2.0 SHORTEST PATH NETWORK INTERDICTION WITH
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will discuss the allocation of the static detection resources to the regions
in order to maximize the detection probability of the evader. First, we will demonstrate the
equivalence between this problem and shortest path network interdiction problems. Then, we
will formulate the problem, develop solution methodologies and finally present computational
examples to illustrate the effectiveness of the model developed.
In the problem we consider, there is an evader who is attempting to reach from an origin
to a destination without being detected, and there is a protector who is trying to catch the
evader before he reaches his destination. First, the protector allocates her available detection
resources to the regions to increase the detection probability of the evader. Then, the evader
takes the path on which his detection probability is minimum to reach the destination. The
protector’s decision is to determine to which regions to allocate the detection resources, and
the evader’s decision is to select the path that minimizes his detection probability. At each
region the evader passes through, there is a chance that he will be caught. The probability
that he will be caught at that region depends on whether there is a detection resource there
or not. We represent the evader’s detection probability at region k with pk if there is no
detection resource at that region, and with p¯k if there is a detection resource at that region.
Also, let P represent the set of regions that the evader passes through.
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Finally, let xk be the binary variable indicating whether or not there is a detection
resource at region k. The probability that the evader will be detected can be calculated as
follows,
P(evader will be detected) = 1−
∏
k∈P
[(1− xk)(1− pk) + xk(1− p¯k)]. (2.1)
The protector wants to determine the values of xk’s that maximize the probability in (2.1),
while the evader wants to determine the set of regions P that minimizes the same probability.
The probability expression in (2.1) is highly non-linear since binary variables are multiplied.
However, this expression can be converted to a linear expression by taking the logarithm
of it. Since logarithm is a monotonic function, maximizing or minimizing an expression
is equivalent to maximizing or minimizing the logarithm of the same expression. For this
purpose we define ck and dk as follows,
ck = − log(1− pk),
dk = log(1− pk)− log(1− p¯k).
Using these new definitions, we can express the logarithm of the detection probability as
follows,
log P(evader will be detected) =
∑
k∈P
(ck + xkdk). (2.2)
The right-hand side of (2.2) is the length of the path the evader takes, with arc lengths
ck+xkdk. The length of the arc corresponding to region k is ck if there is no detection resource
at that region, and it is ck + dk if there is a detection resource there. Using the equivalence
between (2.1) and (2.2) we can restate the detection resource allocation problem as follows:
An evader attempts to go from an origin to a destination by taking the shortest path, while a
protector attempts to maximize the length of evader’s shortest path by interdicting a subset
of the arcs using his limited interdiction budget. This problem is known as the shortest path
network interdiction problem (e.g., [12, 30, 34]).
Network interdiction problems consist of two entities with conflicting objectives. The
evader operates in a network in order to optimize his objective function (maximize flow,
minimize the length of the shortest path, etc.), and the protector attempts to worsen the
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evader’s objective function by interdicting the arcs in order to increase the arc length, or
decrease the arc capacity using limited interdiction resources. In shortest path network
interdiction problems, an evader attempts to traverse the shortest path between the origin
and the destination, while an protector attempts to maximize the length of this shortest
path by interdicting network arcs using limited resources.
In this chapter, we consider an extension of the shortest path network interdiction prob-
lem, where there is information asymmetry between the protector and the evader about
the network. We consider the case where the information asymmetry is in the arc lengths.
Information asymmetry occurs frequently in network problems with more than one oper-
ator, since each operator has his/her own perception of the network and makes decisions
accordingly. From the detection resource allocation problem perspective, the information
asymmetry occurs in the detection capabilities of the resources. Typically, the protector
would know the detection capabilities of the detection resources since she is one who installs
them. However, the evader may not know the true detection probabilities of the detection
resources. In order to decide which path to take from the origin to the destination, he will use
his best available estimates of the detection probabilities. This will result in an information
asymmetry between the protector and the evader. The information asymmetry may lead the
evader to take a path that is suboptimal in terms of the overall detection probability. The
protector may utilize the fact that the evader does not have the perfect information about
the detection probabilities by changing his detection resource allocation scheme based on
the estimates of the evader. We will provide a model that helps the protector to achieve this
goal.
In previous interdiction models, it was assumed that both the protector and the evader
have the same knowledge about the network. Both decision makers know the arc lengths
(or the probability distributions if the arc lengths are stochastic) before and after the inter-
diction. This amounts to an interdiction scheme based on worst-case analysis. In practice,
the evader may not know the true arc lengths, and instead has estimates of them. He will
select his optimal path based on these estimates which can lead to a path other than the true
optimal path. We exploit this asymmetry in information to better utilize available resources.
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Figure 2.1: Asymmetric information networks
Assuming that the evader has the same information as the protector may lead to subop-
timal solutions. We illustrate this with the following example. Consider the two networks in
Figure 2.1, where network (a) is the true network and network (b) is the evader’s perceived
network. The numbers in brackets with each arc are the current length and the length if
interdicted. In this example the evader overestimates the current and interdicted lengths of
the arcs (1,2) and (2,4). Assume that as a result of budget constraints the protector can
interdict only one arc. In standard network interdiction it is assumed that the evader has
the same information as the protector. As a result, the optimal action is to interdict the arc
(1,2) or (2,4) assuming that the evader will select the shortest path 1-3-4 with a length of
six. After the interdiction, the evader will select this path based on his estimates of the arc
lengths. However, if the protector utilized the estimates of the evader, then the optimal ac-
tion would be to interdict the arc (3,4). After the interdiction of the arc (3,4), the evader will
select the path 1-3-4. The length of the path will be eight in this case. As illustrated in the
example above, knowing that the evader does not have full information about the network,
the protector can increase the length of the path the evader traverses. As a result, including
the estimates of the evader in the model may increase the optimal objective function value
of the protector.
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Asymmetric information is standard in game theory and bilevel programming. See [22,
36, 37, 38, 46] for some of the recent work. However, it has not received much attention in
the network interdiction literature. The objective of this chapter is to introduce asymmetric
information in the network interdiction literature and investigate its benefits and risks. In
the problem we consider, we assume that the protector knows the evader’s estimates of the
arc lengths, and model the problem based on this assumption. However, if these estimates
are incorrect, the protector incurs a risk by not interdicting certain arcs. This issue will
be addressed in a later section. In our presentation, we follow a notation similar to Israeli
and Wood [34]. We will present the remainder of the chapter using the terminology of the
network interdiction problems rather than using the terminology of the detection resource
allocation problem to avoid any confusion. The remainder of this chapter is organized as
follows. In Section 2.2, we define and formulate the problem. In Section 2.3, we develop
methodologies to solve the problem. In Section 2.4, we present a computational study, and
provide concluding remarks in Section 2.5.
2.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.2.1 Problem Definition
Let G(N,A) be a directed graph composed of the node set N = {0, 1, . . . , n} and the arc
set A ⊆ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N}. We represent the nodes with indices i or j. Nodes 0 and n are
the origin and destination nodes of the evader. We represent the arcs with arc number k, or
the node pair (i, j). The length of arc k is ck, and it is increased to ck + dk when the arc is
interdicted. Let c¯k and d¯k be the evader’s estimates of ck and dk, respectively. We also define
bk as the amount of resource required to interdict arc k, and B is the amount of available
resource available for interdiction. We define xk as the variable representing whether or
not arc k is interdicted, and yk as the variable representing whether or not arc k is on the
path the evader traverses. As a result of the structure of the shortest path problem, yk is
continuous rather than binary. Bold letters represent the vector forms of the corresponding
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parameters/variables. Finally, let FS(i) be the forward star of node i (set of arcs going out
of node i), and let RS(i) be the reverse star of node i (set of arcs going into node i).
The problem is comprised of two phases. In the first phase, the protector interdicts a
subset of the arcs using the available resources. In the second phase, the evader attempts
to travel from node 0 to node n in the interdicted network. The evader’s objective is to
minimize the length of the path he traverses based on his estimates of the arc lengths {c¯, d¯}.
We assume he knows which arcs are interdicted. The protector’s objective is to maximize
the true length of the evader’s path. Therefore, she uses c and d to evaluate the length of
the evader’s path, and determines an interdiction plan based on both {c, d} and {c¯, d¯}.
2.2.2 Formulation
For a given interdiction plan xˆ, the evader will determine his shortest path by solving the
following problem:
[SP(xˆ)]: min
y
∑
k∈A
(c¯k + d¯kxˆk)yk, (2.3a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
yk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
yk =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(2.3b)
yk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
Note that in (2.3a) the perceived length of arc k is c¯k+ d¯kxˆk. Then the shortest path network
interdiction problem with asymmetric information can be formulated as the following bilevel
program:
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[SPNIA-BL]: max
x
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxk)y
∗
k, (2.4a)∑
k∈A
bkxk ≤ B, (2.4b)
xk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k ∈ A,
where,
y∗ = arg
{
min
y
∑
k∈A
(c¯k + d¯kxk)yk
}
, (2.5a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
yk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
yk =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(2.5b)
yk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
The above bilevel problem consists of an outer optimization problem (2.4a) and (2.4b) as-
sociated with the protector, and an inner optimization problem (2.5a) and (2.5b) associated
with the evader.
2.3 SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
Bilevel programming problems have been studied extensively in the literature. There are
several exact and approximate solution algorithms to solve bilevel problems, such as extreme
point algorithms [14, 17], branch and bound algorithms [9, 10, 41], descent methods [35, 49],
penalty function methods [3, 51], and reformulation [4]. For a detailed review of the solution
methods, see the papers by Vicente and Calamai [48] and Colson et al. [20]. We reformulate
[SPNIA-BL] as a mixed integer nonlinear program, and provide a conversion to a mixed
integer linear program. This allows us to solve the problem optimally, and handle problems
of reasonable sizes.
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2.3.1 MINLP Reformulation
Let ui be the dual variable corresponding to node i in (2.3b). Then the dual problem of
[SP(xˆ)] is:
[SPD(xˆ)]: max
u
u0 − un, (2.6a)
ui − uj ≤ c¯k + d¯kxˆk, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A. (2.6b)
In the above formulation, u0 − ui represents the length of the shortest path from node 0
to node i based on the arc lengths c¯k + d¯kxˆk. The protector evaluates the length of the path
found in [SP(xˆ)] using the arc lengths ck + dkxˆk, resulting in the following problem:
[SPNIA(xˆ)]: max
y,u
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxˆk)yk, (2.7a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
yk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
yk =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(2.7b)
ui − uj ≤ c¯k + d¯kxˆk, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A, (2.7c)
un − u0 +
∑
k∈A
(c¯k + d¯kxˆk)yk = 0, (2.7d)
yk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
Note that (2.7b) is the same as (2.5b), and (2.7c) is the same as (2.6b). Also, (2.7d) states
that the objective function values of [SP(xˆ)] and [SPD(xˆ)] should be equal. From duality
theory we know that these two values will be equal only when y is an optimal solution
for [SP(xˆ)], and u is an optimal solution for [SPD(xˆ)]. Therefore, any feasible solution for
[SPNIA(xˆ)] will be an optimal solution for [SP(xˆ)] and [SPD(xˆ)]. Note that the objective
function used in [SPNIA(xˆ)] does not affect this result. Since we want to evaluate the
shortest path found in [SP(xˆ)] using the arc lengths ck+ dkxˆk, we use the objective function
(2.7a). As a result, for a given interdiction plan xˆ, [SPNIA(xˆ)] will find the shortest path
from node 0 to node n using the arc lengths c¯k + d¯kxˆk, and evaluate it using the arc lengths
ck + dkxˆk.
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Finally, we release xˆ as a variable resulting in the formulation for our complete model of
shortest path network interdiction with asymmetric information:
[SPNIA]: max
x,y,u
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxk)yk, (2.8a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
yk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
yk =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(2.8b)
ui − uj − d¯kxk ≤ c¯k, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A, (2.8c)
un − u0 +
∑
k∈A
(c¯k + d¯kxk)yk = 0, (2.8d)
yk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A,
x ∈ X,
where X = {x ∈ {0, 1}|A| | bTx ≤ B} is the set of feasible interdiction plans.
Remark 1 For a given xˆ, in the optimal solution of [SP(xˆ)], y will only take binary values
even though it is not restricted as such. This fact may not always be valid for [SPNIA(xˆ)]
since constraint (2.7d) links variables y and u. The variables y can take non-integer values
only when there are multiple optimal paths from node 0 to node n that have the same
lengths when evaluated both with the arc lengths ck + dkxk and c¯k + d¯kxk. Even if this
occurs, [SPNIA(xˆ)] will still give the correct optimal objective function value, and hence
[SPNIA] will give the correct optimal x values. Subsequently, the corresponding integer y
values can be computed easily by solving a shortest path problem.
Remark 2 In the above formulation, if there are multiple shortest paths for the evader,
then we assume that he will take the one which is longer when evaluated with the arc lengths
ck + dkxk. This can be interpreted as the cooperation of the evader with the protector (or
the best case scenario) in case of multiple shortest paths. However, if he traverses another
path, then the length of his path will be shorter than expected which results in an incorrect
interdiction plan. We will also present another formulation for which this assumption is not
necessary.
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2.3.2 Linearization
[SPNIA] formulation is a MINLP which consists of quadratic terms in both the objective
function and the constraints. One approach to solve this problem is to linearize the quadratic
terms. For this purpose, we replace yk with two new variables vk and wk: vk can take positive
values if arc k is not interdicted, and wk can take positive values if arc k is interdicted. We
can now reformulate the problem as follows:
[SPNIA-L]: max
x,v,w,u
∑
k∈A
(ckvk + (ck + dk)wk), (2.9a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
(vk + wk)−
∑
k∈RS(i)
(vk + wk) =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(2.9b)
ui − uj − d¯kxk ≤ c¯k, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A, (2.9c)
un − u0 +
∑
k∈A
(c¯kvk + (c¯k + d¯k)wk) = 0, (2.9d)
vk + xk ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ A, (2.9e)
wk − xk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ A, (2.9f)
vk, wk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A,
x ∈ X.
The validity of [SPNIA-L] is proven by the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 Let (x∗,v∗,w∗,u∗) be an optimal solution for [SPNIA-L], and let z∗ be the
corresponding objective function value. Then (x∗,y∗,u∗) is also optimal in [SPNIA], and
the corresponding objective function value is z∗, where y∗k = max{v∗k, w∗k} for every arc.
Proof. Constraints (2.9e) and (2.9f) guarantee that at most one of vk and wk will be positive
for any k. When we set the other variable to 0, the positive one replaces yk in [SPNIA].
Therefore, for any given x, (2.9a),(2.9b), (2.9c) and (2.9d) are equivalent to (2.8a), (2.8b),
(2.8c) and (2.8d) respectively. Hence, [SPNIA] and [SPNIA-L] are equivalent, and the corre-
sponding optimal solutions are also equivalent. Also, y∗k = max{v∗k, w∗k}, since yk = vk when
wk = 0 (xk = 0), and yk = wk when vk = 0 (xk = 1). 2
20
Now, [SPNIA-L] is a linear MIP, and can be solved using any branch-and-bound algo-
rithm.
2.3.3 Alternative Formulation for Worst-case Scenario
As mentioned in Remark 2, in [SPNIA-L] if there are multiple shortest paths for the evader,
we assume that he will take the one which is longer when evaluated with the actual arc
lengths, which may be interpreted as the best case scenario. However, it is generally more
reasonable to assume the worst case scenario. For this purpose, another formulation for the
problem can be achieved by utilizing duality theory and penalty functions. We start with
the [SPNI(xˆ)] formulation. Let pi, α and γ be the dual variables corresponding to (2.7b),
(2.7c) and (2.7d), respectively. Then, the dual of [SPNI(xˆ)] is,
[SPNI-D1(xˆ)]: max
pi,α,γ
pi0 − pin +
∑
k∈A
αk(c¯k + xˆkd¯k),
∑
k∈FS(i)
αk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
αk =

γ , i = 0,
0 , i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
−γ , i = n,
pii − pij + (c¯k + xˆkd¯k)γ ≤ ck + xˆkdk, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A,
αk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
If we define θ = −γ and βk = αkγ , we can restate [SPNI-D1(xˆ)] as follows,
[SPNI-D2(xˆ)]: max
pi,β,θ
pi0 − pin − θ
∑
k∈A
βk(c¯k + xˆkd¯k),
∑
k∈FS(i)
βk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
βk =

1 , i = 0,
0 , i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
−1 , i = n,
pii − pij − (c¯k + xˆkd¯k)θ ≤ ck + xˆkdk, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A,
βk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
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Now, releasing xˆ as a variable, and fixing θ as a constant results in the following formu-
lation,
[SPNI-D2(θˆ)]: max
pi,β,x
pi0 − pin − θˆ
∑
k∈A
βk(c¯k + xkd¯k),
∑
k∈FS(i)
βk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
βk =

1 , i = 0,
0 , i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
−1 , i = n,
pii − pij − (θˆd¯k + dk)xk ≤ θˆc¯k + ck, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A,
βk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A,
x ∈ X.
Finally, we replace βk with two new variables vk and wk, and get the following formulation,
[SPNI-D(θˆ)]: max
x,v,w,pi
pi0 − pin − θˆ
∑
k∈A
(c¯kvk + (c¯k + d¯k)wk), (2.10a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
(vk + wk)−
∑
k∈RS(i)
(vk + wk) =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(2.10b)
pii − pij − (θˆd¯k + dk)xk ≤ θˆc¯k + ck, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A, (2.10c)
vk + xk ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ A, (2.10d)
wk − xk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ A, (2.10e)
vk, wk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A,
x ∈ X.
In the above formulation, constraint (2.10e) guarantees that vk replaces βk when xk = 0,
and similarly constraint (2.10d) guarantees that wk replaces βk when xk = 1.
The shortest path network interdiction problem with asymmetric information can be
solved optimally by solving [SPNI-D(θˆ)] once the optimal value of θˆ is known. We showed
that any value of θˆ that is greater than a threshold value is optimal for [SPNI-D(θˆ)]. To
prove this fact, we define σ to be the length of the longest path from node 0 to node n in
G(N,A) with the arc lengths ck+dk, and δ to be the least significant digit (e.g., 0.001) of the
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evader’s estimates of arc costs, the c¯k and d¯k. The validity of the [SPNI-D(θˆ)] formulation
is given in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2 For any θˆ > σ
δ
, [SPNI-D(θˆ)] solves the shortest path network interdiction
problem with asymmetric information. If there are multiple shortest paths for the evader,
the interdiction plan will be based on the evader’s path with the shortest actual path length.
Proof. For any given x, [SPNI-D(θˆ)] can be separated into two problems. Constraints
(2.10b), (2.10d) and (2.10e) along with the corresponding part of the objective function form
a shortest path problem from node 0 to node n on G(N,A) with the arc lengths θˆ(c¯k+ d¯kxk),
whereas constraint (2.10c) along with the corresponding part of the objective function form
a shortest path problem from node 0 to node n with the arc lengths θˆ(c¯k+ d¯kxk)+ ck+dkxk.
In the latter problem, let P1 and P2 be two distinct paths from node 0 to node n. Assume
that ∑
k∈P1
[θˆ(c¯k + d¯kxk) + ck + dkxk] ≤
∑
k∈P2
[θˆ(c¯k + d¯kxk) + ck + dkxk].
Then, ∑
k∈P1
θˆ(c¯k + d¯kxk)−
∑
k∈P2
θˆ(c¯k + d¯kxk) ≤
∑
k∈P2
(ck + dkxk)−
∑
k∈P1
(ck + dkxk) ≤ σ,
and ∑
k∈P1
(c¯k + d¯kxk)−
∑
k∈P2
(c¯k + d¯kxk) ≤ σ
θˆ
< δ,
by assumption. Therefore,∑
k∈P1
(c¯k + d¯kxk)−
∑
k∈P2
(c¯k + d¯kxk) ≤ 0,
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since δ is the least significant digit of the c¯k and d¯k. As a result, if P1 is a shortest path on
G(N,A) with the arc lengths θˆ(c¯k + d¯kxk) + ck + dkxk, then it must also be a shortest path
on G(N,A) with the arc lengths θˆ(c¯k + d¯kxk). Therefore, the shortest path will be found
based solely on the arc lengths θˆ(c¯k + d¯kxk), and if there is a tie, it will be broken in favor
of shortest actual path length. Therefore, in the optimal solution of [SPNI-D(θˆ)],
pi0 − pin −
∑
k∈A
θˆ(c¯kvk + (c¯k + d¯k)wk) =
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxk).
Hence, [SPNI-D(θˆ)] will find the shortest path based on the arc lengths c¯k + d¯kxk, and eval-
uate its length using the arcs lengths ck + dkxk. 2
2.3.4 Algorithm to Solve [SPNI-D(θˆ)]
We have presented two different formulations of the shortest path network interdiction prob-
lem, which handle the multiple shortest paths in different ways. [SPNIA-L] assumes evader
cooperation when there is a tie, whereas [SPNI-D(θˆ)] assumes the worst case scenario and
breaks the tie in favor of the actual shortest path. In this sense, it is more reasonable to
use [SPNI-D(θˆ)]. However, it may be computationally cumbersome to use [SPNI-D(θˆ)] if
the least significant digit of the arc length estimates is very small, which leads to a large θˆ
value. Our computational experiments show that solving [SPNI-D(θˆ)] requires significantly
more time than solving [SPNIA-L]. For example, for B = 5, it takes 5 to 250 times more
time (depending on the problem instance) to solve [SPNI-D(θˆ)]. On the other hand, these
two formulations almost always give the same solutions. Based on these observations, we
present the following algorithm in an attempt to solve [SPNI-D(θˆ)] more efficiently.
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Algorithm to solve [SPNI-D(θˆ)]
Step 1 Solve [SPNIA-L]. Let z∗ be the optimal objective function value, and let x∗ be the
optimal interdiction plan.
Step 2 Add
pi0 − pin −
∑
k∈A
θˆ(c¯kvk + (c¯k + d¯k)wk) ≤ z∗
to [SPNI-D(θˆ)], and solve this problem using x∗ as the starting solution.
In the algorithm, we use the fact that the objective function value of [SPNI-D(θˆ)] is
always less than or equal to the objective function value of [SPNIA-L]. If the evader does not
have multiple shortest paths, then these two values will be equal, and x∗ will be optimal for
[SPNI-D(θˆ)], too. Therefore, the solver will terminate the solution at the first iteration. If
the evader has multiple shortest paths, then x∗ may not be optimal. In this case, z∗ will be
an upper bound for the objective function value of [SPNI-D(θˆ)], and the solver will continue
the solution procedure with a tight bound.
2.3.5 Benders Decomposition Algorithm
The network interdiction problem with asymmetric information is a two-stage problem. In
the first stage the protector determines which arcs to interdict, and the second stage the
evader determines which path to take. This two-stage nature of the problem offers that
we can apply decomposition algorithms to solve the problem. The first decomposition al-
gorithm that comes to mind is Benders decomposition algorithm. However, because of the
non-linearities in the objective function, we cannot apply Benders decomposition algorithm
to [SPNIA-BL] formulation of the problem. Therefore, we applied Benders decomposition
algorithm to both [SPNIA-L] and [SPNI-D(θˆ)] formulations, which are the linearized versions
of [SPNIA-BL].
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The algorithm is similar for both formulations, therefore we present it for only [SPNI-
D(θˆ)] formulation. To apply Benders decomposition algorithm we define the master problem
and subproblem as follows, where ² is the acceptable optimality gap difference:
[RMP]: max
x,η0
η0,
x ∈ X.
[SUB]: η1 = max
v,w,pi
pi0 − pin − θˆ
∑
k∈A
(c¯kvk + (c¯k + d¯k)wk), (2.11a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
(vk + wk)−
∑
k∈RS(i)
(vk + wk) =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(2.11b)
pii − pij ≤ θˆc¯k + ck + (θˆd¯k + dk)xˆk, ∀k ∈ A, (2.11c)
vk ≤ 1− xˆk, ∀k ∈ A, (2.11d)
wk ≤ xˆk, ∀k ∈ A, (2.11e)
vk, wk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
Let µ1 , µ2 , µ3 and µ4 be the dual vectors corresponding to constraints (2.11b), (2.11c),
(2.11d) and (2.11e) respectively. Then, we can apply Benders’ decomposition algorithm as
follows:
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Benders decomposition algorithm for [SPNI-D(θˆ)]
Step 1 Set initial solution xˆ = 0, lower bound LB ← 0, and upper bound UB ←∞.
Step 2 Solve subproblem with current xˆ. Obtain new dual vectors (µˆ1, µˆ2, µˆ3, µˆ4), and
objective function value ηˆ1. Set LB ← max{LB, ηˆ1}. If UB − LB < ², STOP.
Step 3 Add
η0 −
∑
k∈A
(θˆd¯kµˆ
2
k + dkµˆ
2
k − µˆ3k + µˆ4k)xk ≤
∑
k∈A
(θˆc¯kµˆ
2
k + ckµˆ
2
k + µˆ
3
k) + µˆ
1
0 − µˆ1n
to the RMP. Reoptimize the RMP,and obtain a new solution xˆ and objective function value
ηˆ0. Set UB ← ηˆ0. If UB − LB < ², STOP, otherwise return to Step 2 with new xˆ.
Our computational studies showed that Benders decomposition algorithm does not per-
form well for neither [SPNIA-L] nor [SPNI-D(θˆ)] in terms of running time. In most of the
instances solving the mixed integer programming formulation directly takes less time than
solving the problem using Benders decomposition algorithm. Bender decomposition algo-
rithm does not perform well for [SPNI-D(θˆ)] since there are terms including θˆ both in the
objective function and the constraints in the subproblem. This results in large gaps between
the lower and upper bounds of the problem and the algorithm converges slowly. Even though
there are not terms including θˆ in the subproblem of the Benders decomposition algorithm
for [SPNIA-L], the cuts added to the master problem are not very strong, and the algorithm
converges slowly for this case, too. In order to improve the effectiveness of the Benders
decomposition algorithm, strong valid inequalities should be added throughout the run, and
we are working on this problem. However, these valid inequalities will not be discussed in
this dissertation.
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2.4 COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
In this section we study the computational effectiveness of the proposed algorithms. We
also investigate the benefits and risks of modeling asymmetric information. We begin our
analysis by detailing the test problem sets.
2.4.1 Test Problems and Environment
We created 7 different random directed networks. The networks are n1 × n2 grid networks,
where n1 is the number of rows and n2 is the number of columns. There exists an arc
from each node at grid position (r, c) to the nodes at grid positions (r, c+ 1), (r + 1, c) and
(r + 1, c + 1) if there exists a node at the particular position. In these networks, the node
(1, 1) is the origin node and the node (n1, n2) is the destination node. The number of rows,
columns, nodes and arcs for the instances are given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Network instances used
Network Rows Columns Nodes Arcs
1 6 8 48 113
2 6 10 60 141
3 6 12 72 169
4 8 8 64 161
5 8 10 80 201
6 8 12 96 241
7 10 10 100 261
For each network, we created 10 different instances by using different c,d, c¯, d¯ values.
When presenting the results, we will give the average values for these 10 instances. The
values of ck and dk are real numbers generated from Uniform(1,10). The values of c¯k and d¯k
depend on the values of ck, dk and Q, where Q represents how precise the estimates of the
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evader are. The values of c¯k are generated from Uniform(ck ·Q, ck · (2−Q)) and the values
of d¯k are generated similarly using dk instead of ck. We tested three values of Q: 0.6, 0.7
and 0.8. We used a cardinality constraint as the budget constraint, i.e., bk = 1 for every
arc. We tested four different values of B: 5, 10, 15 and 20. We assumed that all arcs are
interdictable. The parameters used in the test instances are summarized in Table 2.2.
We used CPLEX 9.0 with default settings to solve the test instances. The programs were
coded in C, and run on an Intel Pentium IV computer with 3.05 GHz CPU and 512 MB of
RAM.
Table 2.2: Parameters used in test instances
Parameter Value
ck Uniform(1,10)
dk Uniform(1,10)
Q 0.6, 0.7, 0.8
c¯k Uniform(ck ·Q, ck · (2−Q))
d¯k Uniform(dk ·Q, dk · (2−Q))
bk 1
B 5,10,15,20
2.4.2 Computational Results
We first investigate the benefits of modeling asymmetric information. We compare our results
with the case where there is no information asymmetry. We used the [MXSP-D] formulation
used in Israeli and Wood [34] for comparison. Both formulations were solved using standard
branch-and-bound algorithms of CPLEX 9.0. The results are presented in Appendix A, and
summarized in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Table 2.3 summarizes the results for B = 5 and
B = 10, whereas Table 2.4 summarizes the results for B = 15 and B = 20. In these tables,
T represents the solution time in seconds for the [SPNI-D(θˆ)] formulation. We used the
algorithm explained in Section 3.2 to solve [SPNI-D(θˆ)]. The runs are terminated after 3600
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seconds, and numbers in parentheses represent the number of instances (out of 10) that are
solved within 3600 seconds if not all instances are solved to optimality. Also, %I represents
the percent increase in the objective function value when the information asymmetry is
introduced, and is calculated as follows. Problem [MXSP-D] is solved using c and d. This
means that the protector plans the interdiction (calculates x∗) assuming that the evader has
the same information. Then the evader finds a shortest path using his estimates of the arc
lengths c¯k + d¯kx
∗
k. Finally, the true length of this path is calculated using the arc lengths
ck + dkx
∗
k. This value gives the length of the path the evader will take if the protector
assumes that there is no information asymmetry. We define this value as z∗1 , and z
∗
2 as the
optimal objective function value of [SPNI-D(θˆ)]. Then %I is calculated using the formula
%I =
z∗2−z∗1
z∗1
· 100. In problem [SPNI-D(θˆ)], we assume that the protector knows the evader’s
estimates of the arc lengths. However, if this is not the case, then some important paths
are left more vulnerable. As a result, if the protector assumes incorrect evader estimates,
then a risk arises due to this lack of information. We represent this risk with %R, which is
calculated as follows.
Problem [SPNI-D(θˆ)] is solved, and an optimal interdiction plan x∗ is determined. Then
the true shortest path on this network is determined by using the arc lengths ck + x
∗
kdk.
Let the length of this path be z∗3 , and define z
∗
4 as the optimal objective function value of
[MXSP-D]. Then %R is calculated using the formula %R =
z∗4−z∗3
z∗4
· 100. In Table 2.4, there
are some blank entries for %I and %R, since not all instances are solved to optimality. A
summary of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 is presented in Table 2.5 by taking the averages of %I
and %R over all network instances. Also, the summary of the results is illustrated in Figure
2.2.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of the results for symmetric and asymmetric information for B = 5
and B = 10
Q 0.6 0.7 0.8
Network B T %I %R T %I %R T %I %R
1 5 0.4 4.8 5.6 0.4 3.4 5.6 0.3 2.1 1.9
2 5 0.5 9.0 4.9 0.9 3.9 3.9 6.7 2.2 3.1
3 5 0.9 9.7 5.7 1.4 4.8 5.6 1.3 2.5 4.1
4 5 1.0 8.1 5.6 0.9 6.0 5.5 1.2 2.1 1.7
5 5 2.3 8.1 6.9 1.4 6.2 4.4 7.5 1.8 3.6
6 5 2.2 7.4 4.2 2.1 5.8 3.5 1.6 1.8 3.0
7 5 3.1 8.5 7.0 2.8 3.7 4.0 2.1 1.5 1.5
1 10 2.1 7.1 5.4 1.5 4.8 4.7 1.0 2.3 2.3
2 10 4.3 12.2 6.1 8.1 8.9 3.9 18.4 5.3 2.9
3 10 10.6 12.2 9.1 68.2 6.9 5.6 36.5 4.8 4.3
4 10 8.5 8.3 7.2 9.3 5.5 7.8 9.3 3.5 3.8
5 10 33.9 10.8 8.3 24.4 6.7 5.4 27.1 3.2 5.0
6 10 35.4 9.3 6.4 64.5 6.7 3.9 71.4 2.7 3.7
7 10 170.7 11.4 6.8 99.7 6.7 4.2 42.7 3.2 3.2
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Table 2.4: Comparison of the results for symmetric and asymmetric information for B = 15
and B = 20
Q 0.6 0.7 0.8
Network B T %I %R T %I %R T %I %R
1 15 3.5 7.3 6.4 4.8 4.3 5.2 4.1 2.6 2.0
2 15 36.0 12.5 10.4 50.1 8.5 5.9 110.8 4.4 4.3
3 15 151.0 12.6 11.0 164.3 9.3 7.6 123.2 5.1 4.5
4 15 87.3 13.2 9.9 149.7 10.6 6.6 94.2 5.1 3.8
5 15 263.4 11.7 9.5 207.3 7.2 6.7 301.4 4.3 4.1
6 15 444.2 13.7 10.2 752.6 8.2 5.7 543.3 3.6 5.0
7 15 770.4 13.1 10.1 927.5 8.4 5.1 508.5 4.4 2.5
1 20 11.5 7.6 6.0 8.2 4.5 4.3 5.0 3.3 3.3
2 20 140.0 12.5 9.5 169.0 9.3 7.1 459.8 5.8 4.9
3 20 320.2 13.6 11.4 767.7 9.5 6.9 (7)
4 20 312.4 11.4 8.8 426.1 7.9 8.7 682.7 3.9 5.0
5 20 (7) (6) (6)
6 20 (6) (5) (6)
7 20 (3) (4) (2)
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Table 2.5: Summary of benefits and risks
Q 0.6 0.7 0.8
B %I %R %I %R %I %R
5 7.9 5.7 4.8 4.6 2.0 2.7
10 10.2 7.0 6.6 5.1 3.6 3.6
15 12.0 9.6 8.0 6.1 4.2 3.8
20 11.3 8.9 7.8 6.7 4.3 4.4
Figure 2.2: Summary of benefits and risks
On average, running times increase as the number of arcs increases and as the available
interdiction resources increase. The benefits of modeling asymmetric information tend to
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increase as the available interdiction resources increase and as the accuracy of the evader’s
estimates decreases. As a result, if the protector knows that evader’s estimates are not very
accurate, it may be reasonable to allocate resources to gather better intelligence about the
evader. On the other hand, there is a high correlation between the benefit and the risk taken.
Therefore, if the protector does not have significant knowledge of the evader’s estimates, a
fixed estimate may not be preferable. If this is the case, the evader’s estimates can be
treated as random variables, and the problem can be modeled as a stochastic program. This
approach will be explained in Chapter 4.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we studied the detection resource allocation problem. We demonstrated the
equivalence between this problem and the shortest path network interdiction problem. In the
shortest path network interdiction problem, an evader attempts to go from an origin node to
a destination node by taking the shortest path, and an protector attempts to maximize the
length of the evader’s shortest path by interdicting some of the arcs using limited resources.
We extended this problem by assuming that there is an information asymmetry between
the evader and the protector, i.e., the evader does not know the true lengths of the arcs.
We formulated this problem as a mixed integer nonlinear bilevel programming problem
and converted it to a linear MIP. We presented two different formulations that handle the
cases where there are multiple shortest paths for the evader. One formulation assumes
the worst case scenario, whereas the other assumes the best case scenario. We were able
to solve the resulting MIP formulations by using standard branch-and-bound techniques.
We also developed an algorithm to solve the problem more efficiently, and discussed the
applicability of Benders decomposition algorithm for this problem. Finally, we presented the
computational examples and discussed the benefits and risks associated with the modeling
of symmetric information.
We demonstrated that the protector can gain benefit by including the information asym-
metry between herself and the evader in the model. However, there are some risks in modeling
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the asymmetric information. The protector should be careful if the evader’s estimates are
close to the real values, or the protector does not know these estimates accurately.
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3.0 THE PERIMETER INSPECTION GAME WITH INTERDICTION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we present a model to assist in the allocation of static and dynamic resources
for perimeter security. In the problem, the protector controls a perimeter by installing
static detection resources and subsequently devising a dynamic inspection policy, whereas
the evader attempts to smuggle contraband through the perimeter without being detected.
An example of the perimeter is the border between two countries, in which case the static
detection resources may be check points and cameras and the dynamic inspection resources
may be guards and unmanned aerial vehicles. The problem of static resource allocation
while accounting for the subsequent dynamic strategies can be viewed as the interdiction of
a competitive Markov decision process (or a stochastic game) [45].
Interdiction models have classically been associated with the static interdiction of net-
works, while inspection game models have typically only dealt with the dynamic strategies
of the protector and the smuggler. In this chapter, we fill the gap between static interdiction
models and dynamic inspection game models to provide a more complete model for perimeter
security problems.
In the network interdiction models, first the protector interdicts the network, and then
the evader operates on the interdicted network. Whereas, in the inspection models, the
protector and the evader play an inspection game, but the protector does not have the
capability to alter the properties of the network. Namely, the interdiction models lack the
dynamic nature of the inspection games, whereas the inspection games lack the network
design capability of the protector in network interdiction models. In this chapter, we fill this
gap by combining these two problems into a larger problem allowing the protector both to
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alter the network properties and operate on the interdicted network along with the evader.
In our problem, the protector first installs static detection resources at some of the regions
using an allocated budget. After the initial installation phase, the protector and the evader
play an inspection game over an infinite time horizon.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the
general framework for single player controlled long-run average reward stochastic games
which are the basis for the perimeter inspection problem, and extend this framework to
allow interdiction. We present the perimeter inspection problem with interdiction, explore
some of the structural properties of this problem, and develop solution methodologies in
Section 3.3. We finalize the chapter with computational illustrations in Section 3.4, and
concluding remarks in Section 3.5.
3.2 STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH INTERDICTION
3.2.1 Single Player Controlled Long-run Average Reward Stochastic Games
A zero-sum, single player controlled stochastic game can be viewed as an extension of a
standard Markov decision process where the reward is not only dependent on the current
state and decision maker’s action, but also on the simultaneous action selection of another
person. Formally, following the notation of Filar and Vrieze [25], we assume a finite state-
space S, where |S| = n, and a finite set of actions for player 1 in state s ∈ S, being A1(s),
where |A1(s)| = m1(s), and A2(s) for player 2, where |A2(s)| = m2(s) . If actions a1 ∈ A1(s)
and a2 ∈ A2(s) are selected by players 1 and 2 respectively, then player 1 receives a reward
of r(s, a1, a2) and player 2 incurs a cost of −r(s, a1, a2). The system then transitions from
state s to state s′ according to probability p(s′|s, a1) based solely on player 1’s action and
the current state. This process is repeated over the infinite horizon of the game. Player 1’s
objective is to select a stationary policy f to maximize the long-run average reward from
the game, where
∑
a1∈A1(s) f(s, a
1) = 1, ∀s ∈ S. In other words, player 1 selects action
a1 ∈ A1(s) with probability f(s, a1) in state s. We can then define a transition probability
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under policy f , p(j|s, f) = ∑a1∈A1(s) p(j|s, a1)f(s, a1). Similarly, player 2’s objective is to
select a policy g to minimize his average cost. The expected average payoff to player 1 for
his policy f and player 2’s policy g beginning in state s ∈ S is given by
v(s, f ,g) = lim
T→∞
(
1
T + 1
T∑
t=0
E(Rt| s, f ,g),
)
where Rt is the reward received at period t and E(·| s, f ,g) is the expected value conditioned
on the initial state s, and policies f and g. We select the long-run average reward to capture
the stationary behavior of the system. This criterion is appropriate for determining policies
to minimize rates of non-critical smuggling, such as illegal narcotics or aliens. However, for
critical single occurrence consequences, such as nuclear smuggling, other criteria are more
appropriate, but will not be explored in this dissertation.
We say that stationary policies f∗ and g∗ are an optimal stationary policies for players 1
and 2 if
v(s, f ,g∗) ≤ v(s, f∗,g∗) ≤ v(s, f∗,g)
for all s ∈ S and stationary policies f and g. We also define α ∈ IR|S|, where α(s) ≥ 0 and∑
s∈S α(s) = 1, as an initial probability distribution over the states. Under this framework,
the zero-sum player 1 controlled long-run average reward game can be formulated as the
following primal and dual linear programs [33].
Primal: min
u,v,g
∑
s∈S
α(s)v(s),
u(s) + v(s) ≥
∑
a2∈A2
g(s, a2)r(s, a1, a2) +
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a1)u(s′), ∀s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1,
v(s) ≥
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a1)v(s′), ∀s ∈ S, a1 ∈ A1,∑
a2∈A2
g(s, a2) = 1, ∀s ∈ S,
g ≥ 0.
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The resulting optimal solution (u∗,v∗,g∗) provides the optimal long-run average reward
vector for player 1, v∗, and player 2’s optimal policy, g∗. Associating vectors x,y, and z
with the above constraints yields the associated dual formulation.
Dual: max
x,y,z
∑
s∈S
z(s),∑
a1∈A1
x(s′, a1)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a1∈A1
p(s′|s, a1)x(s, a1) = 0, ∀s′ ∈ S,∑
a1∈A1
x(s′, a1) +
∑
a1∈A1
y(s′, a1)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a1∈A1
p(s′|s, a1)y(s, a1) = α(s′), ∀s′ ∈ S,∑
a1∈A1
r(s, a1, a2)x(s, a1) ≥ z(s), ∀s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2,
x,y ≥ 0.
The resulting optimal solution (x∗,y∗, z∗) in the dual formulation provides player 1’s op-
timal steady state and transient policies and the average long term reward for each state
respectively. Player 1’s policy can be determined by
f(s, a) =
x(s, a)∑
a1∈A1 x(s, a
1)
, ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A1.
3.2.2 Single Player Controlled Stochastic Games with Interdiction
We now extend these formulations to permit player 1, prior to the beginning of the game, to
allocate his constrained resources to impact the one-period rewards in the subsequent game.
We call this action-reward interdiction and represent the interdiction plan with vector γ. We
define r(s, a1, a2, γ) to be the post-interdiction reward value for state-action set (s, a1, a2) for
interdiction vector γ. Since player 1 is interdicting the game, it will typically be true,
although not necessary, that r(s, a1, a2, γ) ≥ r(s, a1, a2) for all γ. For example, binary
interdiction results in
r(s, a1, a2, γ) = r(s, a1, a2) + t(s, a1, a2)γ(s, a1, a2),
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where t(s, a1, a2) is the increase in reward when state-action set (s, a1, a2) is interdicted,
and γ(s, a1, a2) is the binary variable indicating whether or not state-action set (s, a1, a2) is
interdicted. This results in the following mixed-integer nonlinear formulation for the single
player controlled game with initial interdiction.
max
γ∈Γ
max
x,y,z
∑
s∈S
z(s),∑
a1∈A1
x(s′, a1)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a1∈A1
p(s′|s, a1)x(s, a1) = 0, ∀s′ ∈ S,∑
a1∈A1
x(s′, a1) +
∑
a1∈A1
y(s′, a1)−
∑
s∈S
∑
a1∈A1
p(s′|s, a1)y(s, a1) = α(s′), ∀s′ ∈ S,∑
a1∈A1
r(s, a1, a2, γ)x(s, a1) ≥ z(s), ∀s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2,
x,y ≥ 0,
where Γ represents the set of feasible interdiction plans.
3.3 PERIMETER INSPECTION PROBLEM WITH INTERDICTION
3.3.1 Problem Definition and Formulation
Using our presented framework in Section 3.2, we extend the work of Filar [26] on the
traveling inspector problem to include the ability to initially install static detection resources
at various locations, in addition to determining a dynamic policy for the protector. The
problem we consider consists of two entities with conflicting objectives, a protector and an
evader. The evader attempts to bring contraband into a country without being detected,
while the protector attempts to minimize the amount of contraband smuggled by allocating
her static and dynamic detection resources to the regions on the border.
The problem we model is composed of two stages. In the first stage, which is the
design stage, the protector allocates his static detection resources to the regions. In the
second stage, which is the execution stage, the protector and the evader play an inspection
game over an infinite time horizon. The set of regions on the border are represented with
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N = {1, 2, ..., n}. In the second stage, the protector selects the region to inspect for the
next period, i.e., A1 = {1, 2, ..., n}, and the evader decides how to allocate a total of C
discrete units of contraband to each region at each period, i.e., A2 = {a2 = (a21, . . . , a2n)| a2i ∈
{0, 1, . . . , C},∀i ∈ S and ∑ni=1 a2i ≤ C}. We assume that the protector inspects one and only
one region at each period. The location of the protector at a given period can be considered
as the state of game in the second stage, i.e., S = {1, 2, ..., n}. We assume that the protector
and the evader make their decisions simultaneously, i.e., the protector decides which region
to inspect in the next period and the evader decides how much contraband to attempt to
smuggle through each region in the next period without knowing the other’s decision. In
addition, for clarity we assume that if the protector decides to inspect region j, then she
will do so with certainty. This condition implies that if the protector is at region s in the
current period and she wants to inspect region j in the next period, then p(j|s, a1, a2) = 1 if
j = a1 and p(j|s, a1, a2) = 0 if j 6= a1 for every a2 ∈ A2. Hence, this is a game controlled, in
a probabilistic sense, by the protector.
If any contraband is brought through region s while under surveillance by the protector,
then the protector has a probability ps of detecting the contraband and qs of not detecting,
where qs = 1−ps. Similarly, if a static detection resource is located in region s, it will detect
the contraband with probability p¯s and not detect with probability q¯s, where q¯s = 1− p¯s. We
assume that the detection probabilities of the static detection resources and the detection
probabilities of the protector are independent, and they are also independent of the amount
of contraband passing through the region.
The protector earns a reward of one unit for each unit of contraband confiscated and is
charged with a penalty of λ for each unit of contraband smuggled. In the remainder of the
chapter we will use a value of one for λ, however, the results can be extended for any value
of λ with minimal effort. When the protector has inspected region s in the current period,
selects region j to inspect for the next period, and the evader’s contraband allocation to the
regions is a2; the protector’s reward is the expected amount of contraband confiscated less
the expected penalized amount of contraband successfully smuggled, less his travel cost.
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Then for λ = 1, a1 = j, and a2 = (a21, a
2
2, ..., a
2
n),
r(s, j, a2, γ) = γj
[
(1− q¯jqj) a2j − q¯jqja2j
]
+ (1− γj)
[
pja
2
j − qja2j
]
+∑
i∈S
i6=j
[γi(p¯ia
2
i − q¯ia2i )− (1− γi)a2i ]− c(s, j),
where γi is a binary variable indicating whether a static detection resource has been placed
at region i, and c(s, j) is the cost of traveling from region s to region j for the protector.
Note that the cost c(s, j) should be defined in a way such that it is comparable to an
amount of smuggled contraband. The appropriate definition of this value is highly problem
dependent and is beyond the scope of this study. The placement of a static detection
resource at a region is equivalent to interdicting the particular state and these two terms will
be used interchangeably throughout the remainder the chapter. To represent r(s, j, a2, γ)
more clearly, we define k(j, a2), l(j, a2) and m(s, j, a2) as:
k(j, a2) = 2p¯jqja
2
j ,
l(j, a2) = 2p¯ja
2
j ,
m(s, j, a2) = 2pja
2
j −
n∑
i=1
a2i − c(s, j).
Above, k(j, a2) represents the portion of r(s, j, a2, γ) related to region j and dependent on the
interdiction at region j, l(j, a2) represents the reward related to other regions and dependent
on the interdiction at the corresponding region, and m(s, j, a2) represents the reward related
to region j but independent of the interdiction plan. This representation will make the
reward function more tractable, and we rewrite r(s, j, a2, γ) as follows:
r(s, j, a2, γ) = k(j, a2)γj +
∑
i∈S
i6=j
l(i, a2)γi +m(s, j, a
2).
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The problem described above fits in the framework of the single player controlled game
described in Section 3.2. Also, note that the protector can reach from any region to all
other regions, i.e., the underlying system is not a multichain Markov chain. Therefore, the
variables corresponding to transient policies are unnecessary as is the probability distribution
for the initial location of the protector. As a result, we can simplify the formulation of the
perimeter inspection game with initial interdiction as follows:
max
γ∈Γ
max
x,z
n∑
s=1
z(s), (3.1a)
n∑
j=1
x(s, j)−
n∑
j=1
x(j, s) = 0, ∀s ∈ S, (3.1b)
n∑
s=1
n∑
j=1
x(s, j) = 1, (3.1c)
n∑
j=1
r(s, j, a2, γ)x(s, j) ≥ z(s), ∀s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2, (3.1d)
x ≥ 0,
where Γ = {γ|∑ni=1 biγi ≤ B} represents the set of feasible static detection resource instal-
lations, bi is the cost of installing a static detection resource at region i, and B is the total
budget available for static detection resource installation. Also, x(s, j) represents the long
term proportion of periods that the protector is at region s and will visit region j. Therefore
in the protector’s policy, f(s, j) = x(s,j)Pn
i=1 x(s,i)
represents the probability that the protector will
visit region j in the next period if he is at region s in the current period. Also, let g(s, a2) be
the dual variable corresponding to region s and action a2 in constraint (3.1d). Then, g(s, a2)
represents the probability that the evader should select action a2 in the next period if the
protector is at region s in the current period.
If we state r(s, j, a2, γ) explicitly in the above formulation, we have the following formu-
lation:
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max
γ∈Γ
max
x,z
n∑
s=1
z(s), (3.2a)
n∑
j=1
x(s, j) −
n∑
j=1
x(j, s) = 0, ∀ s ∈ S (3.2b)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
x(i, j) = 1, (3.2c)
n∑
j=1
[k(j, a2)γj +
∑
i∈S
i 6=j
l(i, a2)γi +m(s, j, a
2)]x(s, j) ≥ z(s), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2, (3.2d)
x ≥ 0.
The above formulation is a mixed integer nonlinear program (MINLP) since there are
nonlinear terms in constraint (3.2d). However, we linearize these terms by defining
β(i, s, j) = γix(s, j)
for every pair of γi and x(s, j). Adding the following constraints will ensure that this equation
holds:
β(i, s, j) ≤ γi, (3.3a)
β(i, s, j) ≤ x(s, j), (3.3b)
γi + x(s, j) ≤ β(i, s, j) + 1. (3.3c)
When γi = 0, (3.3a) guarantees that β(i, s, j) = 0, and when γi = 1, (3.3b) and (3.3c)
guarantee that β(i, s, j) = x(s, j). After making these changes, we have the following fi-
nal linear mixed integer program (MIP), the “Linearized Perimeter Inspection Game with
Interdiction”:
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[PI-L]: max
γ∈Γ
max
x,z,β
n∑
s=1
z(s),
n∑
j=1
x(s, j) −
n∑
i=1
x(i, s) = 0, ∀ s ∈ S,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
x(i, j) = 1,
n∑
j=1
[k(j, a2)β(j, s, j) +
∑
i∈S
i6=j
l(i, a2)β(i, s, j) +m(s, j, a2)]x(s, j) ≥ z(s), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A2,
β(i, s, j)− γi ≤ 0, ∀i, s, j ∈ S,
β(i, s, j)− x(s, j) ≤ 0, ∀i, s, j ∈ S,
γi + x(s, j)− β(i, s, j) ≤ 1, ∀i, s, j ∈ S,
x ≥ 0.
[PI-L] can be solved using any solver. However, as the amount of regions or the number
of contraband increases, the number of possible actions for the evader becomes very large,
which makes [PI-L] very difficult to solve in an acceptable time. Therefore, we investigate
structural properties about the problem that can reduce the computational time. In addition,
we develop a heuristic algorithm that provides near optimal solutions for large problem sizes
which cannot be solved in a reasonable time, and provide an explicit solution for a simple
case of the problem. We investigate the structural properties of the problem in Section 3.3.2,
present a heuristic algorithm for large problem sizes in Section 3.3.3, and provide the explicit
solution for a simple case in Section 3.3.4.
3.3.2 Structural Properties
When there are C units of contraband to smuggle and n regions that the evader can allocate
these contraband, there are
∑C
c=0
(
c+n−1
c
)
possible allocations which means that the evader
has
∑C
c=0
(
c+n−1
c
)
actions to choose from at each state. As C becomes large, the number of
actions for the evader becomes intractable making [PI-L] intractable. However, some of these
actions may be dominated by others in the optimal policy of the evader. If we can determine
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a subset of the action space of the evader that covers the optimal policies, then we can
reduce the solution time. For this purpose, we define a2,0 as the action of the evader where
he allocates zero contraband to all regions, i.e., a2,0i = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Additionally,
we define a2,j as the action such that he allocates all C units of contraband to region j, i.e.,
a2,jj = C, a
2,j
i = 0, i 6= j, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Also, define A¯2 = {a2,k : k = 0, . . . , n}. Finally,
define A˜2 as the set of actions such that the sum of contraband sent through all regions are
either n or 0, i.e., A˜2 = {{a2,0} ⋃ {a2 :∑ni=1 a2i = n}}.
First, we show that the evader either attempts to smuggle all C units of contraband, or
he does not attempt to smuggle any contraband at all.
Theorem 3.1 There is an optimal solution to [PI-L] such that
∑
a2∈A˜2 g(s, a
2) = 1, ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. Let f∗ be an optimal policy for the protector, and g∗ be an optimal policy for the
evader corresponding to f∗. Let ρ(s, j,g) represent the expected amount of contraband con-
fiscated minus the expected amount of contraband successfully smuggled when the protector
is at region s and chooses to inspect region j at the next period under the evader’s policy g.
Then,
ρ(s, j,g∗) =
∑
a2∈A2
[
2p¯jpja
2
jγj +
n∑
i=1
2p¯ia
2
i γi + 2p¯ja
2
j −
n∑
i=1
a2i
]
g∗(s, a2).
Using the above equation, we can express the contribution of the state s to the objective
function in the optimal solution, z∗(s) as follows:
46
z∗(s) =
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)[ρ(s, j,g∗)− c(s, j)]
=
∑
a2∈A2
{
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)2p¯jpja2jγj +
n∑
i=1
[
2p¯ia
2
i γi
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)
]
+
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)2p¯ja2j −
∑
i=1
[
a2i
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)
]}
g∗(s, a2)−
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)c(s, j)
=
∑
a2∈A2
{
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)2p¯jpja2jγj +
n∑
i=1
2p¯ia
2
i γi +
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)2p¯ja2j −
∑
i=1
a2i
}
g∗(s, a2)
−
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)c(s, j)
=
∑
a2∈A2
{
n∑
j=1
a2j [f
∗(s, j)2p¯jpjγj + 2p¯jγj + f ∗(s, j)2p¯j − 1]
}
g∗(s, a2)−
n∑
j=1
f ∗(s, j)c(s, j).
Now, suppose that g∗(s, a) > 0 for some action a such that 0 <
∑n
i=1 ai = c < n. Then,
n∑
j=1
aj[f
∗(s, j)2p¯jpjγj + 2p¯jγj + f ∗(s, j)2p¯j − 1] ≤ 0.
Otherwise, z∗(s) can be decreased by increasing g∗(s, a2,0) by g∗(s, a) in the optimal solution
and setting g∗(s, a) = 0. Then, there exist j1 ∈ S such that
f ∗(s, j1)2p¯j1pj1γj1 + 2p¯j1γj1 + f
∗(s, j1)2p¯j1 − 1 ≤ 0,
since aj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ S. Let’s define a¯ as the action such that
a¯j1 = aj1 + n− c; a¯j = aj,∀j ∈ S, j 6= j1.
Then,
n∑
j=1
a¯j[f
∗(s, j)2p¯jpjγj+2p¯jγj+f ∗(s, j)2p¯j−1] ≤
n∑
j=1
aj[f
∗(s, j)2p¯jpjγj+2p¯jγj+f ∗(s, j)2p¯j−1].
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So, if we increase g(s, a¯) by g(s, a) and set g(s, a) = 0, then z∗(s) either decreases or
remains the same. As a result, we can replace the actions whose total contraband allocation
is less than n with the actions whose total contraband allocation is equal to n in the optimal
solution. 2
Using Theorem 3.1, the total number of actions for the evader can be reduced from∑C
c=0
(
c+n−1
c
)
to
(
C+n−1
C
)
. Now, [PI-L] can be solved using actions in A˜2 instead of using
the actions in A2. The resulting problem is much smaller, however it is still very large for
large values of C. The problem can be further simplified with the following theorem which
states that there is an optimal solution for evader in which he attempts to smuggle all of his
contraband through one region or he does not attempt to smuggle any contraband at all.
Theorem 3.2 There is an optimal solution to [PI-L] such that
∑
a2∈A¯2 g(s, a
2) = 1, ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. Let f∗ be an optimal policy for the protector, and g∗ be an optimal policy for the
evader corresponding to f∗. Using the previous definition of ρ(s, j,g),
ρ(s, j,g∗) =
∑
a2∈A2
[2p¯jpja
2
jγj +
n∑
i=1
2p¯ia
2
i γi + 2p¯ja
2
j −
n∑
i=1
a2i ]g
∗(s, a2)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
a2∈A2
2p¯ia
2
i γig
∗(s, a2) +
∑
a2∈A2
[2p¯jpja
2
jγj + 2p¯ja
2
j − C]g∗(s, a2)
Let’s define a policy g¯ for the evader which only consists of the actions in A¯2, and let the
probabilities be as follows.
g¯(s, a2,k) =
1
C
∑
a2∈A2
a2kg
∗(s, a2), k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Note that,
n∑
k=1
g¯(s, a2,k) =
n∑
k=1
1
C
∑
a2∈A2
a2kg
∗(s, a2) =
1
C
∑
a2∈A2
n∑
k=1
a2kg
∗(s, a2) =
1
C
∑
a2∈A2
Cg∗(s, a2) = 1.
48
So, g¯ is a valid policy for the evader. Now, we can restate ρ(s, j,g∗) as follows.
ρ(s, j,g∗) =
n∑
i=1
2p¯iγ(i)Cg¯(s, a
2,i) + 2p¯jpjγ(j)C + 2p¯jC − C
=
n∑
i=1
2p¯iγ(i)
n∑
k=1
a2,ki g¯(s, a
2,k) + 2p¯jpjγ(j)
n∑
k=1
a2,kj g¯(s, a
2,k)
+2p¯j
n∑
k=1
a2,kj g¯(s, a
2,k)−
n∑
k=1
g¯(s, a2,k)
n∑
i=1
a2,ki
=
n∑
k=1
[
n∑
i=1
2p¯iγ(i)a
2,k
i + 2p¯jpjγ(j)a
2,k
j + 2p¯ja
2,k
j −
n∑
i=1
a2,ki
]
g¯(s, a2,k)
= ρ(s, j, g¯).
Since ρ(s, j,g∗) is equivalent to ρ(s, j, g¯), and the traveling cost of the the protector is
independent of the evader’s policy, g¯ is also an optimal policy for the evader. 2
Now, we can reformulate [PI-L] using actions in A¯2 only.
[PI-LR]: max
γ∈Γ
max
x,z,β
n∑
s=1
z(s),
n∑
j=1
x(s, j) −
n∑
i=1
x(i, s) = 0, ∀ s ∈ S,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
x(i, j) = 1,
n∑
j=1
[k(j, a2)β(j, s, j) +
∑
i∈S
i6=j
l(i, a2)β(i, s, j) +m(s, j, a2)]x(s, j) ≥ z(s), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A¯2,
β(i, s, j)− γi ≤ 0, ∀i, s, j ∈ S,
β(i, s, j)− x(s, j) ≤ 0, ∀i, s, j ∈ S,
γi + x(s, j)− β(i, s, j) ≤ 1, ∀i, s, j ∈ S,
x ≥ 0.
The following theorem proves the equivalence between [PI-L] and [PI-LR] in terms of the
optimal solutions.
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Theorem 3.3 An optimal policy for the protector and the evader in [PI-LR] is also an
optimal policy for the protector and the evader in [PI-L].
Proof. Let let z¯ be the optimal objective function value of [PI-LR]. Assume that there is an
optimal solution for [PI-L] with an objective function value of z∗ such that z∗ < z¯. Let the
optimal policies for the protector and the evader be f¯ and g¯ in [PI-LR]. Let the protector
select policy f¯ in [PI-L], and let g be the optimal policy for the evader corresponding to
f¯ and z be the corresponding objective function value in [PI-L]. Obviously, z ≤ z∗. By
Theorem 3.2, z = z¯. Then, z¯ ≤ z∗, which is a contradiction with our assumption that
z∗ < z¯. Therefore, z¯ ≤ z∗. Also, [PI-LR] is a relaxation of [PI-L], therefore, z¯ ≥ z∗. As a
result, z¯ = z∗. Since any feasible solution in [PI-LR] is also feasible in [PI-L], any optimal
policy for the protector and the evader in [PI-LR] is also an optimal policy for the protector
and the evader in [PI-L]. 2
Using Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, we converted our problem into a significantly
smaller problem, resulting in much shorter solution times. Note that, even though [PI-LR]
formulation limits the number of actions the evader can take, this does not mean that the
evader has to take the action found using this formulation, there may be other optimal actions
for the evader. However, no matter which optimal action the evader takes, the protector’s
optimal action found using [PI-LR] would still be optimal. Since the problem is formulated
to maximize the protector’s objective, solving [PI-LR] is equivalent to solving [PI-L].
3.3.3 Heuristic Algorithm
[PI-LR] formulation of the perimeter inspection game with interdiction can be solved within
acceptable times for smaller problem instances (around 15 nodes) using standard solvers.
However, solving larger problem instances optimally may require much longer times. There-
fore, we provide a heuristic algorithm to solve the larger problem instances in shorter times.
The algorithm utilizes the fact that the static detection resource allocation scheme will
primarily follow a greedy pattern. In the algorithm, we first start with a single static detec-
tion resource and determine the best region to allocate it by solving n perimeter inspection
games. We allocate the detection resource at the region that maximizes the objective func-
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tion, and find the next best region to allocate a static detection resource by solving n − 1
perimeter inspection games. The algorithm progresses until all static detection resources
have been allocated to regions.
For a given interdiction plan γ, the perimeter inspection game can be formulated as:
[PI-FI]: max
x,z
n∑
s=1
z(s),
n∑
j=1
x(s, j) −
n∑
j=1
x(j, s) = 0, ∀ s ∈ S,
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
x(i, j) = 1,
n∑
j=1
[k(j, a2)γj +
∑
i∈S
i6=j
l(i, a2)γi +m(s, j, a
2)]x(s, j) ≥ z(s), ∀ s ∈ S, a2 ∈ A¯2,
x ≥ 0.
We can formally state the algorithm as follows, where AR represents the set of regions that
are available to place a static detection resource:
Heuristic algorithm to solve perimeter inspection game with interdiction
1. Initialization
• AR = {1, 2, . . . , n}
• γi = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
2. Iteration
• For b = 1, . . . , B
– For every i ∈ AR, temporarily set γi = 1 and solve [PI-FI]
– Get i with the best [PI-FI] optimal objective value and set γi = 1 ,
AR = AR\{i}.
Note that the above algorithm is valid for the case where there is a limit on the number of
available static detection resources. However, it can be generalized to allow other types of
budget constraints with little effort.
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3.3.4 Explicit Solution for a Simple Case
We provided [PI-LR] formulation of the problem which shortens the computational time of
the problem considerably, and also provided a heuristic algorithm to solve the problem more
efficiently with small errors. In this section we investigate solution methodologies that will
reduce the solution time. With this in mind, we seek more insight about the optimal solution
of the problem. We start with a simple case of the problem, state the optimal solution
explicitly for this case, and propose future directions that would build on this solution by
analyzing more general cases. First we consider the case where no static detection resource
allocation is allowed and there is no travel cost between the regions.
Define f(s) as the long run rate that the protector visits region s, i.e.,
f(s) =
∑
j∈S
f(s, j).
Also, define
ρj =
1
pj
, ∀j ∈ S,
ρ =
∑
j∈S
ρj.
The following theorem states the optimal solution of [PI-LR] when there is no traveling cost
and no static detection resource allocation allowed. For this case, we show that the optimal
policy has the following form: the fraction of time the protector selects region i versus region
j is inversely proportional to the ratio of the detection probabilities at these two regions.
Theorem 3.4 If c(s, j) = 0,∀s, j ∈ S, and B = 0, then there is an optimal solution of
[PI-LR] which satisfy the following equations:
f ∗(s, i)
f ∗(s, j)
=
pj
pi
, ∀s, i, j ∈ S,
g∗(s, i)
g∗(s, j)
=
pj
pi
, ∀s, i, j ∈ S,
f ∗(i)
f ∗(j)
=
pj
pi
, ∀i, j ∈ S,
z∗(i)
z∗(j)
=
pj
pi
, ∀i, j ∈ S.
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Proof. The optimal values that satisfy the equations in the proposition are as follows:
f ∗(s) =
ρs
ρ
, ∀s ∈ S,
f ∗(s, j) =
ρj
ρ
, ∀s, j ∈ S,
g∗(s, j) =
ρj
ρ
, ∀s, j ∈ S.
f∗ and g∗ are optimal policies for the protector and the evader if
v(f ,g∗) ≤ v(f∗,g∗) ≤ v(f∗,g)
for any stationary policies f and g. For policies f and g, we can state the objective function
value as
v(f ,g) =
∑
s∈S
f(s)
{∑
j∈S
Cg(s, j)[1− f(s, j) + f(s, j)(1− pj − pj)]
}
=
∑
s∈S
f(s)
{∑
j∈S
Cg(s, j)[1− 2f(s, j)pj]
}
=
∑
s∈S
Cf(s)
{∑
j∈S
g(s, j)−
∑
j∈S
2g(s, j)f(s, j)pj
}
=
∑
s∈S
Cf(s)
{
1−
∑
j∈S
2g(s, j)f(s, j)pj
}
= C − 2C
∑
s∈S
f(s)
{∑
j∈S
g(s, j)f(s, j)pj
}
For the optimal policy f∗ stated above and any policy g,
v(f∗,g∗)− v(f∗,g) = 2C
∑
s∈S
f ∗(s)
{∑
j∈S
g(s, j)f ∗(s, j)pj
}
− 2C
∑
s∈S
f ∗(s)
{∑
j∈S
g∗(s, j)f ∗(s, j)pj
}
= 2C
∑
s∈S
f ∗(s)
{∑
j∈S
f ∗(s, j)pj[g(s, j)− g∗(s, j)]
}
= 2C
∑
s∈S
ρs
ρ2
{∑
j∈S
g(s, j)−
∑
j∈S
g∗(s, j)
}
= 0.
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Therefore,
v(f∗,g∗) ≤ v(f∗,g)
for any policy g. Similarly, for the optimal policy g∗ stated above, and any policy f ,
v(f∗,g∗)− v(f ,g∗) = 2C
∑
s∈S
f(s)
{∑
j∈S
g∗(s, j)f(s, j)pj
}
− 2C
∑
s∈S
f ∗(s)
{∑
j∈S
g∗(s, j)f ∗(s, j)pj
}
=
2C
ρ
{∑
s∈S
f(s)
∑
j∈S
f(s, j)−
∑
s∈S
f ∗(s)
∑
j∈S
f ∗(s, j)
}
=
2C
ρ
{∑
s∈S
f(s)−
∑
s∈S
f ∗(s)
}
= 0.
Therefore,
v(f ,g∗) ≤ v(f∗,g∗)
for any policy f . As a result,
v(f ,g∗) ≤ v(f∗,g∗) ≤ v(f∗,g)
for any stationary policies f and g. Hence, f∗ and g∗ are optimal stationary policies for the
protector and the evader respectively. 2
Using the findings in Theorem 3.4, algorithms can be developed to find the optimal
solutions when interdiction is allowed, but there is no traveling cost between the regions.
Finally, using these results a decomposition algorithm can be developed for the perimeter
inspection problem with interdiction. These extensions are a direction for future research,
and will not be discussed in this dissertation.
3.4 COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
In this section we study the computational effectiveness of the proposed formulations. We
begin our analysis by detailing the test problem sets.
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3.4.1 Test Problems and Environment
Fully connected random networks were created in which nodes correspond to the regions
and arc lengths correspond to the distances between the regions. Four values for the number
of nodes in the network (n) were considered: 10, 15, 30 and 50. The distances between
regions, c(i, j), are real numbers generated randomly from Uniform(0.1, 0.5), and are the
same in both directions. The detection probabilities by the protector at each region (pi) are
real numbers generated from Uniform(0.25, 0.75), and similarly the detection probabilities
by the static detection resources at each region (p¯i) are real numbers generated from Uni-
form(0.1, 0.3). We assumed that the budget required to place a static detection resource at
each region (bi) was 1, and investigated two values for the total available budget (B): 3 and
5. Also, four values for the total number of contraband to smuggle (C) were considered: 3,
4, 5 and 6. Ten random instances were created for each n using different random numbers
to generate the distances between the regions and detection probabilities. When presenting
the results, the average values of these ten instances are reported. The parameters used in
the test instances are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Parameters used in test instances.
Parameter Value
n 10, 15, 30, 50
C 3, 4, 5, 6
B 3, 5
pi Uniform(0.25, 0.75)
p¯i Uniform(0.1, 0.3)
c(i, j) Uniform(0.1, 0.5)
bi 1
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CPLEX 9.0 with default settings was used to solve the test instances. The programs
were coded in C, and run on an Intel Pentium IV computer with 3.05 GHz CPU and 512
MB of RAM.
3.4.2 Computational Examples
We first investigate the computational effectiveness of the proposed formulations. We com-
pare the running times of [PI-L] with running times of [PI-LR] for n = 10. We do not
make the comparison for larger values of n since instances could not be solved using [PI-L]
in acceptable time periods for most of the instances (runs were terminated after 3 hours if
an optimal solution could not be reached). Both formulations were solved using standard
branch-and-bound algorithms of CPLEX 9.0. The results are listed in Appendix B, summa-
rized in Table 3.2, and illustrated in Figure 3.4.2. In Table 3.2, %D represents the percent
decrease in running time resulting from using [PI-LR] instead of [PI-L].
Table 3.2: Comparison of running times (in seconds) for [PI-L] and [PI-LR].
n C B [PI-L] [PI-LR] %D
10 3 3 134.5 23.5 82.6
10 3 5 117.7 21.5 81.7
10 4 3 444.4 23.7 94.7
10 4 5 414.7 20.3 95.1
10 5 3 2044.4 24.0 98.8
10 5 5 1766.2 21.6 98.8
10 6 3 8351.5 24.1 99.7
10 6 5 7293.2 21.6 99.7
From the table we observe that as C increases, the running time for [PI-L] increases
considerably, whereas the running time for [PI-LR] remains about the same. This is because
the number of actions, hence number of constraints, increase considerably with C for [PI-L],
whereas they remain the same for any value of C for [PI-LR]. Therefore, using [PI-LR]
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of running times for [PI-L] and [PI-LR]
formulation provides substantial savings in running times for large values of C.
Next, we investigate the effectiveness of the heuristic algorithm proposed in section 3.3.3
in terms of the running time and quality of the solutions. The results are listed in Appendix
B, and summarized in Table 3.3. The results are reported only for C = 3 and 5 for simplicity
since the results are similar for C = 4 and 6. In the table, %E represents the percent error
(deviation from the optimal solution) for the heuristic algorithm. Columns corresponding
to [PI-LR] and HA are the running times (in seconds) for the [PI-LR] formulation and the
heuristic algorithm respectively. Cells corresponding to rows n = 30 and 50, and columns %E
and [PI-LR] are left blank since [PI-LR] could not be solved to optimality within allocated
time.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of [PI-LR] and the heuristic algorithm
n C B %E [PI-LR] HA
10 3 3 0.02 23.5 0.10
10 3 5 0.01 21.5 0.14
10 5 3 0.02 24.0 0.09
10 5 5 0.02 21.6 0.13
15 3 3 0.18 945.9 0.47
15 3 5 2.52 3089.7 0.76
15 5 3 0.00 1150.3 0.46
15 5 5 0.00 3056.8 0.67
30 3 3 5.22
30 3 5 8.55
30 5 3 8.50
30 5 5 14.09
50 3 3 51.65
50 3 5 86.57
50 5 3 62.27
50 5 5 104.52
As can be seen from the table, the proposed heuristic algorithm provides significant
time savings while providing solutions that are close to optimal solutions. Also, it makes it
possible to solve the larger problem instances within acceptable times.
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we studied the perimeter security problem with static and dynamic resource
allocations. In the problem, an evader attempts to smuggle as much contraband as possi-
ble through a perimeter, and an protector attempts to minimize the number of contraband
smuggled by allocating his static detection resources to some of the inspection points and
later devising a dynamic inspection policy. The problem was formulated as a non-linear
mixed integer program, and converted to a linear mixed integer program using linearization
techniques. The size of the mixed integer program was decreased by exploiting some struc-
tural properties of the problem. Also, a heuristic algorithm was developed to solve the large
problem instances in acceptable times with a small error, and the explicit solution for a sim-
ple case of the problem was provided. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed formulations
and the algorithm was investigated through computational examples.
The primary contribution of this chapter is that it combines two different approaches
in perimeter security problems, static detection resource allocation problems and dynamic
inspection games, in a single problem. The resulting problem takes into account both the
design and execution phases of perimeter security, and provides a more comprehensive and
heretofore unexplored formulation.
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4.0 ASYMMETRIC NETWORK INTERDICTION UNDER RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2, we developed a model to assist the protector in allocating her static detec-
tion resources in order to increase the detection probability of the evader. In the model, it
was assumed that there was information asymmetry between the protector and the evader
in terms of the detection capabilities of the detection resources. The computational studies
demonstrated that including this information asymmetry could increase the detection proba-
bility. However, there was also an additional risk associated with accounting for information
asymmetry. This additional risk is the result of leaving more vulnerable regions with less
detection resources due to the assumption that the evader would not pass through these
regions. The benefits and risks associated with the modeling of information asymmetry was
discussed through computational examples in Section 2.4, and the results were summarized
in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. As can be seen from these tables, the risk associated with mod-
eling information asymmetry can be as high as the benefit associated with it. The model
presented in Chapter 2 can be very useful if the protector has good intelligence regarding
the evader’s estimates. However, if this is not the case, she should be more conservative in
her approach.
60
In this chapter we present two models that take the risk into account. In the first model,
based on the model in Chapter 2, we include a constraint that bounds the risk arising from
the modeling of the information asymmetry. In the second model, instead of assuming that
the protector knows the evader’s estimates, we let her to plan for a set of possible scenarios
with various probabilities. In the latter model, there is a complete information asymmetry
between the protector and the evader.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We formulate the asymmetric
network interdiction model under risk, and present computational examples in Section 4.2.
We define and formulate the asymmetric network interdiction model under uncertainty in
Section 4.3, and make concluding remarks in Section 4.4.
4.2 ASYMMETRIC NETWORK INTERDICTION UNDER RISK
In the shortest path network interdiction model presented in Chapter 2, first the protector
interdicts the arcs, then the evader finds the shortest path using his estimates of the arc
lengths. The true length of this path is calculated to evaluate the performance of the
interdiction plan. If the evader uses the true arc lengths as his estimates to find the shortest
path, then he will find the true shortest path on the interdicted network. The length of this
path may be shorter than the true shortest path if the protector interdicted the arcs based on
the worst case scenario assuming that there was no information asymmetry between herself
and the evader. This is the risk arising due to the assumption that the interdictor knows
the evader’s estimates of arc lengths. We want to limit this risk, i.e., we want the length of
the true shortest path on the interdicted network to be greater than a threshold value. This
threshold value can be a certain percentage (e.g. 95%) of the length of the shortest path
found when the interdiction plan was calculated based on the worst case scenario.
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4.2.1 Formulation
In this chapter, we use the definitions in Chapter 2. In addition to those, let y¯k be the
variable representing whether or not arc k is on the true shortest path. As a result of the
structure of the shortest path problem, y¯k is continuous rather than binary. For a given
interdiction plan xˆ, the true shortest path in the network can be determined by solving the
following problem:
[TSP(xˆ)]: min
y¯
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxˆk)y¯k, (4.1a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
y¯k −
∑
k∈RS(i)
y¯k =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(4.1b)
y¯k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
Let u¯i be the dual variable corresponding to node i in (4.1b). Then, the dual problem of
[TSP(xˆ)] is:
[TSPD(xˆ)]: max
u¯
u¯0 − u¯n, (4.2a)
u¯i − u¯j ≤ ck + dkxˆk, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A. (4.2b)
In the above formulation, u¯0 − u¯i represents the length of the shortest path from node 0 to
node i based on the arc lengths ck + dkxˆk. The optimal objective function values of these
two formulations are same and are equal to the length of the shortest path in G(N,A) with
arc lengths ck + dkxˆk. If we combine constraints (4.1b) and (4.2b) in a single formulation,
and add a constraint stating that the objective function values (4.1a) and (4.2a) should be
equal, then we convert the shortest path problem into a feasibility problem:
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[TSPF(xˆ)]:
∑
k∈FS(i)
y¯k −
∑
k∈RS(i)
y¯k =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
u¯i − u¯j ≤ ck + dkxˆk, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A,
u¯n − u¯0 +
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxˆk)y¯k = 0,
y¯k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A.
Any feasible solution to [TSPF(xˆ)] gives a shortest path on G(N,A) with arc lengths
ck + dkxˆk. Note that, there is no objective function in the above formulation since it is
a feasibility problem rather than an optimization problem. Any objective function value
can be used with [TSPF(xˆ)]. Now, we can combine [TSPF(xˆ)] with [SPNI-L] formulation
in Chapter 2, and add a constraint stating that the length of the true shortest path on
the interdicted network should be greater than a threshold value, z, and get the following
formulation:
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[SPNIA-R]: max
x,y,y¯,u,u¯
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxk)yk, (4.3a)
∑
k∈FS(i)
yk −
∑
k∈RS(i)
yk =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(4.3b)
ui − uj − d¯kxk ≤ c¯k, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A, (4.3c)
un − u0 +
∑
k∈A
(c¯k + d¯kxk)yk = 0, (4.3d)
∑
k∈FS(i)
y¯k −
∑
k∈RS(i)
y¯k =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
(4.3e)
u¯i − u¯j − dkxk ≤ ck, ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A, (4.3f)
u¯n − u¯0 +
∑
k∈A
(ck + dkxk)y¯k = 0, (4.3g)
u¯0 − u¯n ≥ z, (4.3h)
yk, y¯k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A,
x ∈ X.
[SPNIAR] is a non-linear mixed integer program since there are non-linear terms in the
objective function in constraints (4.3d) and (4.3g). However, these terms can be linearized
by defining new variables vk, wk to replace yk, and v¯k, w¯k to replace y¯k similar to the ones
defined in Section 2.2. This results in the following linear mixed integer program:
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[SPNIA-RL]: max
x,v,w,v¯,w¯,u,u¯
∑
k∈A
(ckvk + (ck + dk)wk),
∑
k∈FS(i)
(vk + wk)−
∑
k∈RS(i)
(vk + wk) =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
ui − uj − d¯kxk ≤ c¯k ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A,
un − u0 +
∑
k∈A
(c¯kvk + (c¯k + d¯k)wk) = 0,
vk + xk ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ A,
wk − xk ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ A,
∑
k∈FS(i)
(v¯k + w¯k)−
∑
k∈RS(i)
(v¯k + w¯k) =

1, i = 0,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
−1, i = n,
u¯i − u¯j − dkxk ≤ ck ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A,
u¯n − u¯0 +
∑
k∈A
(ckv¯k + (ck + dkxk)w¯k) = 0,
u¯0 − u¯n ≥ z,
v¯k + xk ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ A,
w¯k − xk ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ A,
vk, wk, v¯k, w¯k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ A,
x ∈ X.
Remark: In the above formulation, if there are multiple shortest paths for the evader,
then we assume that he will take the one which is longer when evaluated with the arc lengths
ck+dkxk. This can be interpreted as the cooperation of the evader with the protector (or the
best case scenario) in case of multiple shortest paths. A similar formulation to [SPNI-D(θˆ)]
can be developed if the worst case scenario is assumed in the case of multiple shortest paths
for the evader.
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4.2.2 Computational Study
In this section we investigate the results of including the risk criterion presented in the model.
We use the same data samples that were presented in Chapter 2, and compare the results of
the formulations with and without the risk criterion.
We first compare the results of asymmetric network interdiction problem under risk
with the results of network interdiction problem without information asymmetry. For this
purpose, we compare the results of [SPNIA-L] formulation with the results of [MXSP-D]
formulation used in Israeli and Wood [34]. Both formulations were solved using standard
branch-and-bound algorithms of CPLEX 9.0. The results are presented in Appendix C, and
summarized in Table 4.1. In the table, Q, T, %I and %R are as defined in Section 2.4, except
that [SPNIA-L] formulation is used instead of [SPNI-D(θˆ)]. In these examples, the threshold
value for the true shortest path is calculated by taking the 95% of the length of the shortest
path when no information asymmetry is assumed, i.e., z = 0.95z∗4 .
A summary of Table 4.1 is given in Table 4.2, and is illustrated in Figure 4.1. As can be
seen from the table and the figure, the benefit gained by modeling the information asymmetry
is larger than the risk arising because of it most of the time. For example, for Q = 0.6 and
B = 5, the benefit is 6.3%, whereas the risk is only 2.8%; and for Q = 0.7 and B = 15, the
benefit is 7.1%, whereas the risk is only 3.7%. The difference between the benefit and the
risk becomes more significant as the level of information the evader has (Q) decreases. If the
protector knows that the evader’s estimates are not very accurate, then she can reap a large
reward with a reasonable amount of risk.
When we compare the results of this chapter with the results of Chapter 2, we see that
the benefits of the model in this chapter is smaller than the benefits of the model in Chapter
2, but the difference is not that significant. However, the risk of the model in this chapter
is much smaller than the risk of the model in Chapter 2. Therefore, if the protector knows
the estimates of the evader, we suggest to use the models in Chapter 2; but if the level of
confidence in these estimates is low, we suggest to use the model in Chapter 4.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of results for [MXSP-D] and [SPNIA-L]
Q 0.6 0.7 0.8
Network B T %I %R T %I %R T %I %R
1 5 0.6 4.3 2.2 0.7 2.5 2.3 0.8 1.9 1.3
2 5 0.9 6.8 2.7 1.2 5.1 2.6 1.2 3.5 2.7
3 5 1.8 7.1 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.3 2.7 2.1 2.3
4 5 2.1 7.1 3.2 2.3 4.5 2.9 2.1 2.0 1.8
5 5 3.4 5.2 3.2 2.6 5.7 3.9 2.5 1.3 2.6
6 5 4.2 6.7 2.2 3.6 5.6 2.2 4.2 2.6 1.6
7 5 5.7 7.0 2.6 4.6 3.7 2.4 4.1 1.9 2.2
1 10 3.1 6.1 4.1 2.7 3.9 2.4 1.9 2.6 1.8
2 10 12.6 11.0 4.3 12.5 8.9 3.8 39.2 5.0 2.7
3 10 33.7 10.1 3.9 125.6 5.9 3.0 86.2 4.6 3.4
4 10 17.9 8.1 3.1 22.3 4.6 2.8 17.7 4.3 2.5
5 10 46.6 8.6 4.0 29.2 5.9 3.7 58.9 3.4 3.7
6 10 104.0 8.7 3.4 158.4 4.9 3.2 183.4 2.6 2.6
7 10 246.6 9.8 3.9 113.9 7.0 3.0 90.3 3.3 2.8
1 15 5.3 6.6 3.1 8.1 3.6 3.0 8.3 2.1 2.0
2 15 77.1 9.8 4.2 130.2 7.7 3.9 184.8 4.5 3.5
3 15 615.7 9.6 4.0 703.0 7.5 4.1 769.2 4.0 3.8
4 15 140.5 11.5 4.4 173.5 8.6 4.0 134.3 5.4 2.3
5 15 466.5 10.7 4.3 367.0 7.4 3.5 433.7 4.5 3.4
6 15 1309.7 10.6 4.1 1488.8 7.2 3.4 1335.2 3.6 3.7
7 15 1508.8 11.1 4.3 998.7 7.7 4.1 1565.8 3.7 3.4
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Table 4.2: Summary of benefits and risks.
Q 0.6 0.7 0.8
B %I %R %I %R %I %R
5 6.3 2.8 4.4 2.8 2.0 2.1
10 8.9 3.8 5.9 3.1 3.6 2.8
15 10.0 4.1 7.1 3.7 4.0 3.2
Figure 4.1: Summary of benefits and risks
68
4.3 ASYMMETRIC NETWORK INTERDICTION UNDER
UNCERTAINTY
In the network interdiction models in Chapter 2 and in Section 4.2, we assumed that the
evader does not know the true arc lengths, instead he uses estimates of these arc lengths
to find the shortest path. On the other hand, it was assumed that the protector knows the
values of these estimates. It was mentioned that a risk arises because of this assumption, and
presented a model in Section 4.2 to limit this risk to beneath of given threshold. However,
in certain cases, the protector may not know the exact values of the evader’s estimates. For
example, in the context of the resource allocation problem, there is an information asymmetry
since the evader may not know the true detection probabilities. Also, there is an information
asymmetry in the other direction, since the protector may not know the estimates of the
evader. In this case, the protector may use the values that she thinks are most likely to
represent the estimates of the evader, and analyze the problem using the models developed
in Chapter 2 and Section 4.2; or instead of using point estimates, she can use a probability
distribution to represent the estimates of the evader. In this case, the problem will become
a two-stage stochastic programming problem.
Different approaches may be taken to model the problem as a stochastic program. The
first approach may be risk based, i.e., the protector might want to minimize the probability
that the length of the path that the evader will be less than a certain value. This approach
is appropriate especially for the cases where a single occurrence of an event might be catas-
trophic. Another approach to model the problem as a stochastic program is to minimize
the expected value of the shortest path that the evader will take. This approach is more
appropriate for the cases where the event occurs many times, and the protector attempts to
minimize the number of long-term occurrences. For illustration, we will present the stochas-
tic programming formulation based on the latter approach. In this dissertation we will only
provide the formulation, but will not formally analyze the model. Solutions methodologies
for the provided formulation is left as future research.
The shortest path network interdiction problem with asymmetric information is com-
posed of two stages. In the first stage, the protector interdicts the arcs. In the second stage,
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the evader realizes the arc lengths on the interdicted network, and finds the shortest path
based on this realization. Let ξ be a random event (scenario) that represents a realization of
arc lengths by the evader, and let c¯k(ξ) and d¯k(ξ) be the estimates of ck and dk respectively
by the evader for this scenario. Also, let p(ξ) be the probability that scenario ξ will occur.
Finally, define variables vk(ξ), wk(ξ) and ui(ξ) for every scenario ξ. In [SPNIA-L] formula-
tion, if we replace the second stage variables and parameters with the corresponding random
variables and parameters we will get the following stochastic programming formulation:
[SPNIA-LS]: max
x,v,w,u
∑
ξ
p(ξ){
∑
k∈A
(ck(ξ)vk(ξ) + (ck(ξ) + dk(ξ))wk(ξ))},
∑
k∈FS(i)
(vk(ξ) + wk(ξ))−
∑
k∈RS(i)
(vk(ξ) + wk(ξ)) =

1, i = 0, ∀ξ,
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,∀ξ,
−1, i = n, ∀ξ,
ui(ξ)− uj(ξ)− xkd¯k(ξ) ≤ c¯k(ξ), ∀(i, j) = k ∈ A, ∀ξ,
un(ξ)− u0(ξ) +
∑
k∈A
(c¯k(ξ)vk(ξ) + (c¯k(ξ) + d¯k(ξ))wk(ξ)) = 0, ∀ξ,
vk(ξ) + xk ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ A, ∀ξ,
wk(ξ)− xk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ A, ∀ξ,
vk(ξ), wk(ξ) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ A, ∀ξ,
x ∈ X.
A similar formulation can be presented for [SPNI-D(θˆ)] by replacing the second stage
variables with the corresponding random variables. [SPNIA-LS] formulation falls into the
class of standard two-stage stochastic programs, and can be solved using standard stochastic
programming techniques. However, the definition of ξ and p(ξ), and the solution methodol-
ogy are left for future work.
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we presented two approaches to handle the risk arising due to modeling in-
formation asymmetry in the network interdiction models. In the first approach, we modeled
the problem in a way such that the risk is never greater than a certain value. The compu-
tational results showed that significant benefits could be gained while limiting the risk at
a desired level. In the second approach, we modeled the problem as a two-stage stochastic
program based on the expected value formulation.
The computational examples suggest that if the protector has a good intelligence about
the evader and knows the evader’s estimates, the models in Chapter 2 provide more benefit.
However, if the protector does not know the evader’s estimates, the model presented in this
chapter is more appropriate and risk averse.
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5.0 SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
5.1 SUMMARY
This dissertation considered the problem of optimally allocating static and dynamic detection
resources available in order to detect or prevent evaders from reaching their destinations.
The evaders may be terrorists or smugglers attempting to enter a facility or illegally cross
a border. Examples of static detection resources include sensors that detect people and
weapons, cameras and check points, whereas examples of dynamic detection resources include
guards at the borders and unmanned aerial vehicles. It is crucial to use these resources
efficiently to increase the detection probabilities of evaders.
We analyzed the detection resource allocation problem in the context of network inter-
diction problems and inspection games. In the context of network interdiction problems,
we considered the allocation of static detection resources and developed models to help the
protector in allocating her detection resources under information asymmetry. The computa-
tional examples showed that there are benefits as well as risks associated with the modeling
of information asymmetry. We proposed two models to deal with the risk. First model
limits the risk to a threshold value, and the second model helps the protector to calculate
the expected value of the risk under uncertainty. In the context of inspection games, we
considered the allocation of both static and dynamic detection resources. We built a model
that combines the inspection games with the network interdiction models. In this model,
first the protector allocates her static dynamic resources to the regions, then the evader and
the protector play an inspection game.
This dissertation is the first study to introduce the information asymmetry in the net-
work interdiction models, and also the first one to combine the network interdiction models
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and inspection games to analyze the allocation of detection resources. With these contri-
butions, the perimeter and facility security problems can be analyzed more thoroughly and
comprehensively. Also, this dissertation proposes possibilities for a wide range of future
research.
The models in this dissertation are built, solved and analyzed using integer programming,
stochastic programming and game theory techniques. Structural properties of the models
are explored and heuristic algorithms are developed to solve larger problem instances.
5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several possible extensions to this dissertation. Section 5.2.1 discusses several
future research directions for the network interdiction problem with asymmetric informa-
tion, and Section 5.2.2 discusses several future research direction for the perimeter security
problem with interdiction.
5.2.1 Possible Extensions to the Network Interdiction Problem with Asymmet-
ric Information
5.2.1.1 Computational Considerations In Chapter 2, we modeled the network in-
terdiction problem with asymmetric information, and solved the problem using standard
branch-and-bound algorithms. We also proposed how to employ Benders’ decomposition
algorithm for these models in Section 2.3.5. However, Benders’ decomposition algorithm
converged slowly. In order to improve the effectiveness of the Benders’ decomposition algo-
rithm, strong valid inequalities should be added throughout the run. These valid inequalities
can be derived from the structural properties of the problem, and requires attention to solve
larger problem instances effectively.
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We provided a two-stage stochastic programming formulation for the network interdiction
problem when there is a complete information asymmetry between the protector and the
evader in Section 4.3. However, we did not develop solution methodologies to solve this
formulation. L-shaped method based algorithms can be employed to solve this problem.
5.2.1.2 Unknown Origin/Destination In all of the problems discussed in this disser-
tation, we assumed that there is a single origin and a single destination, and they are known
both by the evader and the protector. However, the protector may not know the origin
and destination nodes of the evader, instead she may have a probability distribution for the
origin/destination pairs (e.g. [42]). In this case, we have to incorporate the probabilities and
corresponding variables arising from the stochasticity in the origin/destination pairs. This
problem can be formulated as a two-stage stochastic program and solved using stochastic
programming techniques.
5.2.1.3 Unknown Sensor Locations Another assumption made in all of the models
discussed in this dissertation is that the evader knows the locations of the static detection re-
sources allocated. This is typically a valid assumption , however detection resources can often
be hidden from view. Hence, the evader will have less information about the network, and
his capability to make better decisions will be reduced. The protector can utilize this source
of information asymmetry and plan her detection resource allocation scheme accordingly.
5.2.2 Possible Extensions to the Perimeter Security Problem with Interdiction
5.2.2.1 Multiple Protectors In the perimeter security problem model presented in
Chapter 3, there was a single protector that inspected n regions. As n becomes large,
effectiveness of a single protector decreases, and the need for more than one protector arises.
This generalization can be included in the model by expanding the state space of the problem
and defining new traveling costs. However, this increase in model complexity will require
further computational refinements.
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5.2.2.2 Non-zero Sum Games In the execution phase of the perimeter security prob-
lem model presented in Chapter 3, we assumed that the game was zero-sum, i.e., we assumed
that the cost to the protector was a reward for the evader. However, the evader does not
benefit from the traveling cost of the protector. If we can model the problem to take this
asymmetry into consideration, the game becomes a non-zero game. This results in a more
realistic, but more complex model.
5.2.2.3 Asymmetric Information In the perimeter security problem model presented
in Chapter 3, we assumed that the detection probabilities of the detection resources are
known by both the protector and the evader. however, it is possible that the evader may not
know the true detection probabilities. In this case, a similar approach to the ones in Chapter
2 and Chapter 4 can be employed to account for this information asymmetry. In this case,
the problem will be more complicated and difficult to model. However, if successful, it can
provide great benefits to the protector.
5.2.2.4 Non-linear rewards In the perimeter security problem model presented in
Chapter 3, we assumed that the rewards were linearly dependent on the amount of the
contraband crossing through a region. Also, we assumed that the detection probabilities did
not depend on the amount of the contraband passing through the region. However, if these
are not the case, the theorems developed in Chapter 3 would not be valid, and the problem
would be more difficult to solve. Structural properties of the problem can be investigated
for this more complicated model.
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APPENDIX A
RESULTS OF THE RUNS FOR CHAPTER 2
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Table A1: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 5 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.6 1 5 53.681 47.382 0.328 50.494 50.494
1 0.6 2 5 57.664 55.065 0.484 57.467 55.065
1 0.6 3 5 50.531 46.484 0.375 50.141 46.484
1 0.6 4 5 53.192 47.861 0.249 47.861 47.861
1 0.6 5 5 57.150 46.618 0.094 56.395 51.130
1 0.6 6 5 56.091 47.980 0.937 52.625 52.143
1 0.6 7 5 51.485 43.530 0.359 45.662 45.662
1 0.6 8 5 60.833 50.506 0.234 60.409 55.107
1 0.6 9 5 56.081 46.517 0.453 53.630 53.630
1 0.6 10 5 63.118 55.410 0.296 61.210 59.512
2 0.6 1 5 60.697 45.909 0.187 48.987 48.356
2 0.6 2 5 56.478 48.074 0.546 55.822 49.968
2 0.6 3 5 54.917 45.007 0.641 51.153 48.359
2 0.6 4 5 56.903 47.915 0.656 55.492 52.047
2 0.6 5 5 66.705 50.159 0.203 56.173 53.511
2 0.6 6 5 50.494 41.440 0.250 44.911 43.260
2 0.6 7 5 51.877 43.701 0.515 47.626 45.479
2 0.6 8 5 49.430 43.210 0.765 46.974 45.242
2 0.6 9 5 60.017 50.934 0.297 57.898 52.048
2 0.6 10 5 56.468 47.020 0.297 53.331 49.080
3 0.6 1 5 59.857 46.604 1.203 55.251 52.810
3 0.6 2 5 64.704 51.215 0.250 59.401 53.690
3 0.6 3 5 56.185 45.241 3.249 52.495 49.410
3 0.6 4 5 65.072 49.751 0.969 58.560 55.286
3 0.6 5 5 67.783 57.060 0.688 62.518 59.468
3 0.6 6 5 59.136 50.532 0.390 52.520 50.532
3 0.6 7 5 59.217 49.275 0.641 55.370 50.220
3 0.6 8 5 65.350 53.572 0.297 55.784 55.784
3 0.6 9 5 66.048 55.476 0.406 61.987 56.856
3 0.6 10 5 65.045 52.331 0.328 59.382 57.918
4 0.6 1 5 53.217 41.171 0.406 46.188 43.547
4 0.6 2 5 52.100 44.977 0.500 51.020 45.414
4 0.6 3 5 49.240 47.175 0.953 47.762 44.242
4 0.6 4 5 50.850 41.006 0.719 48.367 44.360
4 0.6 5 5 54.362 42.134 0.406 47.852 45.089
4 0.6 6 5 41.328 36.163 1.062 39.596 38.116
4 0.6 7 5 41.816 34.539 1.859 37.584 36.679
4 0.6 8 5 49.754 34.591 0.265 43.766 39.221
4 0.6 9 5 49.562 39.079 0.797 45.914 44.711
4 0.6 10 5 46.364 39.415 2.890 44.184 42.265
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Table A2: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 5 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.6 1 5 53.531 46.267 1.703 50.584 49.750
5 0.6 2 5 51.747 42.279 2.234 47.544 45.951
5 0.6 3 5 56.686 42.517 0.375 49.295 47.745
5 0.6 4 5 56.424 42.653 1.844 50.367 49.006
5 0.6 5 5 50.287 42.827 0.719 44.772 44.735
5 0.6 6 5 48.446 44.281 9.016 48.444 46.388
5 0.6 7 5 53.466 43.715 1.984 48.460 47.555
5 0.6 8 5 55.003 45.974 0.609 55.003 45.974
5 0.6 9 5 52.924 42.920 2.031 48.892 48.892
5 0.6 10 5 53.377 48.557 2.531 49.294 48.889
6 0.6 1 5 61.338 51.976 1.265 61.007 58.927
6 0.6 2 5 64.172 55.249 1.016 60.908 57.445
6 0.6 3 5 66.951 56.518 1.234 59.393 57.353
6 0.6 4 5 61.667 53.747 9.609 60.580 54.758
6 0.6 5 5 64.523 49.907 1.047 54.024 54.024
6 0.6 6 5 68.488 60.593 1.328 63.400 63.400
6 0.6 7 5 62.498 50.574 1.250 54.408 53.574
6 0.6 8 5 62.452 49.603 1.391 61.369 51.998
6 0.6 9 5 63.448 58.723 1.797 61.952 59.424
6 0.6 10 5 59.267 55.565 1.437 55.565 55.565
7 0.6 1 5 65.851 53.594 1.343 59.343 56.025
7 0.6 2 5 62.436 53.989 1.109 55.717 53.520
7 0.6 3 5 65.453 55.349 6.828 66.008 62.095
7 0.6 4 5 59.391 48.744 2.547 53.339 53.052
7 0.6 5 5 56.119 52.740 1.328 54.865 53.972
7 0.6 6 5 53.017 41.405 0.625 46.917 45.612
7 0.6 7 5 54.576 44.069 3.844 49.205 47.727
7 0.6 8 5 66.615 50.218 1.187 60.119 55.195
7 0.6 9 5 67.598 50.368 10.406 61.203 57.505
7 0.6 10 5 58.242 48.825 1.156 56.074 52.409
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Table A3: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 5 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.7 1 5 51.487 44.160 0.281 50.494 50.494
1 0.7 2 5 57.664 55.065 0.265 57.467 55.065
1 0.7 3 5 48.745 45.924 0.563 46.484 46.484
1 0.7 4 5 50.101 42.223 0.313 47.861 47.861
1 0.7 5 5 51.749 49.011 0.171 51.130 51.130
1 0.7 6 5 53.927 49.995 0.984 52.625 52.143
1 0.7 7 5 48.621 44.885 0.453 45.662 45.662
1 0.7 8 5 60.409 50.506 0.124 56.737 55.107
1 0.7 9 5 56.081 46.517 0.234 53.630 53.630
1 0.7 10 5 61.640 60.237 0.250 61.210 59.512
2 0.7 1 5 57.306 48.156 0.234 48.987 48.356
2 0.7 2 5 53.928 48.074 0.610 52.340 49.968
2 0.7 3 5 51.397 48.059 0.531 51.153 48.359
2 0.7 4 5 55.065 44.410 0.453 55.492 52.047
2 0.7 5 5 58.738 49.250 2.438 56.173 53.511
2 0.7 6 5 45.150 43.499 2.906 44.911 43.260
2 0.7 7 5 50.062 43.701 0.313 47.626 45.479
2 0.7 8 5 47.698 43.210 0.656 45.242 45.242
2 0.7 9 5 57.898 52.048 0.344 57.898 52.048
2 0.7 10 5 53.196 47.407 0.484 51.084 49.080
3 0.7 1 5 59.296 47.436 0.343 55.251 52.810
3 0.7 2 5 59.383 49.979 1.984 55.919 53.690
3 0.7 3 5 53.968 44.174 1.312 52.495 49.410
3 0.7 4 5 62.059 52.179 1.156 58.560 55.286
3 0.7 5 5 64.938 57.060 1.281 62.518 59.468
3 0.7 6 5 54.102 50.450 1.859 52.520 50.532
3 0.7 7 5 54.120 46.462 1.875 50.367 50.220
3 0.7 8 5 57.202 53.572 2.906 55.784 55.784
3 0.7 9 5 63.929 55.476 0.391 61.987 56.856
3 0.7 10 5 62.948 55.095 0.484 59.382 57.918
4 0.7 1 5 49.424 42.326 0.656 46.188 43.547
4 0.7 2 5 49.147 44.977 0.672 46.356 45.414
4 0.7 3 5 46.211 41.129 1.062 44.581 44.242
4 0.7 4 5 49.566 40.756 0.437 45.246 44.360
4 0.7 5 5 50.946 41.727 0.375 47.852 45.089
4 0.7 6 5 39.657 33.006 2.266 39.596 38.116
4 0.7 7 5 41.217 36.948 1.453 37.584 36.679
4 0.7 8 5 47.515 37.713 0.250 43.766 39.221
4 0.7 9 5 47.207 42.199 1.062 45.914 44.711
4 0.7 10 5 45.861 39.591 0.859 43.379 42.265
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Table A4: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 5 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.7 1 5 51.003 47.917 1.312 49.874 49.750
5 0.7 2 5 50.197 42.310 2.187 46.066 45.951
5 0.7 3 5 52.839 46.503 1.265 49.295 47.745
5 0.7 4 5 53.420 46.751 2.406 50.367 49.006
5 0.7 5 5 50.287 42.827 0.156 44.772 44.735
5 0.7 6 5 48.444 46.388 1.031 48.444 46.388
5 0.7 7 5 50.087 43.715 2.375 48.460 47.555
5 0.7 8 5 52.187 43.887 0.984 47.963 45.974
5 0.7 9 5 51.041 45.220 1.438 48.892 48.892
5 0.7 10 5 53.377 48.274 0.578 49.294 48.889
6 0.7 1 5 59.648 57.366 1.640 59.648 58.927
6 0.7 2 5 61.887 57.445 1.078 59.993 57.445
6 0.7 3 5 66.153 53.800 0.547 59.393 57.353
6 0.7 4 5 60.580 53.747 5.312 57.767 54.758
6 0.7 5 5 60.916 53.782 0.500 54.024 54.024
6 0.7 6 5 64.552 57.292 6.312 63.400 63.400
6 0.7 7 5 57.547 48.623 1.890 54.408 53.574
6 0.7 8 5 60.248 49.603 1.593 53.873 51.998
6 0.7 9 5 61.952 59.424 1.250 61.952 59.424
6 0.7 10 5 59.267 55.565 0.719 55.565 55.565
7 0.7 1 5 63.422 54.884 1.016 59.343 56.025
7 0.7 2 5 59.594 53.021 1.187 55.717 53.520
7 0.7 3 5 64.159 62.095 3.156 66.008 62.095
7 0.7 4 5 56.915 50.316 2.047 53.339 53.052
7 0.7 5 5 54.865 53.972 0.593 54.865 53.972
7 0.7 6 5 50.594 42.898 0.953 46.917 45.612
7 0.7 7 5 49.721 44.453 4.438 47.727 47.727
7 0.7 8 5 59.019 50.906 2.172 56.812 55.195
7 0.7 9 5 63.212 54.791 11.266 61.203 57.505
7 0.7 10 5 56.208 48.825 1.375 56.074 52.409
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Table A5: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 5 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.8 1 5 51.460 48.952 0.171 50.494 50.494
1 0.8 2 5 55.999 55.065 0.219 55.802 55.065
1 0.8 3 5 48.425 45.924 0.406 46.484 46.484
1 0.8 4 5 49.736 47.778 0.218 47.861 47.861
1 0.8 5 5 51.749 49.011 0.094 51.130 51.130
1 0.8 6 5 53.443 52.143 0.422 52.625 52.143
1 0.8 7 5 47.736 45.654 0.328 45.662 45.662
1 0.8 8 5 57.958 50.506 0.375 56.737 55.107
1 0.8 9 5 54.072 51.895 0.250 53.630 53.630
1 0.8 10 5 61.640 60.237 0.109 61.210 59.512
2 0.8 1 5 51.601 48.156 0.531 48.987 48.356
2 0.8 2 5 51.276 48.538 0.781 49.968 49.968
2 0.8 3 5 51.153 48.059 0.250 49.407 48.359
2 0.8 4 5 52.745 49.112 0.391 53.809 52.047
2 0.8 5 5 56.173 51.231 0.984 56.173 53.511
2 0.8 6 5 44.027 41.440 1.047 43.260 43.260
2 0.8 7 5 48.004 43.421 0.360 47.626 45.479
2 0.8 8 5 45.242 44.263 0.703 45.242 45.242
2 0.8 9 5 55.956 51.053 0.313 54.687 52.048
2 0.8 10 5 53.006 47.020 0.188 49.080 49.080
3 0.8 1 5 55.428 50.723 0.547 55.251 52.810
3 0.8 2 5 57.365 51.654 1.078 55.919 53.690
3 0.8 3 5 51.099 48.401 2.562 49.779 49.410
3 0.8 4 5 57.489 52.303 2.391 55.716 55.286
3 0.8 5 5 62.518 56.208 0.656 60.523 59.468
3 0.8 6 5 51.376 50.532 2.375 51.376 50.532
3 0.8 7 5 51.969 47.191 1.000 50.367 50.220
3 0.8 8 5 56.545 50.630 0.906 55.784 55.784
3 0.8 9 5 60.012 56.562 0.781 58.776 56.856
3 0.8 10 5 62.948 55.095 0.344 59.382 57.918
4 0.8 1 5 46.717 41.171 0.688 45.060 43.547
4 0.8 2 5 46.356 45.414 0.578 46.356 45.414
4 0.8 3 5 44.924 47.175 0.782 44.581 44.242
4 0.8 4 5 46.738 44.359 0.531 45.246 44.360
4 0.8 5 5 47.387 42.134 0.625 45.624 45.089
4 0.8 6 5 37.958 36.163 3.453 38.116 38.116
4 0.8 7 5 38.829 36.336 1.047 36.993 36.679
4 0.8 8 5 40.916 38.122 1.047 39.221 39.221
4 0.8 9 5 45.914 44.891 0.515 45.914 44.711
4 0.8 10 5 43.731 40.868 2.281 43.379 42.265
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Table A6: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 5 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.8 1 5 49.874 48.947 0.984 49.874 49.750
5 0.8 2 5 47.042 43.712 2.859 46.066 45.951
5 0.8 3 5 50.148 46.517 1.281 49.295 47.745
5 0.8 4 5 50.592 46.930 2.656 50.367 49.006
5 0.8 5 5 46.425 41.876 0.359 44.772 44.735
5 0.8 6 5 48.444 45.501 0.359 48.444 46.388
5 0.8 7 5 49.248 46.279 0.906 47.869 47.555
5 0.8 8 5 47.787 43.688 1.469 46.272 45.974
5 0.8 9 5 50.185 46.325 0.734 48.892 48.892
5 0.8 10 5 49.779 48.274 0.953 49.294 48.889
6 0.8 1 5 59.430 58.927 0.718 59.430 58.927
6 0.8 2 5 60.908 57.445 0.578 59.993 57.445
6 0.8 3 5 59.045 52.282 2.062 59.393 57.353
6 0.8 4 5 56.855 53.418 5.688 55.088 54.758
6 0.8 5 5 55.133 51.414 1.187 54.024 54.024
6 0.8 6 5 63.572 60.593 1.265 63.400 63.400
6 0.8 7 5 54.191 48.623 2.594 53.817 53.574
6 0.8 8 5 56.945 52.011 0.750 53.873 51.998
6 0.8 9 5 61.123 58.723 0.703 59.767 59.424
6 0.8 10 5 57.289 55.886 0.828 55.565 55.565
7 0.8 1 5 57.212 53.906 3.515 56.152 56.025
7 0.8 2 5 55.951 53.021 1.297 55.717 53.520
7 0.8 3 5 62.794 62.095 1.468 64.643 62.095
7 0.8 4 5 56.852 53.948 1.500 53.339 53.052
7 0.8 5 5 54.865 53.972 0.359 54.865 53.972
7 0.8 6 5 46.917 45.119 1.890 46.917 45.612
7 0.8 7 5 49.721 45.587 1.281 47.727 47.727
7 0.8 8 5 56.812 55.195 0.640 56.812 55.195
7 0.8 9 5 59.687 56.083 6.203 57.505 57.505
7 0.8 10 5 53.191 50.428 2.422 52.622 52.409
82
Table A7: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 10 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.6 1 10 65.732 55.549 0.484 62.390 59.549
1 0.6 2 10 65.471 59.755 8.093 65.224 62.822
1 0.6 3 10 62.278 54.834 4.249 60.383 57.565
1 0.6 4 10 64.162 56.679 1.749 58.529 58.529
1 0.6 5 10 69.127 55.475 0.234 58.697 58.697
1 0.6 6 10 65.668 55.442 1.031 61.026 59.822
1 0.6 7 10 63.243 55.079 0.499 57.853 57.582
1 0.6 8 10 72.778 57.724 0.656 68.513 63.774
1 0.6 9 10 67.153 59.619 2.890 62.522 62.522
1 0.6 10 10 72.908 67.103 0.968 70.005 69.032
2 0.6 1 10 69.453 51.851 1.703 58.083 56.643
2 0.6 2 10 65.080 51.347 1.625 60.066 55.541
2 0.6 3 10 67.768 55.271 0.687 63.743 58.682
2 0.6 4 10 68.602 53.803 2.765 63.109 58.794
2 0.6 5 10 72.662 54.565 5.468 66.705 60.036
2 0.6 6 10 57.253 46.879 5.421 54.777 48.126
2 0.6 7 10 63.090 50.176 4.343 53.376 52.312
2 0.6 8 10 61.738 50.850 6.984 52.457 52.457
2 0.6 9 10 65.615 55.484 13.578 59.193 58.002
2 0.6 10 10 66.500 51.594 0.781 56.126 55.701
3 0.6 1 10 74.404 55.929 4.546 62.373 60.868
3 0.6 2 10 73.320 53.556 3.078 67.202 61.142
3 0.6 3 10 70.583 56.815 18.843 60.925 60.556
3 0.6 4 10 75.432 58.067 9.875 66.995 63.877
3 0.6 5 10 77.360 60.511 8.203 67.597 67.597
3 0.6 6 10 65.268 52.543 40.750 60.770 55.770
3 0.6 7 10 70.675 49.275 1.203 63.466 56.390
3 0.6 8 10 75.206 56.915 10.078 65.620 63.638
3 0.6 9 10 73.373 59.477 6.999 71.254 64.580
3 0.6 10 10 76.223 59.910 1.453 66.458 65.327
4 0.6 1 10 59.532 46.180 22.921 58.306 50.817
4 0.6 2 10 62.283 47.660 4.531 57.664 52.439
4 0.6 3 10 62.033 53.757 2.843 62.033 53.892
4 0.6 4 10 59.775 50.584 18.281 57.228 52.852
4 0.6 5 10 62.693 42.917 3.843 56.418 52.734
4 0.6 6 10 48.309 40.347 17.718 45.790 42.876
4 0.6 7 10 53.909 42.582 2.015 46.461 45.556
4 0.6 8 10 60.472 45.810 1.171 54.172 47.832
4 0.6 9 10 58.323 47.299 7.718 53.354 53.040
4 0.6 10 10 55.503 45.488 4.187 48.351 46.913
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Table A8: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 10 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.6 1 10 64.612 53.094 12.656 57.562 56.734
5 0.6 2 10 65.661 50.204 7.984 55.321 53.423
5 0.6 3 10 63.898 49.729 38.859 56.117 55.298
5 0.6 4 10 64.017 46.273 63.358 62.424 56.976
5 0.6 5 10 62.083 44.735 2.828 53.044 52.586
5 0.6 6 10 59.309 47.690 2.343 54.075 51.964
5 0.6 7 10 60.445 51.916 184.858 57.627 55.564
5 0.6 8 10 63.446 49.906 7.171 58.638 51.329
5 0.6 9 10 64.142 53.104 7.499 56.262 56.089
5 0.6 10 10 64.034 53.975 14.531 59.714 56.260
6 0.6 1 10 71.853 62.107 30.124 68.475 65.749
6 0.6 2 10 74.179 62.650 39.765 70.694 65.231
6 0.6 3 10 80.277 60.222 10.453 74.337 67.434
6 0.6 4 10 70.943 57.918 52.421 64.733 62.054
6 0.6 5 10 75.799 60.072 12.656 66.422 64.621
6 0.6 6 10 76.149 67.694 22.515 71.505 68.630
6 0.6 7 10 73.141 54.832 49.202 61.791 61.200
6 0.6 8 10 71.841 53.490 94.311 69.694 58.940
6 0.6 9 10 75.492 61.905 21.890 68.002 66.065
6 0.6 10 10 71.364 59.737 21.577 63.254 61.365
7 0.6 1 10 76.697 64.455 2.891 73.890 66.508
7 0.6 2 10 73.047 58.507 29.468 64.113 61.398
7 0.6 3 10 75.859 64.718 176.545 69.360 68.045
7 0.6 4 10 71.218 57.667 2.484 63.741 61.092
7 0.6 5 10 66.510 59.644 70.655 61.572 61.572
7 0.6 6 10 61.101 46.950 9.062 53.126 52.165
7 0.6 7 10 64.826 53.701 83.390 58.697 53.830
7 0.6 8 10 75.098 54.525 221.139 63.701 62.150
7 0.6 9 10 76.516 54.342 1039.258 69.139 65.064
7 0.6 10 10 66.424 52.604 69.452 58.585 56.922
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Table A9: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 10 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.7 1 10 64.963 55.779 0.296 59.549 59.549
1 0.7 2 10 65.224 62.822 1.390 65.224 62.822
1 0.7 3 10 59.984 56.977 4.874 58.897 57.565
1 0.7 4 10 63.186 55.950 0.734 58.529 58.529
1 0.7 5 10 65.716 55.536 0.312 58.697 58.697
1 0.7 6 10 63.020 59.349 1.656 61.026 59.822
1 0.7 7 10 59.383 54.329 1.374 57.853 57.582
1 0.7 8 10 70.896 56.556 0.562 68.513 63.774
1 0.7 9 10 67.153 59.619 0.468 62.522 62.522
1 0.7 10 10 70.005 63.605 3.093 70.005 69.032
2 0.7 1 10 64.565 54.897 2.640 58.083 56.643
2 0.7 2 10 62.230 53.897 7.203 57.471 55.541
2 0.7 3 10 63.743 55.271 2.343 59.214 58.682
2 0.7 4 10 64.790 56.431 10.843 63.109 58.794
2 0.7 5 10 69.451 56.962 4.937 60.512 60.036
2 0.7 6 10 54.777 46.324 11.984 51.737 48.126
2 0.7 7 10 58.520 50.484 12.484 53.376 52.312
2 0.7 8 10 56.040 50.014 23.265 52.457 52.457
2 0.7 9 10 64.322 56.984 3.281 58.220 58.002
2 0.7 10 10 62.522 53.222 1.890 56.126 55.701
3 0.7 1 10 67.922 57.906 14.171 62.373 60.868
3 0.7 2 10 68.948 55.026 7.312 63.720 61.142
3 0.7 3 10 66.773 52.153 28.531 60.925 60.556
3 0.7 4 10 70.601 57.989 22.296 66.995 63.877
3 0.7 5 10 74.361 64.836 8.499 67.597 67.597
3 0.7 6 10 60.588 51.943 583.918 57.730 55.770
3 0.7 7 10 65.524 58.448 4.124 63.466 56.390
3 0.7 8 10 71.773 60.222 7.562 65.620 63.638
3 0.7 9 10 71.254 62.875 5.046 71.254 64.580
3 0.7 10 10 72.790 63.490 3.406 66.458 65.327
4 0.7 1 10 57.034 47.224 4.406 55.483 50.817
4 0.7 2 10 57.664 49.580 11.218 56.186 52.439
4 0.7 3 10 57.309 50.222 5.499 54.396 53.892
4 0.7 4 10 58.172 47.639 2.109 54.308 52.852
4 0.7 5 10 61.340 45.089 2.140 56.418 52.734
4 0.7 6 10 46.745 40.347 10.531 43.754 42.876
4 0.7 7 10 49.136 43.148 13.656 46.461 45.556
4 0.7 8 10 55.799 45.179 2.656 54.172 47.832
4 0.7 9 10 55.066 47.466 16.703 53.354 53.040
4 0.7 10 10 52.123 43.787 23.609 47.652 46.913
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Table A10: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 10 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.7 1 10 62.114 54.245 5.328 57.562 56.734
5 0.7 2 10 59.031 50.204 67.437 53.843 53.423
5 0.7 3 10 60.282 49.729 25.671 56.117 55.298
5 0.7 4 10 62.424 54.704 13.281 57.991 56.976
5 0.7 5 10 59.432 48.455 1.687 53.044 52.586
5 0.7 6 10 56.741 49.623 9.218 52.501 51.964
5 0.7 7 10 58.158 51.571 126.592 57.627 55.564
5 0.7 8 10 59.811 49.605 8.109 58.638 51.329
5 0.7 9 10 60.530 54.515 23.046 56.262 56.089
5 0.7 10 10 61.904 53.975 6.390 59.714 56.260
6 0.7 1 10 68.475 62.686 51.249 68.475 65.749
6 0.7 2 10 70.694 64.301 50.484 65.772 65.231
6 0.7 3 10 78.859 63.830 3.999 72.727 67.434
6 0.7 4 10 66.493 57.918 193.296 64.733 62.054
6 0.7 5 10 73.446 60.072 3.671 66.422 64.621
6 0.7 6 10 73.384 67.575 66.718 71.505 68.630
6 0.7 7 10 68.417 58.170 80.890 61.791 61.200
6 0.7 8 10 69.123 55.300 45.452 59.925 58.940
6 0.7 9 10 70.243 65.020 57.609 68.002 66.065
6 0.7 10 10 66.639 61.365 81.046 63.254 61.365
7 0.7 1 10 73.890 64.077 6.296 70.816 66.508
7 0.7 2 10 67.824 61.398 38.453 64.113 61.398
7 0.7 3 10 73.196 64.843 85.634 69.360 68.045
7 0.7 4 10 66.630 57.667 23.486 61.092 61.092
7 0.7 5 10 63.936 59.531 22.533 61.572 61.572
7 0.7 6 10 56.803 45.825 32.894 53.126 52.165
7 0.7 7 10 59.706 51.256 241.503 54.522 53.830
7 0.7 8 10 70.695 62.343 25.876 63.701 62.150
7 0.7 9 10 71.301 62.785 515.666 69.139 65.064
7 0.7 10 10 63.185 54.106 48.265 58.585 56.922
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Table A11: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 10 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.8 1 10 62.760 57.673 0.265 59.549 59.549
1 0.8 2 10 64.362 62.520 0.687 63.559 62.822
1 0.8 3 10 59.722 56.977 1.406 58.897 57.565
1 0.8 4 10 61.026 56.688 1.109 58.529 58.529
1 0.8 5 10 61.435 57.468 0.281 58.697 58.697
1 0.8 6 10 61.608 59.696 1.562 61.026 59.822
1 0.8 7 10 58.550 54.329 0.812 57.853 57.582
1 0.8 8 10 66.506 63.774 2.672 66.303 63.774
1 0.8 9 10 64.856 59.619 1.015 62.522 62.522
1 0.8 10 10 70.005 67.111 0.500 70.005 69.032
2 0.8 1 10 61.730 55.308 2.375 58.083 56.643
2 0.8 2 10 60.390 53.213 3.421 56.584 55.541
2 0.8 3 10 62.037 56.984 1.031 59.214 58.682
2 0.8 4 10 62.045 56.431 5.328 59.538 58.794
2 0.8 5 10 66.705 58.016 0.484 60.512 60.036
2 0.8 6 10 50.086 47.581 153.563 50.086 48.126
2 0.8 7 10 56.369 50.415 3.265 53.376 52.312
2 0.8 8 10 55.768 52.091 3.187 52.457 52.457
2 0.8 9 10 60.293 55.806 10.500 58.220 58.002
2 0.8 10 10 59.068 54.081 1.531 56.126 55.701
3 0.8 1 10 63.929 57.203 54.312 60.909 60.868
3 0.8 2 10 65.878 56.893 9.031 61.142 61.142
3 0.8 3 10 64.503 58.387 3.656 60.925 60.556
3 0.8 4 10 65.918 58.067 86.172 64.151 63.877
3 0.8 5 10 71.101 63.252 5.218 67.597 67.597
3 0.8 6 10 58.205 54.908 149.171 57.730 55.770
3 0.8 7 10 60.521 55.219 18.593 56.945 56.390
3 0.8 8 10 67.635 61.525 20.140 63.638 63.638
3 0.8 9 10 68.130 62.875 12.609 65.514 64.580
3 0.8 10 10 69.224 64.730 5.703 66.458 65.327
4 0.8 1 10 53.199 47.049 14.046 50.817 50.817
4 0.8 2 10 54.660 49.839 11.875 52.942 52.439
4 0.8 3 10 56.343 53.757 2.344 53.901 53.892
4 0.8 4 10 54.308 52.852 5.375 54.308 52.852
4 0.8 5 10 57.536 48.572 1.453 54.190 52.734
4 0.8 6 10 45.415 42.806 9.765 43.754 42.876
4 0.8 7 10 47.115 43.667 9.109 45.870 45.556
4 0.8 8 10 52.323 45.810 2.265 49.627 47.832
4 0.8 9 10 53.264 48.828 14.671 53.354 53.040
4 0.8 10 10 49.917 46.445 22.016 47.652 46.913
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Table A12: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 10 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.8 1 10 58.953 53.094 7.031 57.562 56.734
5 0.8 2 10 54.781 51.567 84.953 53.843 53.423
5 0.8 3 10 58.320 51.427 10.500 56.117 55.298
5 0.8 4 10 58.799 54.704 36.531 56.976 56.976
5 0.8 5 10 56.675 48.455 2.171 53.044 52.586
5 0.8 6 10 54.535 49.333 5.718 52.501 51.964
5 0.8 7 10 56.100 50.835 75.562 56.178 55.564
5 0.8 8 10 55.195 49.906 30.406 54.093 51.329
5 0.8 9 10 59.237 54.440 7.015 56.262 56.089
5 0.8 10 10 59.421 54.881 9.281 57.533 56.260
6 0.8 1 10 67.826 64.117 15.328 67.062 65.749
6 0.8 2 10 67.832 63.037 38.797 65.772 65.231
6 0.8 3 10 70.998 63.830 34.343 72.727 67.434
6 0.8 4 10 63.610 58.164 340.203 62.054 62.054
6 0.8 5 10 69.907 60.072 3.171 66.422 64.621
6 0.8 6 10 71.869 67.963 14.656 71.505 68.630
6 0.8 7 10 64.170 58.845 182.141 61.200 61.200
6 0.8 8 10 64.571 56.654 30.078 59.925 58.940
6 0.8 9 10 67.997 65.020 12.828 67.195 66.065
6 0.8 10 10 64.954 59.737 43.875 63.254 61.365
7 0.8 1 10 67.803 62.801 25.843 66.508 66.508
7 0.8 2 10 64.889 59.380 22.656 64.113 61.398
7 0.8 3 10 71.350 66.333 29.906 69.360 68.045
7 0.8 4 10 62.527 58.000 135.125 61.092 61.092
7 0.8 5 10 63.431 60.393 11.828 61.572 61.572
7 0.8 6 10 53.789 49.965 50.984 53.126 52.165
7 0.8 7 10 57.118 51.885 39.343 54.522 53.830
7 0.8 8 10 66.598 61.470 30.985 63.701 62.150
7 0.8 9 10 68.415 62.785 54.109 65.441 65.064
7 0.8 10 10 60.933 56.082 22.281 57.556 56.922
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Table A13: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 15 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.6 1 15 71.649 62.376 3.000 68.503 66.376
1 0.6 2 15 75.133 67.400 2.375 68.981 68.675
1 0.6 3 15 72.097 61.713 7.593 67.605 66.521
1 0.6 4 15 73.423 60.069 0.469 65.043 65.043
1 0.6 5 15 74.565 61.544 0.718 71.154 64.585
1 0.6 6 15 73.718 62.801 0.375 65.095 64.048
1 0.6 7 15 69.563 63.057 0.828 66.770 64.048
1 0.6 8 15 82.153 63.774 1.343 76.907 70.034
1 0.6 9 15 75.719 58.087 2.609 70.157 69.297
1 0.6 10 15 78.609 69.030 15.829 76.447 74.733
2 0.6 1 15 73.950 57.061 63.002 65.313 64.019
2 0.6 2 15 70.153 53.832 68.345 66.474 61.183
2 0.6 3 15 77.055 58.682 0.390 67.768 65.697
2 0.6 4 15 75.240 58.187 18.297 67.096 64.898
2 0.6 5 15 79.313 55.276 28.922 67.304 66.130
2 0.6 6 15 64.288 50.421 0.890 57.501 53.637
2 0.6 7 15 70.578 50.720 4.718 60.585 57.894
2 0.6 8 15 67.456 52.091 158.050 59.608 57.876
2 0.6 9 15 71.810 58.506 15.734 65.906 61.900
2 0.6 10 15 70.896 54.081 3.188 63.078 60.184
3 0.6 1 15 78.476 61.194 667.614 69.489 67.045
3 0.6 2 15 77.564 58.216 154.734 72.028 67.370
3 0.6 3 15 82.601 59.827 7.828 69.817 67.910
3 0.6 4 15 83.987 58.067 60.250 74.612 70.689
3 0.6 5 15 84.278 66.550 91.968 75.635 72.883
3 0.6 6 15 71.092 56.214 113.437 61.656 60.367
3 0.6 7 15 74.975 53.931 127.515 67.015 62.376
3 0.6 8 15 82.197 63.218 151.937 71.846 71.846
3 0.6 9 15 79.461 65.194 130.656 75.506 70.113
3 0.6 10 15 82.905 63.644 7.953 71.408 70.721
4 0.6 1 15 65.898 49.282 169.890 58.306 55.532
4 0.6 2 15 70.100 54.175 16.140 58.756 57.695
4 0.6 3 15 69.667 52.334 65.406 69.122 60.841
4 0.6 4 15 66.564 53.647 48.312 59.590 58.072
4 0.6 5 15 67.089 49.287 29.765 59.076 56.454
4 0.6 6 15 56.247 44.786 43.421 48.031 47.329
4 0.6 7 15 61.694 47.839 2.703 55.162 51.721
4 0.6 8 15 67.383 49.097 18.578 53.416 53.161
4 0.6 9 15 64.836 48.680 47.203 57.350 56.396
4 0.6 10 15 58.847 44.946 449.937 55.598 51.618
89
Table A14: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 15 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.6 1 15 71.013 58.809 314.796 65.743 60.815
5 0.6 2 15 71.429 53.993 178.406 59.817 58.854
5 0.6 3 15 72.645 52.411 267.671 61.241 60.422
5 0.6 4 15 71.469 54.704 340.796 63.424 62.236
5 0.6 5 15 68.597 48.692 13.281 60.452 56.690
5 0.6 6 15 65.869 51.207 1.984 56.903 55.032
5 0.6 7 15 67.941 55.126 967.718 66.342 61.662
5 0.6 8 15 68.415 50.441 335.750 63.446 55.947
5 0.6 9 15 71.956 58.933 26.468 63.897 61.198
5 0.6 10 15 70.218 53.560 159.875 66.126 61.378
6 0.6 1 15 81.846 65.534 78.812 74.020 71.294
6 0.6 2 15 81.127 64.758 686.734 72.605 70.882
6 0.6 3 15 90.095 62.045 111.437 77.805 74.749
6 0.6 4 15 76.485 63.316 1010.328 69.440 68.279
6 0.6 5 15 84.228 60.072 79.140 73.933 70.213
6 0.6 6 15 82.402 69.764 40.687 74.898 74.232
6 0.6 7 15 80.506 58.588 404.218 69.884 67.659
6 0.6 8 15 79.661 56.021 1862.671 65.244 64.033
6 0.6 9 15 83.186 66.905 63.860 71.728 70.248
6 0.6 10 15 78.402 60.971 288.000 70.292 67.341
7 0.6 1 15 83.187 67.844 67.109 77.697 70.726
7 0.6 2 15 78.810 60.439 2503.637 68.093 66.768
7 0.6 3 15 85.981 68.045 356.290 74.219 74.123
7 0.6 4 15 75.232 58.018 762.098 70.608 67.500
7 0.6 5 15 75.513 63.135 574.090 68.292 67.468
7 0.6 6 15 68.058 49.192 57.484 60.132 58.294
7 0.6 7 15 71.166 55.759 1132.021 61.242 57.853
7 0.6 8 15 82.467 60.045 368.096 70.695 68.508
7 0.6 9 15 85.521 60.015 1338.358 73.839 72.426
7 0.6 10 15 63.204 60.134 465.123 61.517 61.517
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Table A15: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 15 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.7 1 15 70.225 63.013 1.188 66.454 66.376
1 0.7 2 15 71.890 67.766 8.562 68.981 68.675
1 0.7 3 15 69.409 63.830 9.516 67.605 66.521
1 0.7 4 15 70.686 59.101 2.390 65.043 65.043
1 0.7 5 15 71.544 60.657 0.203 71.154 64.585
1 0.7 6 15 71.150 62.655 0.594 64.048 64.048
1 0.7 7 15 67.649 58.942 1.125 66.770 64.048
1 0.7 8 15 80.152 66.600 0.578 76.907 70.034
1 0.7 9 15 72.644 63.817 19.828 70.157 69.297
1 0.7 10 15 77.280 72.519 3.688 76.447 74.733
2 0.7 1 15 71.096 60.249 13.578 65.313 64.019
2 0.7 2 15 67.373 58.862 65.797 62.992 61.183
2 0.7 3 15 73.752 60.213 0.828 67.768 65.697
2 0.7 4 15 72.494 60.471 23.906 67.096 64.898
2 0.7 5 15 75.042 61.855 11.031 67.304 66.130
2 0.7 6 15 60.615 50.002 83.422 57.501 53.637
2 0.7 7 15 66.932 54.674 8.781 60.585 57.894
2 0.7 8 15 62.992 56.375 291.250 57.876 57.876
2 0.7 9 15 69.298 58.242 18.391 65.906 61.900
2 0.7 10 15 67.322 56.270 1.844 60.926 60.184
3 0.7 1 15 74.404 59.455 637.969 69.489 67.045
3 0.7 2 15 74.494 63.198 199.328 68.546 67.370
3 0.7 3 15 77.029 62.270 65.391 69.817 67.910
3 0.7 4 15 78.231 63.877 259.906 74.612 70.689
3 0.7 5 15 80.778 70.100 57.672 75.635 72.883
3 0.7 6 15 79.134 71.235 86.331 77.123 73.152
3 0.7 7 15 72.245 59.337 158.145 64.025 62.376
3 0.7 8 15 78.873 63.218 97.658 71.846 71.846
3 0.7 9 15 77.678 69.516 18.625 70.113 70.113
3 0.7 10 15 80.249 62.397 10.719 71.408 70.721
4 0.7 1 15 62.129 49.724 250.788 55.532 55.532
4 0.7 2 15 64.802 55.794 80.471 58.756 57.695
4 0.7 3 15 63.636 57.433 412.792 61.607 60.841
4 0.7 4 15 65.477 53.653 51.424 58.072 58.072
4 0.7 5 15 65.831 49.762 8.797 59.076 56.454
4 0.7 6 15 53.679 44.786 11.344 48.031 47.329
4 0.7 7 15 58.565 51.474 13.032 52.161 51.721
4 0.7 8 15 62.449 48.932 25.547 53.416 53.161
4 0.7 9 15 60.415 55.303 569.499 56.575 56.396
4 0.7 10 15 56.963 45.767 85.299 52.538 51.618
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Table A16: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 15 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.7 1 15 67.220 59.409 151.926 65.743 60.815
5 0.7 2 15 65.992 54.762 1010.870 58.902 58.854
5 0.7 3 15 67.366 54.666 556.670 61.241 60.422
5 0.7 4 15 69.405 57.132 119.238 63.424 62.236
5 0.7 5 15 64.095 51.551 103.612 57.318 56.690
5 0.7 6 15 61.895 52.576 25.781 55.569 55.032
5 0.7 7 15 65.398 58.420 145.441 66.342 61.662
5 0.7 8 15 65.454 51.459 86.455 63.446 55.947
5 0.7 9 15 66.412 59.012 711.706 63.897 61.198
5 0.7 10 15 68.221 55.362 39.626 62.348 61.378
6 0.7 1 15 78.053 66.833 117.503 74.020 71.294
6 0.7 2 15 77.076 66.787 1751.014 71.002 70.882
6 0.7 3 15 86.761 69.132 72.674 77.805 74.749
6 0.7 4 15 73.348 67.152 725.940 69.440 68.279
6 0.7 5 15 78.943 63.792 194.302 73.933 70.213
6 0.7 6 15 80.166 69.764 63.424 74.898 74.232
6 0.7 7 15 75.459 62.889 1564.509 69.884 67.659
6 0.7 8 15 75.460 63.218 1100.090 65.244 64.033
6 0.7 9 15 76.584 67.533 1160.170 71.728 70.248
6 0.7 10 15 74.616 61.365 719.440 70.292 67.341
7 0.7 1 15 78.208 70.275 1510.602 74.623 70.726
7 0.7 2 15 74.395 62.392 880.475 68.093 66.768
7 0.7 3 15 80.486 69.386 1484.710 74.219 74.123
7 0.7 4 15 74.726 63.456 50.610 68.029 67.500
7 0.7 5 15 70.403 64.529 1400.129 68.292 67.468
7 0.7 6 15 63.051 50.803 194.614 60.132 58.294
7 0.7 7 15 66.805 56.885 1694.528 58.545 57.853
7 0.7 8 15 76.379 66.817 714.424 70.695 68.508
7 0.7 9 15 75.125 65.123 754.101 71.985 68.235
7 0.7 10 15 69.371 58.477 559.639 61.517 61.517
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Table A17: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 15 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.8 1 15 68.022 63.826 1.093 66.454 66.376
1 0.8 2 15 69.708 68.532 15.907 68.981 68.675
1 0.8 3 15 67.605 66.283 6.485 67.605 66.521
1 0.8 4 15 66.918 62.191 7.094 65.043 65.043
1 0.8 5 15 67.067 64.585 0.515 67.067 64.585
1 0.8 6 15 68.818 62.821 1.046 64.048 64.048
1 0.8 7 15 66.543 63.905 0.578 65.520 64.048
1 0.8 8 15 77.110 67.832 0.672 71.251 70.034
1 0.8 9 15 71.126 66.915 6.828 70.157 69.297
1 0.8 10 15 77.175 72.792 0.578 76.447 74.733
2 0.8 1 15 67.652 61.308 52.689 65.313 64.019
2 0.8 2 15 66.474 59.402 6.469 62.992 61.183
2 0.8 3 15 71.071 62.624 2.390 67.768 65.697
2 0.8 4 15 68.798 63.729 185.223 67.096 64.898
2 0.8 5 15 72.125 62.277 5.656 66.146 66.130
2 0.8 6 15 56.227 51.702 761.270 55.850 53.637
2 0.8 7 15 63.090 55.255 8.891 60.585 57.894
2 0.8 8 15 61.738 53.532 32.329 57.876 57.876
2 0.8 9 15 66.152 59.682 48.220 65.906 61.900
2 0.8 10 15 64.666 57.457 7.078 60.926 60.184
3 0.8 1 15 71.217 63.597 249.381 68.025 67.045
3 0.8 2 15 72.560 63.198 23.375 68.546 67.370
3 0.8 3 15 72.345 63.668 188.630 69.817 67.910
3 0.8 4 15 75.218 66.270 94.393 72.119 70.689
3 0.8 5 15 77.782 70.100 32.579 73.946 72.883
3 0.8 6 15 67.094 60.287 320.009 64.025 62.376
3 0.8 7 15 70.231 64.123 185.145 68.237 65.859
3 0.8 8 15 75.479 69.845 87.049 71.846 71.846
3 0.8 9 15 73.676 69.605 85.236 70.113 70.113
3 0.8 10 15 76.541 66.446 29.797 71.408 70.721
4 0.8 1 15 58.665 51.350 245.319 55.532 55.532
4 0.8 2 15 62.357 55.935 9.141 58.756 57.695
4 0.8 3 15 62.823 57.831 15.203 61.112 60.841
4 0.8 4 15 61.070 56.832 26.860 58.072 58.072
4 0.8 5 15 61.740 52.725 49.767 59.076 56.454
4 0.8 6 15 50.060 46.866 89.518 48.031 47.329
4 0.8 7 15 54.518 50.880 46.970 52.161 51.721
4 0.8 8 15 58.038 48.932 28.126 53.416 53.161
4 0.8 9 15 58.415 54.949 386.666 56.575 56.396
4 0.8 10 15 55.598 51.187 22.563 52.538 51.618
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Table A18: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 15 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.8 1 15 65.343 59.409 41.126 62.328 60.815
5 0.8 2 15 61.722 54.371 614.500 58.902 58.854
5 0.8 3 15 64.079 57.265 202.692 61.241 60.422
5 0.8 4 15 65.449 58.157 180.520 62.315 62.236
5 0.8 5 15 61.583 55.758 74.549 57.318 56.690
5 0.8 6 15 59.327 52.576 13.859 55.569 55.032
5 0.8 7 15 62.349 58.667 961.134 62.330 61.662
5 0.8 8 15 61.995 54.660 35.751 58.901 55.947
5 0.8 9 15 63.897 59.836 292.679 62.751 61.198
5 0.8 10 15 64.013 59.213 567.546 62.348 61.378
6 0.8 1 15 74.295 69.293 460.074 72.607 71.294
6 0.8 2 15 73.989 67.858 264.553 71.002 70.882
6 0.8 3 15 79.827 69.132 270.741 77.805 74.749
6 0.8 4 15 70.138 65.295 1507.273 69.440 68.279
6 0.8 5 15 76.004 63.792 93.112 72.584 70.213
6 0.8 6 15 77.838 69.764 96.252 75.426 74.232
6 0.8 7 15 71.912 63.103 1325.643 69.884 67.659
6 0.8 8 15 69.886 61.722 1182.343 65.244 64.033
6 0.8 9 15 74.237 68.600 156.301 70.921 70.248
6 0.8 10 15 72.313 65.111 93.846 70.292 67.341
7 0.8 1 15 74.240 69.263 957.618 71.432 70.726
7 0.8 2 15 70.784 63.294 671.970 68.093 66.768
7 0.8 3 15 78.083 70.218 444.699 74.219 74.123
7 0.8 4 15 70.499 63.428 214.818 68.029 67.500
7 0.8 5 15 69.090 66.945 220.990 67.631 67.468
7 0.8 6 15 59.888 58.144 162.566 58.309 58.294
7 0.8 7 15 63.115 57.786 277.819 58.545 57.853
7 0.8 8 15 73.592 65.910 39.610 70.695 68.508
7 0.8 9 15 70.887 63.586 336.547 65.985 62.588
7 0.8 10 15 65.548 61.900 1638.651 61.517 61.517
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Table A19: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 20 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.6 1 20 77.849 65.767 2.172 72.138 72.138
1 0.6 2 20 82.057 73.549 0.594 76.726 73.987
1 0.6 3 20 78.546 66.689 21.438 72.876 72.361
1 0.6 4 20 78.130 62.662 1.203 68.396 68.347
1 0.6 5 20 76.528 63.192 2.390 71.089 64.585
1 0.6 6 20 76.853 64.194 6.188 68.825 68.175
1 0.6 7 20 73.386 66.954 1.593 70.939 69.316
1 0.6 8 20 86.502 67.832 4.922 79.489 75.620
1 0.6 9 20 80.396 67.933 22.016 75.994 73.985
1 0.6 10 20 83.562 76.284 52.314 81.896 80.229
2 0.6 1 20 77.932 62.756 382.666 70.295 67.534
2 0.6 2 20 76.202 58.460 176.770 69.152 65.298
2 0.6 3 20 81.295 61.911 6.937 73.798 69.756
2 0.6 4 20 82.148 66.425 77.283 71.700 71.316
2 0.6 5 20 84.959 61.609 67.752 74.631 68.842
2 0.6 6 20 67.080 51.198 80.971 60.417 56.633
2 0.6 7 20 74.239 54.005 198.677 65.447 61.719
2 0.6 8 20 73.264 55.875 299.789 62.644 62.203
2 0.6 9 20 76.786 60.976 56.564 69.021 65.257
2 0.6 10 20 73.250 57.571 37.345 65.001 63.832
3 0.6 1 20 85.627 64.131 287.085 74.730 71.989
3 0.6 2 20 84.531 60.531 46.235 76.644 72.045
3 0.6 3 20 88.176 65.697 87.596 78.441 74.179
3 0.6 4 20 91.604 68.104 178.145 77.625 77.232
3 0.6 5 20 91.686 66.701 163.020 78.732 78.349
3 0.6 6 20 75.381 61.181 678.001 68.594 64.406
3 0.6 7 20 80.681 56.165 990.900 70.263 67.831
3 0.6 8 20 87.704 67.998 465.559 75.902 75.794
3 0.6 9 20 85.166 69.437 291.273 75.883 74.111
3 0.6 10 20 87.261 67.276 23.610 78.418 74.537
4 0.6 1 20 73.421 54.104 206.943 65.621 60.102
4 0.6 2 20 73.916 56.389 1721.278 66.173 61.602
4 0.6 3 20 75.966 56.594 223.693 69.935 63.186
4 0.6 4 20 70.472 58.114 1644.933 66.973 63.560
4 0.6 5 20 71.311 52.725 476.012 61.619 59.873
4 0.6 6 20 62.207 43.841 16.282 57.455 50.759
4 0.6 7 20 67.308 53.942 2.656 59.588 57.427
4 0.6 8 20 72.861 50.298 48.892 59.696 56.083
4 0.6 9 20 71.741 60.510 53.939 64.054 61.084
4 0.6 10 20 64.417 51.396 118.753 60.909 55.413
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Table A20: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 20 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.6 1 20 76.573 62.333 3599.691 70.681 66.194
5 0.6 2 20 76.978 57.579 1126.508 67.640 62.443
5 0.6 3 20 77.433 56.522 3598.322 67.000 65.740
5 0.6 4 20 75.540 57.984 3598.381 68.148 66.036
5 0.6 5 20 72.454 52.270 123.301 66.840 60.501
5 0.6 6 20 69.421 53.529 40.168 60.678 59.014
5 0.6 7 20 73.958 58.376 2685.351 67.418 66.177
5 0.6 8 20 74.537 56.344 460.576 64.170 60.181
5 0.6 9 20 79.186 58.394 13.368 68.820 65.187
5 0.6 10 20 75.136 57.947 922.073 66.360 65.688
6 0.6 1 20 90.157 72.956 101.357 81.811 76.401
6 0.6 2 20 86.035 66.758 3598.303 78.191 75.157
6 0.6 3 20 97.639 69.606 943.594 84.422 79.618
6 0.6 4 20 81.324 63.062 3598.304 73.265 72.881
6 0.6 5 20 89.081 63.792 1527.594 76.991 74.272
6 0.6 6 20 87.958 71.151 49.742 80.375 77.828
6 0.6 7 20 85.835 64.181 3598.303 76.386 72.586
6 0.6 8 20 86.026 66.973 3598.304 76.001 69.454
6 0.6 9 20 88.247 67.533 1789.032 76.453 73.164
6 0.6 10 20 84.899 66.658 3322.186 77.213 72.459
7 0.6 1 20 87.728 69.037 3440.707 80.460 74.068
7 0.6 2 20 82.787 62.897 3598.319 72.214 71.323
7 0.6 3 20 91.226 69.833 3598.304 80.096 77.400
7 0.6 4 20 80.805 62.310 3606.173 73.477 71.635
7 0.6 5 20 82.893 67.715 506.934 71.167 71.167
7 0.6 6 20 71.861 58.397 493.952 64.833 62.380
7 0.6 7 20 74.081 55.254 3603.588 65.423 61.192
7 0.6 8 20 88.151 65.343 3603.588 74.185 72.726
7 0.6 9 20 92.685 62.219 2496.364 78.487 76.647
7 0.6 10 20 77.734 61.713 3603.557 70.774 67.658
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Table A21: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 20 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.7 1 20 74.790 65.381 9.181 72.138 72.138
1 0.7 2 20 77.882 72.868 7.194 76.726 73.987
1 0.7 3 20 74.956 68.605 41.963 72.876 72.361
1 0.7 4 20 75.241 62.293 4.192 68.396 68.347
1 0.7 5 20 73.333 63.537 0.376 71.089 64.585
1 0.7 6 20 75.076 65.526 1.236 68.825 68.175
1 0.7 7 20 73.386 69.316 1.189 70.939 69.316
1 0.7 8 20 84.020 71.140 2.330 79.489 75.620
1 0.7 9 20 79.138 71.808 10.276 75.994 73.985
1 0.7 10 20 82.981 77.547 3.941 81.896 80.229
2 0.7 1 20 75.351 62.756 83.488 70.295 67.534
2 0.7 2 20 72.398 60.907 118.929 65.670 65.298
2 0.7 3 20 77.537 64.032 91.965 71.062 69.756
2 0.7 4 20 79.962 65.927 5.271 71.700 71.316
2 0.7 5 20 80.119 61.609 82.080 74.631 68.842
2 0.7 6 20 64.288 52.445 459.324 57.516 56.633
2 0.7 7 20 70.397 57.080 149.756 64.216 61.719
2 0.7 8 20 70.258 60.236 450.147 66.338 63.719
2 0.7 9 20 71.594 63.901 420.271 65.325 65.257
2 0.7 10 20 69.788 59.670 112.266 65.001 63.832
3 0.7 1 20 80.470 68.940 1707.123 74.730 71.989
3 0.7 2 20 79.643 68.703 1431.619 73.162 72.045
3 0.7 3 20 84.363 69.260 210.534 78.441 74.179
3 0.7 4 20 88.591 70.689 22.882 77.625 77.232
3 0.7 5 20 88.186 72.883 60.418 78.732 78.349
3 0.7 6 20 84.891 67.289 125.968 77.224 73.187
3 0.7 7 20 77.189 64.159 129.518 70.263 67.831
3 0.7 8 20 84.056 66.405 432.438 75.902 75.794
3 0.7 9 20 80.801 69.215 2348.970 75.883 74.111
3 0.7 10 20 85.049 69.599 8.524 78.418 74.537
4 0.7 1 20 68.267 53.594 73.806 60.591 60.102
4 0.7 2 20 69.145 57.695 1363.271 64.009 61.602
4 0.7 3 20 70.660 58.722 479.469 65.676 63.186
4 0.7 4 20 68.596 57.181 608.377 63.964 63.560
4 0.7 5 20 69.320 51.801 97.017 61.619 59.873
4 0.7 6 20 57.958 48.045 53.020 57.455 50.759
4 0.7 7 20 63.161 52.912 137.635 59.588 57.427
4 0.7 8 20 67.383 49.383 47.343 59.696 56.083
4 0.7 9 20 66.582 57.493 813.186 64.054 61.084
4 0.7 10 20 61.915 50.853 475.277 57.459 55.413
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Table A22: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 20 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.7 1 20 73.543 64.338 679.602 69.184 66.194
5 0.7 2 20 71.163 58.816 3564.851 62.631 62.443
5 0.7 3 20 73.127 59.951 3594.777 67.000 65.740
5 0.7 4 20 73.125 60.585 3572.798 66.036 66.036
5 0.7 5 20 68.726 55.271 633.061 61.522 60.501
5 0.7 6 20 65.887 54.161 221.320 60.678 59.014
5 0.7 7 20 70.660 64.189 3597.359 67.418 66.177
5 0.7 8 20 70.459 55.681 662.508 64.170 60.181
5 0.7 9 20 72.521 61.050 1307.122 65.761 65.187
5 0.7 10 20 72.092 58.062 419.313 66.360 65.688
6 0.7 1 20 86.364 74.055 27.432 78.428 76.401
6 0.7 2 20 81.458 67.858 3597.358 76.713 75.157
6 0.7 3 20 93.378 73.593 357.891 84.422 79.618
6 0.7 4 20 79.077 68.163 3597.358 73.265 72.881
6 0.7 5 20 84.468 67.962 999.960 74.347 74.272
6 0.7 6 20 85.116 71.151 579.055 78.751 77.828
6 0.7 7 20 81.236 68.992 3597.358 76.386 72.586
6 0.7 8 20 81.751 67.179 1339.926 76.001 69.454
6 0.7 9 20 79.975 67.533 3597.405 74.547 73.164
6 0.7 10 20 79.653 66.658 3597.374 74.695 72.459
7 0.7 1 20 84.924 72.841 2540.284 77.386 74.068
7 0.7 2 20 78.810 66.758 3601.214 72.214 71.323
7 0.7 3 20 85.981 71.295 3601.183 77.400 77.400
7 0.7 4 20 78.214 66.137 3601.167 73.477 71.635
7 0.7 5 20 77.705 67.757 1380.457 71.167 71.167
7 0.7 6 20 68.460 58.823 582.984 64.833 62.380
7 0.7 7 20 70.509 58.753 3601.183 65.423 61.192
7 0.7 8 20 82.467 70.061 643.628 74.185 72.726
7 0.7 9 20 84.533 72.860 3601.293 78.487 76.647
7 0.7 10 20 73.601 62.584 3601.183 70.774 67.658
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Table A23: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 20 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.8 1 20 73.425 70.329 1.641 72.138 72.138
1 0.8 2 20 75.864 71.944 9.737 74.324 73.987
1 0.8 3 20 74.053 71.772 7.487 72.876 72.361
1 0.8 4 20 71.321 64.767 13.911 68.396 68.347
1 0.8 5 20 69.798 64.585 0.188 67.002 64.585
1 0.8 6 20 71.926 65.526 4.627 68.825 68.175
1 0.8 7 20 70.939 66.771 0.954 69.896 69.316
1 0.8 8 20 81.459 71.140 7.190 76.210 75.620
1 0.8 9 20 77.869 68.628 3.454 73.985 73.985
1 0.8 10 20 82.661 79.221 0.485 81.896 80.229
2 0.8 1 20 71.976 64.084 524.480 68.831 67.534
2 0.8 2 20 70.015 62.875 48.828 65.670 65.298
2 0.8 3 20 74.540 67.277 66.647 71.062 69.756
2 0.8 4 20 75.132 68.788 482.342 71.700 71.316
2 0.8 5 20 77.189 66.430 3.149 70.684 68.842
2 0.8 6 20 60.915 52.854 2337.454 57.516 56.633
2 0.8 7 20 66.932 56.652 629.061 64.216 61.719
2 0.8 8 20 66.398 57.303 319.236 62.644 62.203
2 0.8 9 20 69.267 63.048 157.547 65.325 65.257
2 0.8 10 20 68.760 61.882 4.813 65.001 63.832
3 0.8 1 20 76.871 69.755 3600.400 73.266 71.989
3 0.8 2 20 77.648 68.703 116.887 73.162 72.045
3 0.8 3 20 80.578 71.158 29.800 78.441 74.179
3 0.8 4 20 81.971 73.052 449.781 77.625 77.232
3 0.8 5 20 84.278 73.702 23.378 78.732 78.349
3 0.8 6 20 67.514 60.188 3600.681 66.943 64.406
3 0.8 7 20 72.422 65.558 1748.523 70.263 67.831
3 0.8 8 20 79.896 70.991 3599.492 75.902 75.794
3 0.8 9 20 78.055 73.396 1396.362 75.883 74.111
3 0.8 10 20 81.341 71.793 70.941 76.760 74.537
4 0.8 1 20 62.718 55.677 1321.864 60.591 60.102
4 0.8 2 20 65.893 59.568 180.389 64.009 61.602
4 0.8 3 20 66.458 58.866 530.229 65.181 63.186
4 0.8 4 20 67.026 63.135 34.206 63.964 63.560
4 0.8 5 20 64.154 54.799 2063.143 61.619 59.873
4 0.8 6 20 54.283 47.058 296.132 51.537 50.759
4 0.8 7 20 60.032 53.942 137.370 59.588 57.427
4 0.8 8 20 62.587 56.083 37.940 56.338 56.083
4 0.8 9 20 63.637 57.991 1198.764 61.988 61.084
4 0.8 10 20 58.632 52.843 807.219 57.459 55.413
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Table A24: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 20 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.8 1 20 70.451 62.800 120.666 69.184 66.194
5 0.8 2 20 66.586 59.422 3600.307 62.631 62.443
5 0.8 3 20 68.885 61.330 3600.308 67.000 65.740
5 0.8 4 20 69.534 61.482 3600.308 66.036 66.036
5 0.8 5 20 66.840 57.796 58.770 61.522 60.501
5 0.8 6 20 63.873 56.776 39.159 60.678 59.014
5 0.8 7 20 67.683 64.189 3600.308 67.418 66.177
5 0.8 8 20 67.000 57.631 160.450 64.170 60.181
5 0.8 9 20 68.870 64.224 2638.468 65.761 65.187
5 0.8 10 20 69.212 63.355 1131.853 66.360 65.688
6 0.8 1 20 80.332 74.035 2221.702 78.210 76.401
6 0.8 2 20 79.838 72.722 498.465 76.713 75.157
6 0.8 3 20 84.553 72.531 3600.124 81.871 79.618
6 0.8 4 20 75.099 70.114 3600.124 73.265 72.881
6 0.8 5 20 80.853 72.298 646.063 74.347 74.272
6 0.8 6 20 83.022 75.534 162.957 79.279 77.828
6 0.8 7 20 77.621 68.992 2527.159 76.386 72.586
6 0.8 8 20 75.304 67.920 3600.123 70.133 69.454
6 0.8 9 20 77.183 70.407 3600.124 74.547 73.164
6 0.8 10 20 77.350 69.949 2707.054 74.695 72.459
7 0.8 1 20 79.189 73.124 3600.123 74.195 74.068
7 0.8 2 20 75.038 68.166 3600.123 72.214 71.323
7 0.8 3 20 82.772 74.238 3600.124 77.400 77.400
7 0.8 4 20 75.459 68.854 3600.124 73.477 71.635
7 0.8 5 20 73.739 68.452 3600.123 71.167 71.167
7 0.8 6 20 64.589 62.380 1976.207 63.010 62.380
7 0.8 7 20 67.211 61.823 3599.229 63.244 61.192
7 0.8 8 20 78.562 70.176 138.624 74.185 72.726
7 0.8 9 20 80.860 71.170 3599.733 78.487 76.647
7 0.8 10 20 69.792 65.801 3600.032 67.848 67.658
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APPENDIX B
RESULTS OF THE RUNS FOR CHAPTER 3
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Table B1: Results of the runs for n = 10, C = 3, 4
n C B Instance z∗ [PI-L] [PI-LR]
10 3 3 1 -2.780 122.1 19.7
10 3 3 2 -2.778 134.0 22.2
10 3 3 3 -2.871 146.8 24.6
10 3 3 4 -2.741 145.4 20.2
10 3 3 5 -2.684 112.4 27.5
10 3 3 6 -2.742 142.8 23.3
10 3 3 7 -2.724 128.1 24.5
10 3 3 8 -2.856 118.5 25.7
10 3 3 9 -2.729 158.2 24.5
10 3 3 10 -2.810 136.7 22.4
10 3 5 1 -2.483 81.6 18.0
10 3 5 2 -2.480 167.4 18.9
10 3 5 3 -2.636 124.4 24.3
10 3 5 4 -2.392 95.6 16.0
10 3 5 5 -2.430 96.5 20.1
10 3 5 6 -2.531 119.0 26.2
10 3 5 7 -2.475 91.6 22.9
10 3 5 8 -2.628 144.2 23.9
10 3 5 9 -2.475 150.8 24.4
10 3 5 10 -2.548 106.2 20.3
10 4 3 1 -3.627 335.8 19.1
10 4 3 2 -3.620 450.7 22.1
10 4 3 3 -3.745 386.2 20.3
10 4 3 4 -3.571 490.0 20.7
10 4 3 5 -3.495 448.9 33.1
10 4 3 6 -3.568 377.0 24.1
10 4 3 7 -3.554 379.2 28.9
10 4 3 8 -3.732 517.6 23.5
10 4 3 9 -3.563 594.7 23.6
10 4 3 10 -3.666 463.7 21.6
10 4 5 1 -3.235 210.5 16.6
10 4 5 2 -3.229 521.2 20.7
10 4 5 3 -3.431 431.6 22.2
10 4 5 4 -3.116 353.8 14.5
10 4 5 5 -3.166 453.6 24.7
10 4 5 6 -3.284 431.8 22.5
10 4 5 7 -3.234 290.0 18.9
10 4 5 8 -3.428 421.9 19.6
10 4 5 9 -3.223 595.3 24.2
10 4 5 10 -3.324 437.4 19.7
Columns corresponding to [PI-L] and [PI-LR] represent the running times (in seconds) of the corresponding
formulations.
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Table B2: Results of the runs for n = 10, C = 5, 6
n C B Instance z∗ [PI-L] [PI-LR]
10 5 3 1 -4.473 1976.2 19.7
10 5 3 2 -4.461 2001.4 20.8
10 5 3 3 -4.618 2300.5 22.0
10 5 3 4 -4.399 2055.6 25.8
10 5 3 5 -4.306 1703.7 26.1
10 5 3 6 -4.393 1709.0 24.2
10 5 3 7 -4.383 1551.3 25.6
10 5 3 8 -4.608 2364.5 26.3
10 5 3 9 -4.398 2542.2 26.4
10 5 3 10 -4.523 2239.4 23.5
10 5 5 1 -3.988 1146.1 14.6
10 5 5 2 -3.979 1569.5 22.1
10 5 5 3 -4.225 1749.4 24.2
10 5 5 4 -3.839 1844.7 17.8
10 5 5 5 -3.901 1516.1 22.9
10 5 5 6 -4.037 1318.8 24.7
10 5 5 7 -3.994 1471.6 19.4
10 5 5 8 -4.229 1898.1 22.7
10 5 5 9 -3.969 2804.1 28.7
10 5 5 10 -4.100 2343.8 19.1
10 6 3 1 -5.320 6905.0 20.4
10 6 3 2 -5.302 7323.2 24.3
10 6 3 3 -5.492 8696.1 22.0
10 6 3 4 -5.224 9040.4 24.3
10 6 3 5 -5.117 7020.9 23.3
10 6 3 6 -5.219 7038.3 25.4
10 6 3 7 -5.213 8547.7 27.5
10 6 3 8 -5.484 8803.8 25.0
10 6 3 9 -5.232 10203.9 26.1
10 6 3 10 -5.379 9335.6 22.5
10 6 5 1 -4.740 3916.4 17.3
10 6 5 2 -4.728 9773.2 18.7
10 6 5 3 -5.020 7501.4 23.8
10 6 5 4 -4.562 5709.3 20.8
10 6 5 5 -4.637 7462.5 20.7
10 6 5 6 -4.790 5831.6 25.0
10 6 5 7 -4.753 8809.4 20.1
10 6 5 8 -5.029 5606.3 23.0
10 6 5 9 -4.714 10303.3 25.2
10 6 5 10 -4.876 7518.2 21.0
Columns corresponding to [PI-L] and [PI-LR] represent the running times (in seconds) of the corresponding
formulations.
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Table B3: Results of the runs for n = 10 for [PI-LR] and HA
n C B Instance z∗ [PI-LR] zHA HA
10 3 3 1 -2.780 19.73 -2.780 0.09
10 3 3 2 -2.778 22.23 -2.778 0.11
10 3 3 3 -2.871 24.59 -2.878 0.13
10 3 3 4 -2.741 20.23 -2.741 0.11
10 3 3 5 -2.684 27.50 -2.684 0.09
10 3 3 6 -2.742 23.28 -2.742 0.09
10 3 3 7 -2.724 24.52 -2.724 0.08
10 3 3 8 -2.856 25.66 -2.856 0.09
10 3 3 9 -2.729 24.48 -2.729 0.09
10 3 3 10 -2.810 22.38 -2.810 0.11
10 3 5 1 -2.483 18.05 -2.483 0.14
10 3 5 2 -2.480 18.94 -2.480 0.14
10 3 5 3 -2.636 24.34 -2.636 0.16
10 3 5 4 -2.392 16.05 -2.392 0.14
10 3 5 5 -2.430 20.09 -2.432 0.13
10 3 5 6 -2.531 26.16 -2.531 0.14
10 3 5 7 -2.475 22.92 -2.475 0.13
10 3 5 8 -2.628 23.89 -2.628 0.16
10 3 5 9 -2.475 24.36 -2.475 0.14
10 3 5 10 -2.548 20.34 -2.548 0.16
10 5 3 1 -4.473 19.70 -4.473 0.09
10 5 3 2 -4.461 20.77 -4.461 0.09
10 5 3 3 -4.618 22.00 -4.624 0.09
10 5 3 4 -4.399 25.83 -4.400 0.09
10 5 3 5 -4.306 26.09 -4.306 0.08
10 5 3 6 -4.393 24.19 -4.393 0.09
10 5 3 7 -4.383 25.63 -4.383 0.08
10 5 3 8 -4.608 26.30 -4.608 0.09
10 5 3 9 -4.398 26.39 -4.398 0.09
10 5 3 10 -4.523 23.47 -4.523 0.09
10 5 5 1 -3.988 14.61 -3.988 0.14
10 5 5 2 -3.979 22.11 -3.979 0.14
10 5 5 3 -4.225 24.20 -4.225 0.14
10 5 5 4 -3.839 17.80 -3.839 0.13
10 5 5 5 -3.901 22.89 -3.908 0.13
10 5 5 6 -4.037 24.66 -4.037 0.13
10 5 5 7 -3.994 19.41 -3.994 0.13
10 5 5 8 -4.229 22.72 -4.229 0.14
10 5 5 9 -3.969 28.70 -3.969 0.13
10 5 5 10 -4.100 19.09 -4.100 0.13
Columns corresponding to [PI-LR] and HA represent the running times (in seconds) of [PI-LR] and the
heuristic algorithm, z∗ is the optimal objective function value, and zHA is the objective function value found
by the heuristic algorithm.
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Table B4: Results of the runs for n = 15 for [PI-LR] and HA
n C B Instance z∗ [PI-LR] zHA HA
15 3 3 1 -3.000 789.79 -3.000 0.45
15 3 3 2 -3.000 1065.68 -3.000 0.49
15 3 3 3 -3.000 715.29 -3.000 0.44
15 3 3 4 -2.990 1082.32 -3.000 0.47
15 3 3 5 -2.974 971.73 -3.000 0.47
15 3 3 6 -2.985 1118.40 -3.000 0.50
15 3 3 7 -3.000 977.59 -3.000 0.47
15 3 3 8 -3.000 714.95 -3.000 0.42
15 3 3 9 -2.996 1249.46 -3.000 0.50
15 3 3 10 -3.000 773.96 -3.000 0.45
15 3 5 1 -2.943 2466.11 -3.000 0.75
15 3 5 2 -2.935 3552.89 -3.000 0.78
15 3 5 3 -2.948 2551.87 -3.000 0.70
15 3 5 4 -2.900 3250.08 -3.000 0.77
15 3 5 5 -2.880 2954.44 -3.000 0.75
15 3 5 6 -2.900 3553.77 -3.000 0.83
15 3 5 7 -2.927 3191.03 -3.000 0.78
15 3 5 8 -2.966 2472.81 -3.000 0.67
15 3 5 9 -2.921 4485.74 -2.996 0.83
15 3 5 10 -2.944 2418.70 -3.000 0.72
15 5 3 1 -4.877 1080.82 -4.877 0.50
15 5 3 2 -4.827 1140.56 -4.827 0.44
15 5 3 3 -4.881 1143.65 -4.881 0.50
15 5 3 4 -4.806 1171.84 -4.806 0.45
15 5 3 5 -4.761 1073.73 -4.761 0.39
15 5 3 6 -4.785 1146.35 -4.785 0.42
15 5 3 7 -4.826 1130.21 -4.826 0.45
15 5 3 8 -4.894 1135.37 -4.894 0.52
15 5 3 9 -4.817 1407.73 -4.817 0.44
15 5 3 10 -4.863 1072.94 -4.863 0.49
15 5 5 1 -4.739 2559.80 -4.739 0.72
15 5 5 2 -4.698 3802.29 -4.698 0.66
15 5 5 3 -4.740 2340.37 -4.740 0.72
15 5 5 4 -4.662 2869.68 -4.662 0.66
15 5 5 5 -4.613 2846.81 -4.613 0.58
15 5 5 6 -4.647 3356.30 -4.647 0.61
15 5 5 7 -4.697 3069.07 -4.697 0.66
15 5 5 8 -4.774 2836.70 -4.774 0.75
15 5 5 9 -4.698 4138.95 -4.698 0.63
15 5 5 10 -4.733 2748.29 -4.733 0.69
Columns corresponding to [PI-LR] and HA represent the running times (in seconds) of [PI-LR] and the
heuristic algorithm, z∗ is the optimal objective function value, and zHA is the objective function value found
by the heuristic algorithm.
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Table B5: Results of the runs for n = 30 for [PI-LR] and HA
n C B Instance z∗ [PI-LR] zHA HA
30 3 3 1 -3.000 9.06
30 3 3 2 -2.986 8.59
30 3 3 3 -3.000 9.24
30 3 3 4 -3.000 7.98
30 3 3 5 -2.985 8.32
30 3 3 6 -2.982 8.42
30 3 3 7 -2.986 7.92
30 3 3 8 -2.987 8.95
30 3 3 9 -3.000 8.40
30 3 3 10 -3.000 8.60
30 3 5 1 -3.000 5.36
30 3 5 2 -2.974 4.93
30 3 5 3 -2.974 5.81
30 3 5 4 -3.000 4.85
30 3 5 5 -3.000 4.97
30 3 5 6 -2.980 5.53
30 3 5 7 -2.973 4.85
30 3 5 8 -3.000 5.56
30 3 5 9 -2.986 5.05
30 3 5 10 -2.972 5.24
30 5 3 1 -5.000 14.35
30 5 3 2 -5.000 14.88
30 5 3 3 -4.978 13.59
30 5 3 4 -4.975 15.85
30 5 3 5 -4.981 14.31
30 5 3 6 -5.000 15.18
30 5 3 7 -5.000 13.37
30 5 3 8 -5.000 11.99
30 5 3 9 -4.988 15.34
30 5 3 10 -4.984 12.08
30 5 5 1 -4.987 8.18
30 5 5 2 -4.972 9.18
30 5 5 3 -4.970 8.07
30 5 5 4 -4.989 9.49
30 5 5 5 -4.973 8.48
30 5 5 6 -4.983 8.51
30 5 5 7 -4.978 8.65
30 5 5 8 -5.000 7.53
30 5 5 9 -4.978 9.59
30 5 5 10 -5.000 7.34
Columns corresponding to [PI-LR] and HA represent the running times (in seconds) of [PI-LR] and the
heuristic algorithm, z∗ is the optimal objective function value, and zHA is the objective function value found
by the heuristic algorithm.
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Table B6: Results of the runs for n = 50 for [PI-LR] and HA
n C B Instance z∗ [PI-LR] zHA HA
50 3 3 1 -3.000 89.14
50 3 3 2 -3.000 93.75
50 3 3 3 -2.982 85.55
50 3 3 4 -3.000 82.70
50 3 3 5 -2.989 91.29
50 3 3 6 -2.986 88.15
50 3 3 7 -2.986 83.67
50 3 3 8 -2.982 84.73
50 3 3 9 -3.000 86.92
50 3 3 10 -3.000 79.85
50 3 5 1 -3.000 54.18
50 3 5 2 -2.987 56.02
50 3 5 3 -3.000 51.09
50 3 5 4 -3.000 49.61
50 3 5 5 -2.989 52.99
50 3 5 6 -2.984 51.68
50 3 5 7 -3.000 48.80
50 3 5 8 -3.000 51.32
50 3 5 9 -2.990 52.51
50 3 5 10 -2.985 48.33
50 5 3 1 -4.983 108.76
50 5 3 2 -5.000 103.58
50 5 3 3 -5.000 108.71
50 5 3 4 -4.984 96.49
50 5 3 5 -4.985 99.95
50 5 3 6 -4.982 100.19
50 5 3 7 -4.990 107.98
50 5 3 8 -4.980 108.12
50 5 3 9 -5.000 104.63
50 5 3 10 -4.982 106.75
50 5 5 1 -5.000 63.06
50 5 5 2 -5.000 61.77
50 5 5 3 -4.983 63.90
50 5 5 4 -5.000 57.92
50 5 5 5 -4.987 60.66
50 5 5 6 -5.000 60.38
50 5 5 7 -5.000 63.72
50 5 5 8 -5.000 63.44
50 5 5 9 -4.988 64.51
50 5 5 10 -4.987 63.37
Columns corresponding to [PI-LR] and HA represent the running times (in seconds) of [PI-LR] and the
heuristic algorithm, z∗ is the optimal objective function value, and zHA is the objective function value found
by the heuristic algorithm.
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APPENDIX C
RESULTS OF THE RUNS FOR CHAPTER 4
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Table C1: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 5 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.6 1 5 53.681 48.113 0.594 50.494 50.494
1 0.6 2 5 57.664 55.065 0.812 57.467 55.065
1 0.6 3 5 50.531 46.484 0.765 50.141 46.484
1 0.6 4 5 53.192 47.861 0.421 47.861 47.861
1 0.6 5 5 56.395 50.56 0.171 56.395 51.130
1 0.6 6 5 56.091 49.995 1.421 52.625 52.143
1 0.6 7 5 51.485 43.53 0.562 45.662 45.662
1 0.6 8 5 56.94 55.107 0.516 60.409 55.107
1 0.6 9 5 55.305 51.346 0.687 53.630 53.630
1 0.6 10 5 62.888 57.565 0.515 61.210 59.512
2 0.6 1 5 57.306 48.156 1.171 48.987 48.356
2 0.6 2 5 56.478 48.074 1.187 55.822 49.968
2 0.6 3 5 52.922 48.059 0.703 51.153 48.359
2 0.6 4 5 54.428 49.112 1.375 55.492 52.047
2 0.6 5 5 66.705 52.701 0.734 56.173 53.511
2 0.6 6 5 50.494 41.44 0.421 44.911 43.260
2 0.6 7 5 51.233 43.668 1.046 47.626 45.479
2 0.6 8 5 49.43 43.21 1.328 46.974 45.242
2 0.6 9 5 60.017 50.934 0.562 57.898 52.048
2 0.6 10 5 56.468 47.02 0.703 53.331 49.080
3 0.6 1 5 57.1 50.827 4.484 55.251 52.810
3 0.6 2 5 64.704 51.215 0.921 59.401 53.690
3 0.6 3 5 55.278 47.119 3.406 52.495 49.410
3 0.6 4 5 62.059 52.93 3.531 58.560 55.286
3 0.6 5 5 67.783 57.06 1.156 62.518 59.468
3 0.6 6 5 59.136 50.532 0.688 52.520 50.532
3 0.6 7 5 59.217 49.275 1.531 55.370 50.220
3 0.6 8 5 65.35 53.572 0.656 55.784 55.784
3 0.6 9 5 66.048 55.476 0.75 61.987 56.856
3 0.6 10 5 64.181 55.35 0.765 59.382 57.918
4 0.6 1 5 50.265 42.326 3.14 46.188 43.547
4 0.6 2 5 52.1 44.977 0.89 51.020 45.414
4 0.6 3 5 49.24 43.362 1.062 47.762 44.242
4 0.6 4 5 50.85 42.835 1.375 48.367 44.360
4 0.6 5 5 54.362 43.181 0.89 47.852 45.089
4 0.6 6 5 41.328 36.163 1.843 39.596 38.116
4 0.6 7 5 41.816 35.176 3.156 37.584 36.679
4 0.6 8 5 47.515 37.713 1.046 43.766 39.221
4 0.6 9 5 46.935 42.682 1.187 45.914 44.711
4 0.6 10 5 45.861 40.868 6.406 44.184 42.265
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Table C2: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 5 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.6 1 5 51.456 47.641 3.313 50.584 49.750
5 0.6 2 5 51.706 43.712 4.843 47.544 45.951
5 0.6 3 5 52.839 46.503 2.234 49.295 47.745
5 0.6 4 5 56.424 46.751 3.188 50.367 49.006
5 0.6 5 5 50.287 42.827 0.296 44.772 44.735
5 0.6 6 5 48.446 44.281 6.719 48.444 46.388
5 0.6 7 5 50.473 45.936 7.546 48.460 47.555
5 0.6 8 5 55.003 45.974 1.093 55.003 45.974
5 0.6 9 5 49.748 46.648 2.937 48.892 48.892
5 0.6 10 5 53.377 48.269 1.531 49.294 48.889
6 0.6 1 5 61.007 58.184 2.515 61.007 58.927
6 0.6 2 5 64.172 55.249 2.015 60.908 57.445
6 0.6 3 5 66.951 56.518 1.484 59.393 57.353
6 0.6 4 5 61.667 53.747 16.406 60.580 54.758
6 0.6 5 5 60.916 53.259 0.968 54.024 54.024
6 0.6 6 5 68.488 60.593 2.687 63.400 63.400
6 0.6 7 5 59.028 49.668 7.812 54.408 53.574
6 0.6 8 5 62.452 49.603 2.812 61.369 51.998
6 0.6 9 5 63.448 58.723 2.515 61.952 59.424
6 0.6 10 5 59.267 53.576 3.093 55.565 55.565
7 0.6 1 5 65.851 53.594 3.109 59.343 56.025
7 0.6 2 5 62.436 51.479 1.984 55.717 53.520
7 0.6 3 5 64.159 59.982 7.796 66.008 62.095
7 0.6 4 5 59.391 52.256 5.828 53.339 53.052
7 0.6 5 5 56.119 52.74 1.25 54.865 53.972
7 0.6 6 5 48.675 45.017 6.187 46.917 45.612
7 0.6 7 5 51.462 44.165 11.719 49.205 47.727
7 0.6 8 5 66.615 54.515 2.109 60.119 55.195
7 0.6 9 5 65.837 56.083 12.796 61.203 57.505
7 0.6 10 5 56.359 48.825 4.547 56.074 52.409
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Table C3: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 5 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.7 1 5 51.46 48.952 0.5 50.494 50.494
1 0.7 2 5 57.664 55.065 0.718 57.467 55.065
1 0.7 3 5 48.745 45.924 1.046 46.484 46.484
1 0.7 4 5 49.736 47.134 0.64 47.861 47.861
1 0.7 5 5 51.749 49.011 0.203 51.130 51.130
1 0.7 6 5 53.927 49.995 1.468 52.625 52.143
1 0.7 7 5 48.621 44.885 0.875 45.662 45.662
1 0.7 8 5 56.94 55.107 0.468 56.737 55.107
1 0.7 9 5 55.305 51.346 0.625 53.630 53.630
1 0.7 10 5 61.64 57.611 0.515 61.210 59.512
2 0.7 1 5 57.306 48.156 0.438 48.987 48.356
2 0.7 2 5 53.928 48.074 0.984 52.340 49.968
2 0.7 3 5 51.397 48.059 0.843 51.153 48.359
2 0.7 4 5 54.428 49.112 0.562 55.492 52.047
2 0.7 5 5 58.738 50.935 2.625 56.173 53.511
2 0.7 6 5 45.15 42.147 3.656 44.911 43.260
2 0.7 7 5 50.062 43.701 0.703 47.626 45.479
2 0.7 8 5 47.698 43.21 0.859 45.242 45.242
2 0.7 9 5 57.898 52.048 0.391 57.898 52.048
2 0.7 10 5 53.196 47.407 1.14 51.084 49.080
3 0.7 1 5 55.428 50.723 3.421 55.251 52.810
3 0.7 2 5 58.823 51.215 6.718 55.919 53.690
3 0.7 3 5 53.664 47.15 3.109 52.495 49.410
3 0.7 4 5 61.017 52.605 2.812 58.560 55.286
3 0.7 5 5 64.938 57.06 2 62.518 59.468
3 0.7 6 5 54.102 50.45 4.015 52.520 50.532
3 0.7 7 5 53.312 48.162 4.015 50.367 50.220
3 0.7 8 5 57.202 53.572 3.546 55.784 55.784
3 0.7 9 5 63.929 55.476 0.765 61.987 56.856
3 0.7 10 5 62.948 57.349 0.671 59.382 57.918
4 0.7 1 5 49.424 42.326 1.109 46.188 43.547
4 0.7 2 5 49.147 44.977 1.171 46.356 45.414
4 0.7 3 5 44.924 43.362 1.875 44.581 44.242
4 0.7 4 5 49.566 42.968 1.687 45.246 44.360
4 0.7 5 5 50.946 43.961 0.921 47.852 45.089
4 0.7 6 5 39.596 36.565 3.171 39.596 38.116
4 0.7 7 5 41.217 35.176 2.421 37.584 36.679
4 0.7 8 5 47.515 37.713 0.546 43.766 39.221
4 0.7 9 5 46.935 42.682 1.094 45.914 44.711
4 0.7 10 5 44.05 40.825 9.39 43.379 42.265
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Table C4: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 5 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.7 1 5 51.003 47.917 2.218 49.874 49.750
5 0.7 2 5 49.327 42.665 6.531 46.066 45.951
5 0.7 3 5 52.839 46.125 2.109 49.295 47.745
5 0.7 4 5 53.42 46.751 3.796 50.367 49.006
5 0.7 5 5 50.287 42.827 0.25 44.772 44.735
5 0.7 6 5 48.444 44.671 1.921 48.444 46.388
5 0.7 7 5 49.839 45.936 4.671 48.460 47.555
5 0.7 8 5 52.187 43.887 1.422 47.963 45.974
5 0.7 9 5 49.748 46.648 2.281 48.892 48.892
5 0.7 10 5 53.377 47.642 0.859 49.294 48.889
6 0.7 1 5 59.648 58.184 2.328 59.648 58.927
6 0.7 2 5 61.887 56.119 2.171 59.993 57.445
6 0.7 3 5 65.527 54.713 1.125 59.393 57.353
6 0.7 4 5 60.58 53.747 6.656 57.767 54.758
6 0.7 5 5 60.916 53.259 0.812 54.024 54.024
6 0.7 6 5 64.552 58.621 9.062 63.400 63.400
6 0.7 7 5 56.028 50.574 5.609 54.408 53.574
6 0.7 8 5 60.248 50.654 3.812 53.873 51.998
6 0.7 9 5 61.952 59.424 2.266 61.952 59.424
6 0.7 10 5 59.267 53.576 1.968 55.565 55.565
7 0.7 1 5 63.422 54.884 2.312 59.343 56.025
7 0.7 2 5 58.128 50.859 3.031 55.717 53.520
7 0.7 3 5 64.159 59.982 6.125 66.008 62.095
7 0.7 4 5 56.852 52.256 5.515 53.339 53.052
7 0.7 5 5 54.865 53.972 1.234 54.865 53.972
7 0.7 6 5 48.675 45.017 3.968 46.917 45.612
7 0.7 7 5 49.721 44.165 6.078 47.727 47.727
7 0.7 8 5 56.812 55.114 2.593 56.812 55.195
7 0.7 9 5 63.212 54.791 12.718 61.203 57.505
7 0.7 10 5 56.208 48.825 2.828 56.074 52.409
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Table C5: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 5 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.8 1 5 51.46 48.952 0.328 50.494 50.494
1 0.8 2 5 55.999 55.065 0.5 55.802 55.065
1 0.8 3 5 48.425 45.924 0.687 46.484 46.484
1 0.8 4 5 49.736 47.778 0.468 47.861 47.861
1 0.8 5 5 51.749 49.011 0.187 51.130 51.130
1 0.8 6 5 53.443 52.143 3.765 52.625 52.143
1 0.8 7 5 47.736 45.654 0.812 45.662 45.662
1 0.8 8 5 56.94 55.107 0.281 56.737 55.107
1 0.8 9 5 54.072 51.895 0.485 53.630 53.630
1 0.8 10 5 61.64 58.95 0.359 61.210 59.512
2 0.8 1 5 51.601 48.156 1.25 48.987 48.356
2 0.8 2 5 51.276 48.538 1.468 49.968 49.968
2 0.8 3 5 51.153 48.059 0.64 49.407 48.359
2 0.8 4 5 52.745 49.112 0.687 53.809 52.047
2 0.8 5 5 56.173 51.36 2.203 56.173 53.511
2 0.8 6 5 44.027 41.44 2.921 43.260 43.260
2 0.8 7 5 48.004 43.421 0.734 47.626 45.479
2 0.8 8 5 45.242 44.263 1.093 45.242 45.242
2 0.8 9 5 55.956 51.053 0.656 54.687 52.048
2 0.8 10 5 53.006 47.02 0.64 49.080 49.080
3 0.8 1 5 55.428 50.723 1.203 55.251 52.810
3 0.8 2 5 57.365 51.654 2.421 55.919 53.690
3 0.8 3 5 51.099 48.401 3.687 49.779 49.410
3 0.8 4 5 57.383 54.453 4.156 55.716 55.286
3 0.8 5 5 61.534 57.06 1.656 60.523 59.468
3 0.8 6 5 51.376 50.532 5.109 51.376 50.532
3 0.8 7 5 51.614 48.995 3.609 50.367 50.220
3 0.8 8 5 55.784 55.784 2.796 55.784 55.784
3 0.8 9 5 60.012 56.562 1.828 58.776 56.856
3 0.8 10 5 62.948 55.095 0.718 59.382 57.918
4 0.8 1 5 46.717 42.326 1.5 45.060 43.547
4 0.8 2 5 46.356 45.414 0.875 46.356 45.414
4 0.8 3 5 44.924 43.362 1 44.581 44.242
4 0.8 4 5 46.738 44.359 1.484 45.246 44.360
4 0.8 5 5 46.564 43.181 1.703 45.624 45.089
4 0.8 6 5 37.958 37.326 5.25 38.116 38.116
4 0.8 7 5 38.829 35.767 2.421 36.993 36.679
4 0.8 8 5 40.916 37.713 2.156 39.221 39.221
4 0.8 9 5 45.914 44.702 0.921 45.914 44.711
4 0.8 10 5 43.731 40.868 3.234 43.379 42.265
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Table C6: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 5 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.8 1 5 49.874 49.75 2.187 49.874 49.750
5 0.8 2 5 47.042 43.712 5.297 46.066 45.951
5 0.8 3 5 50.148 46.517 1.984 49.295 47.745
5 0.8 4 5 50.592 46.93 5.312 50.367 49.006
5 0.8 5 5 45.079 42.827 0.765 44.772 44.735
5 0.8 6 5 48.444 46.388 0.859 48.444 46.388
5 0.8 7 5 49.248 46.279 2.312 47.869 47.555
5 0.8 8 5 47.787 43.688 2.375 46.272 45.974
5 0.8 9 5 49.093 47.733 1.937 48.892 48.892
5 0.8 10 5 49.779 47.642 2.468 49.294 48.889
6 0.8 1 5 59.43 58.047 1.562 59.430 58.927
6 0.8 2 5 60.908 57.445 1.328 59.993 57.445
6 0.8 3 5 58.901 56.376 4 59.393 57.353
6 0.8 4 5 56.855 53.418 16.171 55.088 54.758
6 0.8 5 5 54.378 53.256 1.938 54.024 54.024
6 0.8 6 5 63.572 60.577 3.281 63.400 63.400
6 0.8 7 5 54.018 50.574 7.625 53.817 53.574
6 0.8 8 5 56.945 51.139 2.125 53.873 51.998
6 0.8 9 5 61.123 58.723 1.625 59.767 59.424
6 0.8 10 5 57.289 53.038 2.64 55.565 55.565
7 0.8 1 5 57.212 53.953 8.64 56.152 56.025
7 0.8 2 5 55.951 50.859 3.515 55.717 53.520
7 0.8 3 5 62.794 59.982 3.531 64.643 62.095
7 0.8 4 5 56.852 52.256 2.281 53.339 53.052
7 0.8 5 5 54.865 53.972 0.875 54.865 53.972
7 0.8 6 5 46.917 44.267 2.625 46.917 45.612
7 0.8 7 5 49.721 44.165 2.015 47.727 47.727
7 0.8 8 5 56.812 55.114 1.484 56.812 55.195
7 0.8 9 5 59.687 56.083 10.39 57.505 57.505
7 0.8 10 5 53.191 50.428 5.188 52.622 52.409
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Table C7: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 10 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.6 1 10 64.881 57.25 2.609 62.390 59.549
1 0.6 2 10 65.471 59.755 8.875 65.224 62.822
1 0.6 3 10 62.278 54.834 6.328 60.383 57.565
1 0.6 4 10 64.162 56.679 2.171 58.529 58.529
1 0.6 5 10 67.289 55.828 0.89 58.697 58.697
1 0.6 6 10 65.184 57.506 3.5 61.026 59.822
1 0.6 7 10 63.243 55.079 1.343 57.853 57.582
1 0.6 8 10 69.954 61.782 1.015 68.513 63.774
1 0.6 9 10 67.153 59.619 1.687 62.522 62.522
1 0.6 10 10 72.908 65.398 2.25 70.005 69.032
2 0.6 1 10 67.956 54.983 9.171 58.083 56.643
2 0.6 2 10 64.456 53.215 8.75 60.066 55.541
2 0.6 3 10 66.614 55.891 2.203 63.743 58.682
2 0.6 4 10 65.474 56.355 38.969 63.109 58.794
2 0.6 5 10 70.101 57.222 19.422 66.705 60.036
2 0.6 6 10 57.253 45.827 19.125 54.777 48.126
2 0.6 7 10 63.09 49.917 4.14 53.376 52.312
2 0.6 8 10 61.738 50.138 10.265 52.457 52.457
2 0.6 9 10 65.615 55.484 12.39 59.193 58.002
2 0.6 10 10 65.984 53.214 1.687 56.126 55.701
3 0.6 1 10 70.744 58.262 75.828 62.373 60.868
3 0.6 2 10 69.932 58.441 35.781 67.202 61.142
3 0.6 3 10 70.583 58.387 6.671 60.925 60.556
3 0.6 4 10 71.737 60.769 59.89 66.995 63.877
3 0.6 5 10 76.54 64.836 8.421 67.597 67.597
3 0.6 6 10 64.713 54.278 78.89 60.770 55.770
3 0.6 7 10 70.675 53.834 1.89 63.466 56.390
3 0.6 8 10 73.353 61.525 48.5 65.620 63.638
3 0.6 9 10 73.373 62.536 6.531 71.254 64.580
3 0.6 10 10 73.135 62.543 14.64 66.458 65.327
4 0.6 1 10 58.368 49.226 37.89 58.306 50.817
4 0.6 2 10 62.283 50.009 12.328 57.664 52.439
4 0.6 3 10 62.033 53.451 6.781 62.033 53.892
4 0.6 4 10 59.775 50.584 7.828 57.228 52.852
4 0.6 5 10 60.75 51.619 5.422 56.418 52.734
4 0.6 6 10 47.779 41.714 38.296 45.790 42.876
4 0.6 7 10 53.909 44.796 4.453 46.461 45.556
4 0.6 8 10 60.472 46.279 2 54.172 47.832
4 0.6 9 10 55.468 49.089 51.265 53.354 53.040
4 0.6 10 10 55.503 44.572 12.547 48.351 46.913
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Table C8: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 10 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.6 1 10 64.612 54.367 14.515 57.562 56.734
5 0.6 2 10 62.176 51.884 24.938 55.321 53.423
5 0.6 3 10 63.898 52.842 11.516 56.117 55.298
5 0.6 4 10 62.424 54.128 62.484 62.424 56.976
5 0.6 5 10 59.21 50.157 6.89 53.044 52.586
5 0.6 6 10 59.309 49.67 3.5 54.075 51.964
5 0.6 7 10 58.978 52.289 282.296 57.627 55.564
5 0.6 8 10 63.446 49.906 11.093 58.638 51.329
5 0.6 9 10 62.212 54.44 23.89 56.262 56.089
5 0.6 10 10 64.034 53.975 24.656 59.714 56.260
6 0.6 1 10 71.853 64.172 55.437 68.475 65.749
6 0.6 2 10 74.179 62.355 30.984 70.694 65.231
6 0.6 3 10 76.749 66.336 26.5 74.337 67.434
6 0.6 4 10 67.939 59.024 416.875 64.733 62.054
6 0.6 5 10 75.055 61.718 10.671 66.422 64.621
6 0.6 6 10 76.149 67.963 45.64 71.505 68.630
6 0.6 7 10 71.674 56.976 266.781 61.791 61.200
6 0.6 8 10 71.633 56.116 121.375 69.694 58.940
6 0.6 9 10 73.785 63.309 27.468 68.002 66.065
6 0.6 10 10 71.364 59.737 38.015 63.254 61.365
7 0.6 1 10 76.697 64.455 5.578 73.890 66.508
7 0.6 2 10 71.394 58.47 49.203 64.113 61.398
7 0.6 3 10 75.737 64.962 69.078 69.360 68.045
7 0.6 4 10 71.218 57.667 10.343 63.741 61.092
7 0.6 5 10 66.51 59.569 90.609 61.572 61.572
7 0.6 6 10 58.746 49.714 71.468 53.126 52.165
7 0.6 7 10 62.869 50.554 217.563 58.697 53.830
7 0.6 8 10 73.592 59.96 247.891 63.701 62.150
7 0.6 9 10 73.751 61.619 1194.39 69.139 65.064
7 0.6 10 10 63.859 54.145 510.296 58.585 56.922
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Table C9: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 10 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.7 1 10 62.76 57.673 2.171 59.549 59.549
1 0.7 2 10 65.224 62.822 2.703 65.224 62.822
1 0.7 3 10 59.984 56.977 7.64 58.897 57.565
1 0.7 4 10 63.186 55.95 1 58.529 58.529
1 0.7 5 10 62.492 56.497 1.671 58.697 58.697
1 0.7 6 10 63.02 59.696 3.046 61.026 59.822
1 0.7 7 10 59.331 56.379 2.406 57.853 57.582
1 0.7 8 10 69.33 61.782 1.078 68.513 63.774
1 0.7 9 10 67.153 59.619 0.671 62.522 62.522
1 0.7 10 10 70.005 67.111 5.015 70.005 69.032
2 0.7 1 10 64.565 54.602 8.015 58.083 56.643
2 0.7 2 10 62.23 53.215 7.359 57.471 55.541
2 0.7 3 10 62.037 56.984 8.296 59.214 58.682
2 0.7 4 10 64.79 56.355 23.703 63.109 58.794
2 0.7 5 10 69.428 57.316 10.562 60.512 60.036
2 0.7 6 10 54.777 46.324 23.813 51.737 48.126
2 0.7 7 10 58.52 49.917 12.312 53.376 52.312
2 0.7 8 10 56.04 50.014 24.843 52.457 52.457
2 0.7 9 10 64.322 56.984 4.687 58.220 58.002
2 0.7 10 10 62.522 53.222 1.781 56.126 55.701
3 0.7 1 10 67.922 57.906 24.671 62.373 60.868
3 0.7 2 10 66.74 58.737 104.359 63.720 61.142
3 0.7 3 10 65.011 58.387 33.875 60.925 60.556
3 0.7 4 10 69.676 61.083 53.046 66.995 63.877
3 0.7 5 10 74.361 64.836 13.796 67.597 67.597
3 0.7 6 10 60.355 54.523 962.921 57.730 55.770
3 0.7 7 10 65.524 55.462 17.437 63.466 56.390
3 0.7 8 10 71.068 62.875 28.062 65.620 63.638
3 0.7 9 10 71.254 63.891 9.687 71.254 64.580
3 0.7 10 10 72.79 63.49 8.14 66.458 65.327
4 0.7 1 10 55.152 50.817 25.265 55.483 50.817
4 0.7 2 10 57.664 51.416 16.796 56.186 52.439
4 0.7 3 10 56.595 53.451 9.14 54.396 53.892
4 0.7 4 10 56.871 50.53 9.5 54.308 52.852
4 0.7 5 10 57.259 51.836 10.218 56.418 52.734
4 0.7 6 10 46.061 41.244 40.921 43.754 42.876
4 0.7 7 10 48.958 43.625 16.265 46.461 45.556
4 0.7 8 10 55.799 45.81 4.656 54.172 47.832
4 0.7 9 10 53.634 49.369 42.078 53.354 53.040
4 0.7 10 10 52.123 45.197 48.516 47.652 46.913
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Table C10: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 10 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.7 1 10 62.114 54.245 9.203 57.562 56.734
5 0.7 2 10 58.683 51.133 54.375 53.843 53.423
5 0.7 3 10 60.259 52.817 30.813 56.117 55.298
5 0.7 4 10 62.424 55.985 16.328 57.991 56.976
5 0.7 5 10 56.675 50.168 6.625 53.044 52.586
5 0.7 6 10 56.741 49.628 10.406 52.501 51.964
5 0.7 7 10 58.122 53.252 114.89 57.627 55.564
5 0.7 8 10 59.811 49.605 18.437 58.638 51.329
5 0.7 9 10 60.53 54.44 21.515 56.262 56.089
5 0.7 10 10 61.904 53.975 9.546 59.714 56.260
6 0.7 1 10 68.475 64.117 76.593 68.475 65.749
6 0.7 2 10 69.602 63.037 139.297 65.772 65.231
6 0.7 3 10 74.921 65.575 26.031 72.727 67.434
6 0.7 4 10 65.447 59.318 915.515 64.733 62.054
6 0.7 5 10 70.911 62.327 14.656 66.422 64.621
6 0.7 6 10 73.384 67.963 54.75 71.505 68.630
6 0.7 7 10 68.417 57.652 104.406 61.791 61.200
6 0.7 8 10 69.123 56.251 66.203 59.925 58.940
6 0.7 9 10 70.243 63.309 34.343 68.002 66.065
6 0.7 10 10 66.626 59.4 152.234 63.254 61.365
7 0.7 1 10 73.89 62.229 6.328 70.816 66.508
7 0.7 2 10 67.824 59.882 43.984 64.113 61.398
7 0.7 3 10 73.196 64.843 104.734 69.360 68.045
7 0.7 4 10 66.63 57.667 33.921 61.092 61.092
7 0.7 5 10 63.936 59.927 59.328 61.572 61.572
7 0.7 6 10 55.415 50.094 123.468 53.126 52.165
7 0.7 7 10 58.657 51.369 293.921 54.522 53.830
7 0.7 8 10 70.695 61.754 39.562 63.701 62.150
7 0.7 9 10 71.301 62.785 284.015 69.139 65.064
7 0.7 10 10 63.051 55.567 149.297 58.585 56.922
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Table C11: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 10 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.8 1 10 62.76 57.673 0.61 59.549 59.549
1 0.8 2 10 64.362 62.52 1.546 63.559 62.822
1 0.8 3 10 59.722 56.977 3.609 58.897 57.565
1 0.8 4 10 61.026 57.056 1.89 58.529 58.529
1 0.8 5 10 61.435 57.468 0.625 58.697 58.697
1 0.8 6 10 61.608 59.349 3.047 61.026 59.822
1 0.8 7 10 58.438 56.379 1.718 57.853 57.582
1 0.8 8 10 66.506 63.774 2.375 66.303 63.774
1 0.8 9 10 64.856 59.619 1.89 62.522 62.522
1 0.8 10 10 70.005 67.111 1.234 70.005 69.032
2 0.8 1 10 61.73 55.308 5.89 58.083 56.643
2 0.8 2 10 60.39 53.154 3.468 56.584 55.541
2 0.8 3 10 62.037 56.984 2.625 59.214 58.682
2 0.8 4 10 62.045 58.718 15.094 59.538 58.794
2 0.8 5 10 66.705 58.016 1.125 60.512 60.036
2 0.8 6 10 50.086 47.074 318.375 50.086 48.126
2 0.8 7 10 56.369 50.415 8.468 53.376 52.312
2 0.8 8 10 55.768 51.859 8.25 52.457 52.457
2 0.8 9 10 60.293 55.806 25.937 58.220 58.002
2 0.8 10 10 59.068 53.469 2.828 56.126 55.701
3 0.8 1 10 63.551 58.756 163.125 60.909 60.868
3 0.8 2 10 65.87 58.737 13.906 61.142 61.142
3 0.8 3 10 64.503 58.387 8 60.925 60.556
3 0.8 4 10 65.491 61.2 214.015 64.151 63.877
3 0.8 5 10 71.101 65.839 11.016 67.597 67.597
3 0.8 6 10 58.205 54.523 314.796 57.730 55.770
3 0.8 7 10 60.225 53.676 59.296 56.945 56.390
3 0.8 8 10 67.635 61.117 37.968 63.638 63.638
3 0.8 9 10 68.13 62.875 16.938 65.514 64.580
3 0.8 10 10 69.224 63.625 22.953 66.458 65.327
4 0.8 1 10 53.199 48.568 21.109 50.817 50.817
4 0.8 2 10 54.66 49.839 23.421 52.942 52.439
4 0.8 3 10 56.343 53.451 2.796 53.901 53.892
4 0.8 4 10 54.308 51.785 11.39 54.308 52.852
4 0.8 5 10 56.418 51.535 6.25 54.190 52.734
4 0.8 6 10 45.415 42.519 17.843 43.754 42.876
4 0.8 7 10 47.115 45.213 15.109 45.870 45.556
4 0.8 8 10 52.323 46.087 4.812 49.627 47.832
4 0.8 9 10 53.264 48.828 30.078 53.354 53.040
4 0.8 10 10 49.917 46.445 44.656 47.652 46.913
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Table C12: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 10 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.8 1 10 58.953 53.898 15.671 57.562 56.734
5 0.8 2 10 54.781 51.874 90.375 53.843 53.423
5 0.8 3 10 58.32 52.842 16.546 56.117 55.298
5 0.8 4 10 58.799 54.704 56.812 56.976 56.976
5 0.8 5 10 56.675 50.168 3.375 53.044 52.586
5 0.8 6 10 54.335 49.864 14.25 52.501 51.964
5 0.8 7 10 55.766 52.856 303.093 56.178 55.564
5 0.8 8 10 55.195 49.906 48.265 54.093 51.329
5 0.8 9 10 59.237 54.44 27.187 56.262 56.089
5 0.8 10 10 59.421 54.881 13.531 57.533 56.260
6 0.8 1 10 67.826 65.749 31.312 67.062 65.749
6 0.8 2 10 67.832 62.104 79.937 65.772 65.231
6 0.8 3 10 70.988 66.877 30.469 72.727 67.434
6 0.8 4 10 63.61 59.369 1183.125 62.054 62.054
6 0.8 5 10 67.996 63.468 13.203 66.422 64.621
6 0.8 6 10 71.869 67.575 30.765 71.505 68.630
6 0.8 7 10 64.17 58.845 251.406 61.200 61.200
6 0.8 8 10 64.571 56.654 70.484 59.925 58.940
6 0.8 9 10 67.997 62.852 20.921 67.195 66.065
6 0.8 10 10 64.954 59.737 121.985 63.254 61.365
7 0.8 1 10 67.803 62.801 58.75 66.508 66.508
7 0.8 2 10 64.889 58.663 44.188 64.113 61.398
7 0.8 3 10 71.35 66.333 55.531 69.360 68.045
7 0.8 4 10 62.527 57.638 193.531 61.092 61.092
7 0.8 5 10 63.431 60.393 27.5 61.572 61.572
7 0.8 6 10 53.789 49.965 87.156 53.126 52.165
7 0.8 7 10 57.118 51.705 83.234 54.522 53.830
7 0.8 8 10 66.598 61.724 53.015 63.701 62.150
7 0.8 9 10 68.415 62.785 147.171 65.441 65.064
7 0.8 10 10 60.084 55.645 152.968 57.556 56.922
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Table C13: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 15 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.6 1 15 70.994 63.363 10.921 68.503 66.376
1 0.6 2 15 75.133 67.4 8.296 68.981 68.675
1 0.6 3 15 72.097 63.831 9.812 67.605 66.521
1 0.6 4 15 71.662 61.809 2.515 65.043 65.043
1 0.6 5 15 74.565 63.537 0.859 71.154 64.585
1 0.6 6 15 73.718 62.801 0.687 65.095 64.048
1 0.6 7 15 69.563 63.057 1.312 66.770 64.048
1 0.6 8 15 81.459 67.832 0.953 76.907 70.034
1 0.6 9 15 74.244 67.694 4.906 70.157 69.297
1 0.6 10 15 78.609 71.218 12.328 76.447 74.733
2 0.6 1 15 71.096 61.308 160.437 65.313 64.019
2 0.6 2 15 69.391 58.177 92.375 66.474 61.183
2 0.6 3 15 71.526 62.624 30 67.768 65.697
2 0.6 4 15 75.132 62.125 49.562 67.096 64.898
2 0.6 5 15 75.408 62.277 84.609 67.304 66.130
2 0.6 6 15 62.95 51.198 40.437 57.501 53.637
2 0.6 7 15 66.932 55.484 108.218 60.585 57.894
2 0.6 8 15 67.456 55.414 146.734 59.608 57.876
2 0.6 9 15 71.81 60.103 35.828 65.906 61.900
2 0.6 10 15 69.466 57.53 22.625 63.078 60.184
3 0.6 1 15 78.476 64.412 435.546 69.489 67.045
3 0.6 2 15 75.63 64.779 431.781 72.028 67.370
3 0.6 3 15 80.071 65.088 109.453 69.817 67.910
3 0.6 4 15 79.723 67.805 673.437 74.612 70.689
3 0.6 5 15 83.373 69.441 65.109 75.635 72.883
3 0.6 6 15 68.757 57.461 3600.031 61.656 60.367
3 0.6 7 15 73.374 60.406 251.062 67.015 62.376
3 0.6 8 15 80.689 66.932 322.985 71.846 71.846
3 0.6 9 15 79.461 67.725 100.985 75.506 70.113
3 0.6 10 15 80.289 68.438 166.781 71.408 70.721
4 0.6 1 15 65.621 54.228 165.719 58.306 55.532
4 0.6 2 15 70.1 54.897 73.719 58.756 57.695
4 0.6 3 15 68.199 56.315 49.391 69.122 60.841
4 0.6 4 15 64.121 55.807 292.235 59.590 58.072
4 0.6 5 15 65.831 53.275 50.141 59.076 56.454
4 0.6 6 15 56.247 44.786 29.813 48.031 47.329
4 0.6 7 15 60.032 49.749 31.422 55.162 51.721
4 0.6 8 15 67.122 50.533 14.125 53.416 53.161
4 0.6 9 15 63.008 53.732 252.969 57.350 56.396
4 0.6 10 15 57.728 49.147 445.766 55.598 51.618
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Table C14: Results of the runs for Q = 0.6, B = 15 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.6 1 15 71.013 59.246 353.625 65.743 60.815
5 0.6 2 15 70.832 56.3 145.61 59.817 58.854
5 0.6 3 15 71.133 57.433 504.031 61.241 60.422
5 0.6 4 15 69.405 58.933 1156.766 63.424 62.236
5 0.6 5 15 66.84 54.504 27.344 60.452 56.690
5 0.6 6 15 64.67 52.7 116.296 56.903 55.032
5 0.6 7 15 65.943 57.586 1349.235 66.342 61.662
5 0.6 8 15 67.721 53.222 607.328 63.446 55.947
5 0.6 9 15 71.956 58.933 35.61 63.897 61.198
5 0.6 10 15 68.819 58.463 368.828 66.126 61.378
6 0.6 1 15 80.66 68.424 563.672 74.020 71.294
6 0.6 2 15 80.561 67.872 439.406 72.605 70.882
6 0.6 3 15 85.476 71.778 347.016 77.805 74.749
6 0.6 4 15 73.862 64.792 3600.031 69.440 68.279
6 0.6 5 15 80.802 67.942 275.328 73.933 70.213
6 0.6 6 15 82.402 70.098 61.828 74.898 74.232
6 0.6 7 15 76.635 65.284 3600.031 69.884 67.659
6 0.6 8 15 78.206 60.948 3600.031 65.244 64.033
6 0.6 9 15 81.124 66.793 277.609 71.728 70.248
6 0.6 10 15 78.402 64.605 331.766 70.292 67.341
7 0.6 1 15 83.187 67.329 121.812 77.697 70.726
7 0.6 2 15 76.547 64.054 1127.782 68.093 66.768
7 0.6 3 15 83.071 70.52 1755.203 74.219 74.123
7 0.6 4 15 74.726 64.513 762.75 70.608 67.500
7 0.6 5 15 75.076 64.939 972.172 68.292 67.468
7 0.6 6 15 66.594 55.874 33.937 60.132 58.294
7 0.6 7 15 68.17 55.438 3600.031 61.242 57.853
7 0.6 8 15 79.57 65.777 639.141 70.695 68.508
7 0.6 9 15 82.669 69.084 2475.141 73.839 72.426
7 0.6 10 15 71.388 58.496 3600.031 61.517 61.517
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Table C15: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 15 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.7 1 15 68.022 63.123 20.313 66.454 66.376
1 0.7 2 15 71.89 67.766 19.5 68.981 68.675
1 0.7 3 15 69.409 63.83 12.438 67.605 66.521
1 0.7 4 15 69.7 62.464 3.61 65.043 65.043
1 0.7 5 15 71.544 62.653 0.547 71.154 64.585
1 0.7 6 15 71.15 62.821 1.813 64.048 64.048
1 0.7 7 15 66.77 64.048 2.985 66.770 64.048
1 0.7 8 15 80.152 67.832 0.641 76.907 70.034
1 0.7 9 15 72.396 66.915 10.797 70.157 69.297
1 0.7 10 15 77.28 71.629 8.296 76.447 74.733
2 0.7 1 15 71.096 61.308 21.641 65.313 64.019
2 0.7 2 15 67.134 58.72 97.718 62.992 61.183
2 0.7 3 15 71.526 62.624 15.75 67.768 65.697
2 0.7 4 15 72.227 62.125 92.672 67.096 64.898
2 0.7 5 15 74.272 62.277 45.062 67.304 66.130
2 0.7 6 15 59.673 51.537 607.969 57.501 53.637
2 0.7 7 15 65.189 55.263 47.188 60.585 57.894
2 0.7 8 15 62.992 56.375 325.39 57.876 57.876
2 0.7 9 15 68.58 59.682 44.078 65.906 61.900
2 0.7 10 15 67.322 58.076 4.141 60.926 60.184
3 0.7 1 15 73.927 63.756 1032.469 69.489 67.045
3 0.7 2 15 73.32 64.47 290.719 68.546 67.370
3 0.7 3 15 73.534 64.598 673.531 69.817 67.910
3 0.7 4 15 76.923 67.758 729.516 74.612 70.689
3 0.7 5 15 80.778 70.1 75.063 75.635 72.883
3 0.7 6 15 66.722 57.461 3600.032 77.123 73.152
3 0.7 7 15 70.675 59.61 382.031 64.025 62.376
3 0.7 8 15 78.638 68.613 162.11 71.846 71.846
3 0.7 9 15 77.678 68.631 31.86 70.113 70.113
3 0.7 10 15 79.733 67.319 52.312 71.408 70.721
4 0.7 1 15 61.304 53.594 185.36 55.532 55.532
4 0.7 2 15 64.802 55.794 114.422 58.756 57.695
4 0.7 3 15 63.636 56.523 125.469 61.607 60.841
4 0.7 4 15 61.74 55.182 281.5 58.072 58.072
4 0.7 5 15 63.647 53.264 87.344 59.076 56.454
4 0.7 6 15 53.679 44.786 18.125 48.031 47.329
4 0.7 7 15 58.565 49.749 23.578 52.161 51.721
4 0.7 8 15 61.48 50.533 44.813 53.416 53.161
4 0.7 9 15 60.415 55.303 496.391 56.575 56.396
4 0.7 10 15 56.381 49.714 358.063 52.538 51.618
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Table C16: Results of the runs for Q = 0.7, B = 15 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.7 1 15 67.22 59.409 250.375 65.743 60.815
5 0.7 2 15 65.395 56.402 593.25 58.902 58.854
5 0.7 3 15 67.366 57.677 343.125 61.241 60.422
5 0.7 4 15 68.86 60.335 169.75 63.424 62.236
5 0.7 5 15 64.083 54.454 68.578 57.318 56.690
5 0.7 6 15 61.895 52.576 40.672 55.569 55.032
5 0.7 7 15 65.398 58.42 278.781 66.342 61.662
5 0.7 8 15 64.975 53.925 217.922 63.446 55.947
5 0.7 9 15 66.412 60.429 633.219 63.897 61.198
5 0.7 10 15 65.897 58.486 1073.969 62.348 61.378
6 0.7 1 15 78.053 68.424 186.265 74.020 71.294
6 0.7 2 15 76.033 67.858 2207.172 71.002 70.882
6 0.7 3 15 84.34 72.336 113.656 77.805 74.749
6 0.7 4 15 73.348 65.871 636.61 69.440 68.279
6 0.7 5 15 76.92 67.717 556.61 73.933 70.213
6 0.7 6 15 80.166 70.098 158.61 74.898 74.232
6 0.7 7 15 73.992 65.454 3600.062 69.884 67.659
6 0.7 8 15 74.853 62.306 2531.906 65.244 64.033
6 0.7 9 15 75.478 67.859 1296.687 71.728 70.248
6 0.7 10 15 73.361 65.707 3600.031 70.292 67.341
7 0.7 1 15 78.208 67.336 1707.656 74.623 70.726
7 0.7 2 15 73.047 63.468 1187.453 68.093 66.768
7 0.7 3 15 79.876 70.419 1630.547 74.219 74.123
7 0.7 4 15 74.726 65.411 105.235 68.029 67.500
7 0.7 5 15 70.403 64.529 1553.86 68.292 67.468
7 0.7 6 15 63.051 55.38 104.688 60.132 58.294
7 0.7 7 15 65.411 55.131 1455.444 58.545 57.853
7 0.7 8 15 76.379 66.817 298.582 70.695 68.508
7 0.7 9 15 78.465 69.313 1037.275 71.985 68.235
7 0.7 10 15 69.231 59.652 906.39 61.517 61.517
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Table C17: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 15 for networks 1,2,3,4
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
1 0.8 1 15 68.022 63.826 4.75 66.454 66.376
1 0.8 2 15 69.708 68.532 39.735 68.981 68.675
1 0.8 3 15 67.605 66.283 12.188 67.605 66.521
1 0.8 4 15 66.918 62.191 9.219 65.043 65.043
1 0.8 5 15 67.067 64.585 0.75 67.067 64.585
1 0.8 6 15 68.818 62.821 2.281 64.048 64.048
1 0.8 7 15 66.543 63.905 1.531 65.520 64.048
1 0.8 8 15 77.11 67.832 1.672 71.251 70.034
1 0.8 9 15 71.126 66.915 8.25 70.157 69.297
1 0.8 10 15 77.175 72.792 2.61 76.447 74.733
2 0.8 1 15 67.652 61.308 122.235 65.313 64.019
2 0.8 2 15 66.474 58.72 8.375 62.992 61.183
2 0.8 3 15 71.071 62.624 7.406 67.768 65.697
2 0.8 4 15 68.798 63.729 441.781 67.096 64.898
2 0.8 5 15 72.125 62.277 9.578 66.146 66.130
2 0.8 6 15 56.227 51.537 1037.5 55.850 53.637
2 0.8 7 15 62.073 56.07 71.031 60.585 57.894
2 0.8 8 15 61.738 56.323 91.828 57.876 57.876
2 0.8 9 15 66.152 60.611 53.391 65.906 61.900
2 0.8 10 15 64.666 57.457 5.36 60.926 60.184
3 0.8 1 15 71.217 64.412 944.344 68.025 67.045
3 0.8 2 15 71.386 64.47 166.985 68.546 67.370
3 0.8 3 15 70.584 65.088 1158.125 69.817 67.910
3 0.8 4 15 75.218 67.164 267.485 72.119 70.689
3 0.8 5 15 77.782 70.1 65.031 73.946 72.883
3 0.8 6 15 63.051 57.417 3600.063 64.025 62.376
3 0.8 7 15 66.524 60.197 1189.406 68.237 65.859
3 0.8 8 15 75.479 68.394 124.078 71.846 71.846
3 0.8 9 15 73.676 68.976 123.703 70.113 70.113
3 0.8 10 15 76.279 67.667 52.906 71.408 70.721
4 0.8 1 15 58.658 53.661 246.266 55.532 55.532
4 0.8 2 15 62.357 55.935 24.641 58.756 57.695
4 0.8 3 15 62.823 57.735 19.61 61.112 60.841
4 0.8 4 15 61.07 56.832 65.485 58.072 58.072
4 0.8 5 15 61.34 54.445 173.922 59.076 56.454
4 0.8 6 15 50.06 46.866 196.656 48.031 47.329
4 0.8 7 15 54.518 51.721 85.485 52.161 51.721
4 0.8 8 15 58.038 51.083 44.406 53.416 53.161
4 0.8 9 15 58.415 54.134 420.375 56.575 56.396
4 0.8 10 15 55.598 51.187 65.86 52.538 51.618
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Table C18: Results of the runs for Q = 0.8, B = 15 for networks 5,6,7
Network Q Instance B z∗2 z∗3 T z∗1 z∗4
5 0.8 1 15 65.343 59.83 147.594 62.328 60.815
5 0.8 2 15 61.722 56.714 423.156 58.902 58.854
5 0.8 3 15 64.079 58.081 372.625 61.241 60.422
5 0.8 4 15 65.449 59.643 440.735 62.315 62.236
5 0.8 5 15 61.147 54.454 140.594 57.318 56.690
5 0.8 6 15 59.327 52.576 96.594 55.569 55.032
5 0.8 7 15 62.349 57.586 1428.25 62.330 61.662
5 0.8 8 15 61.995 54.394 112.594 58.901 55.947
5 0.8 9 15 63.897 59.836 565.813 62.751 61.198
5 0.8 10 15 64.013 59.194 609.516 62.348 61.378
6 0.8 1 15 74.295 69.293 1291.328 72.607 71.294
6 0.8 2 15 73.989 67.858 380.765 71.002 70.882
6 0.8 3 15 77.08 71.116 846.593 77.805 74.749
6 0.8 4 15 70.138 65.871 3460.375 69.440 68.279
6 0.8 5 15 75.567 68.128 224.812 72.584 70.213
6 0.8 6 15 77.838 70.098 185.063 75.426 74.232
6 0.8 7 15 70.222 64.277 3600.031 69.884 67.659
6 0.8 8 15 69.886 61.394 2779.953 65.244 64.033
6 0.8 9 15 74.237 68.352 180.656 70.921 70.248
6 0.8 10 15 72.313 65.111 402.141 70.292 67.341
7 0.8 1 15 74.24 67.336 1822.393 71.432 70.726
7 0.8 2 15 70.784 63.257 648.738 68.093 66.768
7 0.8 3 15 78.083 70.426 676.329 74.219 74.123
7 0.8 4 15 69.032 64.795 2163.188 68.029 67.500
7 0.8 5 15 69.09 66.945 711.625 67.631 67.468
7 0.8 6 15 59.888 57.738 220.531 58.309 58.294
7 0.8 7 15 61.751 56.252 3600.031 58.545 57.853
7 0.8 8 15 73.592 65.321 68.109 70.695 68.508
7 0.8 9 15 73.973 69.38 2416.61 65.985 62.588
7 0.8 10 15 65.548 60.086 3330.485 61.517 61.517
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